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**From Mahmud Ghazni  
to the  
Disintegration of  
Mughal Empire**

**SIDNEY OWEN**

**1987**

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## Preface

The present volume is a complete study of a historical background of India from Mahmud Ghazni to the fall of the Moghul Empire which has been prepared after collecting material from many important books and journals on Medieval Indian History published within last four decades. Some original authorities have been utilized in the present work which are beyond the approach of specialists of Indian History. It will also be solution to all the important questions of the students of Indian History.

The present book seems to be a historical revision as the material has been compiled from all the books, journals and periodicals published in India and other countries.

Some important chapters have been first time introduced here. "Gujarat in the Reign of Akbar" is one of them. In the serial chapter an analytical background of Gujarat during the reign of Akbar has been vividly given and it has been produced to the Indian people first time which is now here in other books and authorities on Indian History.

Much credit goes to all the authors and friends whose authorities and books gave me help producing the present work to the students and readers of Indian History. I am also thankful to the publishers who accepted my manuscript for publication.

Sidney Owen

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## INDIA ABOUT 1000 A. D.

Harsha was the last great ruler of Northern India. His kingdom extended from the Satluj to the Gangetic delta in the east and to Gujrat and Kuchh in the West. In the Deccan, his contemporary, Pulakesen the second, had occupied the same place. His authority covered almost as extensive an area in the south as that of Harsha's kingdom in the north. The death of these two rulers seems to close the era of great rulers. As it was, even under them, actual authority in various parts of India was wielded by some eighty rulers many of whom acknowledged either Harsha or Pulakesen as their overlord.

The centuries that followed saw an increase in the number of these petty states. Another change seems to have taken place about the same time. A series of dynasties now come into prominence who describe themselves as Rajput. Though the traditional genealogies of these ruling houses run back to the creation, the names by which they come to be known at this time cannot be traced even in classical literature. Chauhans, Kacchawahas, Rathors and Guhilots are names which, though they may claim to be derived from earlier designations, are quite new in their modern form.

The origin of these and other Rajput clans has long divided historians. All these dynasties claim to be descendants of the Kshatriyas of old. In some cases the claim may be valid. It is inconceivable that Kshatriyas entirely disappeared from the Indian scene at once or even gradually. During the course of time many old houses may have disappeared. This involved changes in ruling dynasties and not the extinction of the warrior class. Some of the new ruling houses were undoubtedly non-

Kshatriyas. But there is no reason to believe that this led to the permanent depression of the old warrior class all over India to a different status. The Khatrijs in the Punjab and the neighbouring States may, however, represent a wholesale revolution whereby a large number of Kshatriyas of old became traders.

But the emergence of the collective name Rajput and the co-existence of Rajput and Khatrijs in some parts of India does suggest the rise of a new star in the Indian sky. The emphasis on being the descendants of rulers in the name Rajput may well indicate that the claim to the Kshatriya status of some, at least, of these sub-castes was based on their progenitors having exercised authority a little earlier somewhere or other in India. Some of the Rajput clans may thus represent the foreigners admitted into Hinduism, others may well be descendants of the non-Kshatriya rulers. This belief is strengthened by the fact that the *Gotras* which some of these Rajput clans bear are current among other castes as well. There is nothing to be surprised at in either of these phenomena. Hindu society was still fluid in these centuries. Foreigners were admitted into the Hindu fold and seem to have been assimilated into various castes. Within the framework of the caste system there was fluidity so that some crossing of the frontiers was always occurring. The myth of purity of blood on which the caste system is sometimes said to have been based had not yet been invented.

This origin of some of the Rajput castes is confirmed by the traditional account of the origins of the Rajputs. On the extinction of the Kshatriyas of old a great sacrifice is said to have been performed at Mount Abu. Out of the sacrificial fire arose the progenitors of four Rajput clans in order to re-establish the warrior caste in India. Central India, Rajputana and Gujrat soon became the homelands of the Rajputs.



About 1000 A. D. we have Guhilots ruling in Mewar, three branches of Chauhans in Jaipur, Nadol and Pratapgarh. Chandels are in occupation of Kalinjar, Kachhwahas of Bharatpur and Gwalior. Parwars are ruling at Ujjain, Solankis at Patan and the Tomars at Delhi. The Punjab, North Western frontier and a part of Afghanistan had been under the Hindu Shahis till about 995, though they were pushed back from there soon thereafter. Bengal and Bihar were under the Palas. In the south, Chalukyas and Parmars shared authority in the central plateau. Gangas, Chalukyas and Pandyas occupied the eastern ghats and the neighbouring areas, whereas Gangas, Kadambas and Sailharis were in occupation of the western ghats. At Multan and Sind Muslim rulers wielded authority. Some of their subjects may have been converted to Islam during the course of the centuries following the occupation of these areas by the Muslims. But the rulers of Multan were heretics to Muslims outside India.

All in all, some 100 states, big and small, may have been exercising authority in various parts of India at this time. Outside the 'home lands' of the occupying clans, the frontiers of many of these states were fluid. Frequent changes in the ruling dynasty were apt to make the emergence of loyalty to the rulers, as such, rather difficult for the large mass of their subjects. A strong state may sometime claim some sort of overriding authority over its weaker, smaller neighbours. The claims of this 'paramountcy' were never well defined nor usually pushed beyond tolerable limits. The smaller states therefore did not always display much resistance to the vague claims of their stronger neighbour. Their love of liberty thus seems to have been dulled sometimes.

The princes lived in forts—combined palaces, temples, and government offices. Some of the more promi-

ment of wielders of subordinate authority also had their own forts where they lived in quasi-royal splendour. The ruler very often exercised authority as much by virtue of being the head of the clan as by descent from the founder. The raj-purohit (the spiritual guide of the ruler as well as of the clan) exercised, if not authority, considerable influence. A 'council of ministers' as a corporate body having functions of its own does not seem to be functioning anywhere. But when matters concerning the state or the ruling house required consideration, a much larger assembly mainly consisting of the raj-purohit, ministers, princes and heads of the prominent families met under the ruler. It was occasionally reinforced by representatives of the trading and other classes.

The land 'belonged' to the cultivators. Under the rulers, there was in most places a class of 'superior proprietors'. Some of them represented the families that had been granted rights in these lands by the rulers. There were others, however, whose ancestors had exercised these rights long before the establishment of the existing ruling house in the area. These 'superior proprietors' had their rights in land fixed by custom. They were never entitled to anything as substantial as an economic rent. The cultivators of the land were bound to perform certain services for the 'superior proprietors', they paid him a quit rent usually in kind. The cultivators had their fields, they lived either near enough their holdings or, usually in a group of houses clustered together in a convenient spot. They enjoyed rights in the common land where they grazed their cattle and wherefrom they cut wood for their household needs.

Law was mostly custom. The village panchayats decided most of the cases and performed other administrative functions. They also organized fairs and festivals and looked after temples. Their income seems to have

consisted of the produce of the village common, the labour of the villagers and probably an occasional cess for a specified local purpose

The panchayats paid the 'revenue' due to the king, usually assessed at  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the produce or even less. Sales tax, octroi, market dues, licence fees of one type or another and other occasional payments probably formed the main public sources of royal income. The rulers had their own demesne lands wherefrom they could derive some income like other 'superior proprietors' of land.

Some of the public offices were hereditary. Their incumbents stored official papers in their own houses which very often served as their offices as well. Some administrative functions seem to have been discharged by occupational panchayats as well as regional panchayats of the sub-castes. Trading classes in the big cities were also similarly organized

Rajputs formed the potential military strength of each state. As elsewhere in the world, the rulers did not maintain large standing armies. Such troops as they permanently employed were used for guard duties, as garrison troops or for police purposes. But when a call to arms came either for offensive or defensive purposes, 'the adults in arms flocked to the king's standard under their own leaders. The status of these leaders made it possible for them to be both a prop to royal authority and a challenge thereto. They could easily control the strength of the contingent that would be available at a particular occasion. They do not seem to have often misused their status. Though the duty of fighting for their country was in theory confined to the Rajputs, there were always other contingents available to supplement them. The Bhils seem to have occupied a special position as the defenders of the country in some states. The Muslim accounts of various battles fought in the eleventh century

or later, do not suggest that the Indian rulers were ever worsted because they could not raise enough soldiers to fight the invaders. Armies were in India, as elsewhere, a haphazard collection of citizens in arms. There was no training, no regimentation, no sense of belonging to one organized group.

The four castes had now become static. Brahmans, Kshatriyas (Rajputs), Vaishyas and Shudras took their place in the caste system in this order. Not only were the castes ranged in a descending order, the sub-castes had further come to be similarly ranged. Some new communities had come to be formed which do not seem to have acquired a settled place among the four castes.

Usually Brahmans and Rajputs alone could be said to have a group consciousness higher than that of their immediate sub-castes. The rest were content to be known by their sub-caste designations. Alberuni says of the Brahmans that they never married any women except of their own class. 'They neither paid taxes nor did they perform any other service to the king.'

In villages or towns, the various castes—or sub-castes—lived in quarters traditionally assigned to each. The outcastes and untouchables lived beyond the city walls or outside the living quarters in the villages. Alberuni, the Arab scholar who was in India early in the eleventh century, notices fullers, shoemakers, jugglers, basket-weavers, shield-makers, sailors, fishermen, hunters of wild animals and weavers among the outcastes and untouchables. Below them lay the chandals, the domas, badis and bhadans, all occupying the lowest place in society on account of their unclean living.

The vast bulk of the population lived in villages. They were mostly self-contained, producing most of the food they needed, meeting most of their needs by the labour of their artisans. Villagers went to the nearest

market town once a week on the market day and traded their surplus wares for supplies which they could not secure locally. Means of communication were primitive. There is some evidence to believe that parts of the grand trunk road were in existence as the result of the local enterprise, but it is doubtful if uninterrupted travel was possible on a large scale. The holy cities—Banaras, Haridwar, Nasik, Allahabad, Conjivaram among others—demanded heavy traffic occasionally. This must have secured some fairly workable system of roads over which pilgrims could travel comfortably in fair weather. The division of the country into many states further aggravated the lack of easy means of communication. Most of the roads were fair weather roads.

Purdah was unknown. 'Women appeared at social gatherings and amusements accompanied by their men folk'. Alberuni would have us believe that most of the festivals were primarily intended for women and children.

The life of the people seems to have been a round of fasts and festivities. Itsing in the ninth century had noticed a complete *pharmaecopœia* consisting of fasts only. For every known ailment a fast of appropriate nature and of appropriate length was prescribed. But besides the medicinal, purificatory, expiatory or commemorative fasts, there were fasts 'at large' coming on a particular day of the week or the fortnight. Belief in omens, augurs and astrology bound the high and the low in fetters which could not be easily broken. Travel was governed by omens and augurs. All activity was controlled by the notion of an auspicious day for beginning it. Astrology could sometime wreck human lives as well as play havoc with national fortunes. Alberuni places it 'first among the false sciences which preyed upon the multitude'.

Popular Hinduism seems to have been Vishnava over the larger part of the country. Shaivism, Shaktism and

other cults had also their devotees Alberuni who was in the Punjab in the eleventh century tells us that educated 'Hindus believe that God is one, eternal, without beginning and end, all mighty and all wise' 'But the ideas of God among the common people present a great variety. Some of them are simply abominable. They speak of the wife, the son and daughter of God'. Idol worship though common was 'for the uneducated, common low class people of little understanding'. The temples at Somnath, Multan, Thanesar and Kashmir were famous and drew a very large number of pilgrims and devotees from far off places. At some of these or other temples 'barlotry seems to have been permitted by the kings who make them an attraction for their cities, a bait of pleasure for their subjects for no other than financial reasons' 'But for this no Brahman or priest would suffer in their temples, women who sing, dance and play'.

Virtuous behaviour demands that a man shall not kill, lie, whore, steal, nor hoard up treasure. A man must practice holiness and purity perpetually, perform the prescribed fastings, dress poorly, hold fast to the adoration of God and have the word Om always in mind. 'Hindus', Alberuni concedes, 'never stake their soul or body or property on religious controversy. At the utmost they fight with words. They have a bad habit of praising one god to the sky and then hinting that there is some One greater behind him'.

Sanskrit was the language of scholarship all over India and for all communities. Buddhists, Jains and Brahmans were equally at home in it. Banaras, Nadia, Nasik, Dhar, Vikramsila, Ajmer, Nawadip and Svarnagiri, were among the great centres of Sanskrit learning. But 'even the Brahmans recite the Vedas without understanding them'. Other more popular texts had gained currency, the *Puranas* and the epics among them. The

common people spoke their own language, most of them local variants of Sanskrit each peculiar to its own area. Hindi, Prakrit, Apabhransh, Sauraseni, Magadhi, Maharashtra, Avantiki and Paishachi had developed into literary vehicles in their own areas. In the south Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam had come into their own. A gulf seemed to yawn between the common people and their scholarly leaders.

Indians were proud of their country and of themselves but unfortunately no longer curious and therefore no longer willing to learn from others. This made it impossible for them to improve their strategy and tactics when these proved unequal to the task of keeping out the new horde from across the Hindukoh.

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## II

### THE FIRST MUSLIM CONTACTS WITH INDIA

About the time Harsba was ruling in India, an upheaval took place in neighbouring Arabia which was to have far reaching effects on the history of the world. Muhammad born in 571 A.D. in the Quraish tribe of Mecca, claimed prophethood in his own right in 611 A.D. and set about his reforming task with a zeal not often paralleled in the history of the world. In place of the contemporary worship of images and many deities, he offered salvation through the worship of one God and belief in his prophet Muhammad. He cut down the sexual promiscuity of his times by permitting only four legally wedded wives at a time. He promised equality and brotherhood to all who joined the charmed circle of Islam—the faith. He based his claim to prophethood on the polished 'divine' messages in which he laid down the law for all and sundry. He preached uncomplaining submission to God's will so that a man could ride untroubled all sorts of weathers, fair and foul, and count it fortunate that he died fighting for his faith. Mecca at first refused to take an humble son of its own seriously and exasperated by his vehement claims drove him out. Muhammad turned to Medina and from there ultimately succeeded in winning over his townsmen of Mecca. He combined in his person prophethood and royalty and when he died in 632 A.D., Arabia lost a great leader.

Islam sought for no successor to Prophet Muhammad, prophethood would be worth nothing if it could be easily transmitted to others. The religious edifice of Islam was complete in the *Quran*, where any lacuna was discovered, in civil or criminal law, memories of how the prophet



had acted under similar circumstances helped in laying down the law. It is well to remember that though the religious beliefs of the Muslims are based on the *Quran*, their daily life has been governed more by the *Shariat*—the memory of what the prophet had considered lawful or otherwise—transmitted sometimes by his contemporaries but often by others who professed to derive their knowledge from contemporaries or their correspondents. It was but natural that soon conflicting statements of what was or was not lawful should appear and ultimately divide the Muslims into the traditional seventy two 'sects'. As the entire religion thus came to turn round the prophet, Islam set up no ordained priests and established no organized church, fallible or otherwise.

Though there was no apostolic succession, the burden of the newly founded Muslim state had to be carried on after the prophet's death. Later on, two main schools came to be founded on the question of succession; the Shias claimed that Ali, an adopted son of Muhammad, should have been recognized as his legitimate successor, the Sunnis asserted that the election of the first three temporal deputies—Khalifa—of the Prophet was lawful. Though ultimately both Shia and Sunni ruling dynasties came to be founded in various parts of the world, enough of the original doctrine of 'election' remained intact to confound the princes. Immediately after the prophet's death, the seniormost of his 'companions' was 'elected' his temporal deputy and leader, Imam, of the Muslims. Three more of these companions followed suit. When Ali succeeded to Khalifat, his right thereto was disputed. The end of the civil war that followed found Islam divided among Shias and Sunnis.

The main development under the early *Khalifas* was the establishment of Muslim authority first over the whole of the Arabian peninsula, then in the neighbouring

countries. For some time the doctrine of one single ruler for all the Muslim territories was tenaciously held and actually practised; but it soon degenerated into the sort of polity which we later saw in the Maratha empire—claiming as its head a Peshwa—the office curiously implying the deputyship of the Raja—who allowed his generals to make conquests far and wide in his name. Persia, the Middle East, Egypt, northern Africa and finally Spain soon accepted Muslim authority.

A curious—to modern eyes—result of these conquests was the coextensiveness of the Muslim conquests and Muslim faith. Sooner or later, everywhere, except in Spain, there was almost a wholesale conversion of the inhabitants of these countries following upon their conquest. At first 'non-believers' could not be entirely eliminated everywhere, the Muslim governments needed an army of accountants and professional men to make them effective. If driven too hard, the non-believers could cross over to other non-Muslim countries—as the Parsis did and settled in India. But the Muslim governments everywhere expected the ultimate conversion to the faith of their non-believing subjects.

Against the sharp and swift Muslim conquests elsewhere, the Indian career of Muslim arms was an extremely slow business. In 712 A. D., a part of Sind was conquered by the Arabs. It remained under Muslim domination for some time but failed to act as a spearhead of India's conversion to Islam. The next Indian clash with Muslim arms occurred three centuries thereafter in 875, when Javapal, ruler of Kabul, North Western Frontier and Punjab sought conclusions with his Muslim neighbour, Subuktgin. Jayapal was driven back, but it took Subuktgin's son and successor years of hard campaigning to establish his power in the plains of the Punjab and Multan. The Ghaznavid province of Lahore got embroiled in the

quarrels between the Ghoris and the Ghanzavids in Kabul till Lahore was ultimately conquered and occupied by Muhammad Ghorī in 1186. Prithviraj of Delhi and Ajmer got uneasy at the establishment of a new strong power in his neighbourhood and moved his armies northwards to challenge Muhammad Ghorī. Prithviraj vanquished Muhammad Ghorī at Taraori in 1192. The Ghorī army fled headlong from the battle field after its leader was all but killed in battle. Muhammad Ghorī returned next year at the head of a much bigger army; but so wary was he of the might of his Rajput foe that, when politely advised by Prithviraj to remember last year's defeat, he thought it necessary to pretend that he would not proceed any further till he heard from his brother in Ghor whose agent he was. Prithviraj believed him, Muhammad Ghorī moved his armies under the cover of night. The initial advantage which this surprise attack gave the Ghoris soon wore out. Muhammad Ghorī now played his trump card. Twelve thousand of his soldiers who had been kept in reserve now joined the fray. The battle raged long and furiously till Prithviraj was killed. It was now the turn of the Delhi army to flee. Panipat gave Muhammad Ghorī the right to consolidate his power in the Punjab.

In the years that followed fortune now favoured the home forces now the invaders. The thirteenth century saw the invaders advance further on all sides till the whole of northern India excluding the major portion of Rajputana had been conquered. The fourteenth century saw the expansion of the kingdom of Delhi into the south. In the existing state of communications it was difficult to rule the whole of India, north and south of the Vindhya, from one centre. Muhammad Tughluq thought this could be remedied by moving the capital from Delhi in one corner to a central place like Daulatabad. But he only went

farther and fared worse. The contemporary method of administration broke down under the weight of the mighty empire and what the Khiljis had gained the Tughluqs lost. Temur's invasion in 1398 delivered a *coup de grace* to the tottering kingdom of Delhi. The rulers who followed still styled themselves the rulers of the world, Badshah-i-Alam, but, as a wag had it, they held sway only over the small area between Delhi and Palam, the present aerodrome for Delhi! The rest of the country was governed by the Rajput rulers of Rajputana and the Punjab, the Hindu princes of Vijayanagar and farther south and a large number of local Muslim dynasties dotted all over India. Thus during the Sultanate, the first kingdom of Delhi lasted for about a century and the empire of Delhi but another half a century. The second kingdom of Delhi which Bahlol Lodhi founded in 1451 was much smaller at first. Unlike the earlier kingdom of Delhi, it shared authority in northern India with Muslim dynasties except in Rajputana.

The Sultanate period which roughly covered the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is not a period of ever expanding Muslim authority in India, much less a continuous period of conquest. In 1206 as in 1526, the country was ruled by several local dynasties. But whereas in 1206 authority outside Delhi was usually wielded by the Hindus, it was now divided between the Hindu and Muslim dynasties. The Muslim conquest begun in 712 was not complete even in 1526. Several Hindu dynasties had only bowed low before the storm for a very short period and reverted thereafter to their independent status. What was still more significant, more than three centuries of Muslim rule at Delhi had not succeeded in converting a substantial section of the population of the country.

It is this that requires explanation when we are dealing with the contact of Islam with India. We see no easy, swift and complete conquest of the country as we find elsewhere in the world. India was not easily conquered by the virile races from the northwest. As a map would show none of the invaders came from the north west of the Punjab—the area they had to enter at first. Soldier to soldier, a Rajput, a Punjabi warrior or a Gujrati horseman, was a match against his opposite number in the armies of Islam. Muslim domination was not established in India because Hindu soldiers of a warmer climate were any the less hardy than their opponents. Hindu armies were not defeated either because all the classes in the country did not feel it their duty to fight for the defence of their country. For aught we know, Mahmud in 1008 had to fight in the Punjab against what looks like a mass resistance movement. The Hindu women who are said to have sold their ornaments to furnish the sinews of war do not seem to have been all Rajputs. But what is plainly obvious in the stories of the various battles, except probably in 1193 at Taraori, the Hindus armies were seldom outnumbered by the invaders. In the eleventh and the twelfth centuries war was not, in any part of the world, a matter of popular concern. Thus the caste system does not seem to have played any large part in weakening the resistance that could have been offered to the invaders. Nor could the existence of several States, big and small, by itself have provided a cause for the defeat of the home forces. It is arguable that the invaders might have found it difficult to establish themselves if the whole country had been under the sway of a single ruler. But the story of the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and the fourteenth century easily disproves the contention that a central government of Delhi

would have necessarily defended the country any the better.

It is again necessary to eliminate certain other causes which are usually offered as an explanation. Howsoever badly elephants may have behaved in particular battles, their value as an engine of destruction was never in doubt. The invaders soon set themselves the task of employing them as plentifully as had the Indian rulers. They were too good a weapon to be hastily discarded. As yet, there was no artillery to frighten them off the field and lead to slaughter among their owners. The weapons of defence and offence which were used by the invaders and the home forces were again almost the same, spears, swords and daggers were used by both the sides. Bows and arrows seem to have been used by the defenders alone. The defensive armour was only worn by men of high birth. In this probably the Indian side had the advantage. The Rajput warrior was high-caste and therefore easily entitled to all that nature and artifice could provide him with for fighting in safety. The descriptions of the contemporary defensive armour do not concede any superiority to the invaders.

The invaders had one advantage over the home forces. Their horses were much better adapted to warfare and were more useful as mounts, adding by their speed more to the weight of the attack by their riders. The decisive superiority of foreign horses resulted in their continuous import during all these centuries, if it had not started even earlier. The central Asian breed continued to remain much in demand on both sides of the Indian frontier.

Another factor that made for the success of the invaders was the inspiration which motivated the early Muslim soldiers. Like soldiers of Islam everywhere, they were fired by their iconoclastic and missionary zeal. India did not yield much fruit in conversions to Islam. But

rich plunder was as good a substitute, particularly when it could be combined with the destruction of shrines. The Hindu rulers of India had discovered that temple forts provided the best means of preserving their riches from greedy hands. Their sanctity would keep all rivals away. Naturally, these temple fortresses at Kangra, Somnath and elsewhere became sure magnets to draw the attacks of the invading forces as they richly rewarded them. The early Muslim practice of dividing all the spoils of war between the soldiers and keeping only one fifth of the booty for the commander, may probably have further encouraged the soldiers to follow leaders who could easily promise them fair rewards. The very difficulties and dangers of the early expeditions resulted in a natural selection which must have placed only the toughest of the soldiers on the early expeditions to India.

It should be further remembered that in India, as elsewhere, the invaders could choose their time of attack, not so the defenders. The invaders felt no compulsion to be always on the march; the defenders had to fight whenever they were attacked. In many battles fought, early and late, during the establishment and expansion of the Turkish and Pathan rule in India the offensive was taken by them only when they seem to have been previously assured of a smooth passage for their arms.

Another cause to which the 'easy' success of the invaders has been ascribed is the alleged disunion and even treachery among the rulers in India. There is some evidence of such acts occasionally, they do not however, figure as a major factor in these engagements. The classic example of a feud between Prithviraj and Jai Chand and the latter's invitation to Shihab-ud-Din Muhammad Ghorî stands discredited now. There may have been some bad blood between the rulers of Ajmer and Kanauj, but the

contemporary Muslim accounts do not bear out the story as told in the *Prithviraj Raso*. Shihab-ud-Din Ghorī left Ghazni without telling his soldiers where he was leading them. This would have been impossible had an emissary of Jai Chand been leading them to India. The interval between the first and the second battles of Taraori is not enough to have allowed all that is alleged to have taken place therein, Samyukta's search for a husband from among the assembled guests of her father, Prithviraj's marriage to her, Jai Chand's discomfiture and sending of an emissary to Ghazni to invite Shihab-ud-Din Ghorī to India. Nor does the subsequent invasion of Kanauj by Shihab-ud-Din bear out any previous amity between him and Jai Chand. Instead of disunity in the ranks of the Indian rulers, we find that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries they very often offered organized resistance to the invaders. Mahmud had to deal with a confederacy of Indian rulers when he attacked the Punjab in 1008. Muhammad Ghorī was similarly opposed in the battles of Taraori in 1191 and 1192, at Ajmer in 1197 and near Abu later on. It was a cheap generalization which tried to account for the defeat of Indian arms by the alleged treachery in Indian ranks.

It has sometimes been suggested that Indian rulers were slow to recognize the foreign danger and waited patiently to be attacked in their capital cities rather than venture forth boldly to meet the enemy on their frontiers. Critics forget that news of an invading army could not then be speedily received. By the time a ruler learnt that an invader had entered his dominions, he had little time to venture forth to his frontiers and fight the enemy. But Indian rulers did not always wait for their enemies to advance into their territory. Jai Pal attacked Subaktgin in his own dominions, Prithviraj met Shihab-ud-Din Ghorī at Taraori nearer to the frontiers of Ghazanvid kings



of the Punjab than to his own, Bhim of Gujrat challenged Aibak and Muhammad Ghorī at Ajmer and Abu

It should however be remembered that the way of an established ruler at Delhi or elsewhere was not as smooth as it is sometimes supposed to be. When during the Sultanate, Mongol tried invading India through Kanda-har, very often the rulers of Delhi met their armies in the interior rather than at their own frontiers. Even such a wide awake ruler as Ala-ud-Din Khilji had to meet them once at least, outside the walls of Delhi. It seems difficult for us today to realise how defective and difficult the means of communication were in the medieval times, in India or elsewhere.

A detailed study of the battles fought in the middle ages in India proves that neither the Indian rulers nor the Indian soldiers deemed themselves in any way inferior to the foreigners who invaded the country. Mahmud had to fight against the rulers of the Punjab four times in a decade before he could occupy the Punjab. Muhammad Ghorī's success at Taraori did not give him access to Delhi. Here again fierce battle raged for about ten years before the Ghoris could settle down in security at Delhi. At Ajmer again there was no tame submission to the enemy, repeated risings in the area went on for a decade here as well. The Indian rulers never considered themselves soundly beaten when fortunes of battle went against them. They were almost always eager to stake their fortune again and did not easily give in.

In the centuries we are dealing with, battles were trials of strength between the leaders of the opposing armies, in India as elsewhere. The disappearance or death of the leader would bring an engagement to an end. When Muhammad Ghorī was defeated, his army ran away and 'did not draw rein for forty miles'. When Prithviraj or Jai Chand was killed on the battlefield, his armies

acknowledged defeat Shihab-ud-din Ghorī's slave could bear his wounded master off the field, but no Ghorī commander could re-organize the army for trying fresh conclusions with the Rajputs

It is usually the difference in the leadership, and therefore the strategy and tactics employed on the battlefield, that plays the decisive part in these engagements. Mahmud Ghaznavi and Muhammad Ghorī were great military leaders, as successful in their campaigns outside India as in India. They displayed a method of warfare different very largely from the traditional methods of fighting prevalent among Indian rulers. This visualized an engagement as a duel between the soldiers of the two armies under well recognized rules of sport. The outsiders knew no rules, or, if they did, they were different. Sudden attacks, feints, shamming defeat and flight and keeping a considerable part of the army in reserve for use at critical moments took the Indian armies by surprise and vitiated their value as fighting machines. They were too slow to learn new tricks of trade. The Rajput chivalry usually disclaimed running away from the battle-field in order to fight another day. They took a battle as a ritual wherein *jauhar* played its due part, men flinging themselves on the enemy in order to meet certain death and women preferring death to the horrors of anticipated dishonour. They shouted a foul whenever the strategy and the tactics employed by their opponents took them in; there were no referees however disqualifying their opponents who fought on as before. It is wrong to hold that the invaders had always their way. They had to fight for every square inch of the territory they cared to occupy.

Much has been said about the religious beliefs of the opposing armies playing a part in the engagements that were fought. The Muslim submission to God's will may be claimed to have influenced the conduct of the soldiers on

the battlefield; it does not however seem to have restrained Muhammad Ghor's soldiers at the first battle of Taraori. The Hindu belief in astrology does however seem to have played its part occasionally in bringing about their discomfiture. Dahar lost the first battle of Sind when a missile struck the flag staff of the temple of the protecting deity of the city. His son, Jaisingh lost his country finally to the enemy when his astrologers told him not to fight as the stars in the sky were against him. Bakhtiar Khilji's task of conquering Gaur was made easier, it is said, because the astrologers had told Lakshman Sen that he was destined to lose his state when strange looking, garlic smelling strangers entered the capital. The common belief that, if fighting to the last, one fell into the hands of the enemy one would cease to be Hindu, might have played a part in making the soldiers play safe. It would, thus, be considered safer to run away from the battle-field as soon as the fortune of war showed any sign of deserting one's side.

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## AN ALMOST CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT OF MAHMUD'S INVASIONS OF INDIA

(Mahmud's invasions of India have always attracted the attention of Indian historians. Unfortunately, however, not many contemporary accounts of it have come down to us. For a long time students of history were content to depend upon Firishta's history and Utbi's *Kitab-ul-Yamini*. Utbi's account, however, is very meagre and lacks details whereas Firishta's distance from his subject matter does not lend much authority to his work. The publication of the Persian text of a part of the *Zamul Akhbar* of Girdizi edited by Professor Muhammad Nazim in 1928 made available an account of Mahmud's invasions of India written, at the latest, in 1052 A. D., i. e. within twenty two years of Mahmud's death. Its account of Mahmud's invasions of India therefore deserves the foremost place among original authorities on Mahmud's reign and as such it is sure to interest students of Indian History. In the following pages an attempt has been made at providing readers of Indian history with a translation of Girdizi's Persian account)

When Mahmud became Amir of Khurasan, the Caliph of Baghdad gave him the title of Yamin-ul-Daulat wa Amin-ul-Millat.<sup>1</sup>

In 930 A. H. (1000 A. D.) Mahmud left for India from Ghazni and conquered many forts.<sup>2</sup>

On 5th Ramazan 391 A. H. (August 28, 1001 A. D.) Mahmud reached Herat and left for Ghazni. He left Ghazni for India and encamped at Peshawar. He had ten thousand soldiers with him. Jaipal, king of India, with twelve thousand horse, 30,000 foot and 300 elephants came

out to oppose him. Both the armies were drawn up in battle array. Soon the battle began. God gave victory to the Muslims. Mahmud was victorious. Jaipal was defeated. Many infidels were killed. The Muslims killed 5,000 Hindus in that battle and Jaipal was made a prisoner. Fifteen of his sons and brothers also fell into their hands. A good deal of booty was taken. It is said that the necklace that Jaipal was wearing was valued at 180 000 Dinars. Similarly other Hindu chiefs who were taken prisoners were found wearing valuable ornaments round their necks. This victory was gained on Friday,<sup>3</sup> 8th Muharram, 392 A. H. (27th Nov 1001 A. D.)

From here Mahmud marched on Waihind<sup>4</sup>. This country was also ravaged. When spring came Mahmud returned to Ghazni<sup>5</sup>.

When Mahmud returned to Ghazni (from Sistan in 393 A. H. 1003 1004 A. D.), he decided to attack Bhatia. He marched by way of Walihstan (Sibbi) and Hissar and reached Bhatia<sup>6</sup>. Here a battle raged for three days. Bajrao formed his troops in line of battle and sent them against Mahmud. He himself left for the bank of river Sasana. When Mahmud learnt this, he sent some of his men in pursuit in order to capture Bajrao and his companions. When Bajrao learnt of the pursuit, he left his main body and killed himself. Mahmud's soldiers took his head and captured all his companions and brought them before Mahmud who was overjoyed. By his orders all of them were killed. Two hundred and eighty elephants fell into his hands<sup>7</sup>.

In 396 A. H. (1006 A. D.) Mahmud decided to make a surprise attack on Multan. He was afraid that if he marched by the direct route Daud would get to know of it and make preparations to oppose him. He chose therefore a roundabout way to Multan. Anand Pal, son of Jaipal, contested his progress. Mahmud directed his army

to attack Anand Pal's territories. Many men were taken prisoners and many were killed, the country was ravaged.<sup>8</sup>

Anand Pal ran away to the mountains of Kashmir. Mahmud reached Multan. He besieged it for a week till the garrison sued for peace. They agreed to pay 20,000 Dinars in two instalments every year. Mahmud now returned to Ghazni<sup>9</sup>.

When Mahmud was free from his struggle against Ilak Khan (defeated in January, 1008), he heard that Shokpal, grandson of Jaipal, who had fallen into the hands of Abuali at Nishapur and been converted to Islam, had abjured his religion. Mahmud turned towards him and captured him in the hills of Kashnod. He undertook to pay 400,000 Dinars. He was entrusted to Hakin Khazan and imprisoned. He died in prison<sup>10</sup>.

From here Mahmud left for India. In 399 A. H. (1005-1009 A. D.) he fought against Anand Pal and defeated him. Thirty elephants were taken and a large number of prisoners was made<sup>11</sup>. From here Mahmud marched on to Bhim Nagar and besieged it. For three days the siege continued. Mahmud then succeeded in entering the fort with some of his companions. Gold, silver and diamonds that had been accumulating, since the days of Bhim Pando, in this fort fell into his hands. Booty beyond counting fell into Mahmud's hands. Mahmud now returned to Ghazni. A throne of gold and silver was built. The booty was displayed at Ghazni for the people to stare at<sup>12</sup>.

From Ghazni in 400 A. H. (1010 A. D.) he left for Multan. The territory left unconquered last time was conquered now. Many Carmathians there in Multan were captured, some were slain, others mutilated, and made to suffer otherwise so that all of them died. Daud was also captured and taken to Ghazni and sent to Ghorak where he died.<sup>13</sup>

In 402 A. H. (1012 A. D.), Mahmud left Ghazni for Thanesar. When Trilochanpal, emperor of India, heard this, he sent messengers and offered 50 elephants if Mahmud would not march on Thanesar. Mahmud paid no heed to his words. When his armies reached the Camp of Ram, his men disputed his path. From their protected places, they attacked the Muslims, many of whom were killed.

When Mahmud reached Thanesar, he found the city deserted. Whatever fell into the hands of his men was destroyed. Many of the idols were broken. Jogar Om (which was the most famous idol in that Mecca of the Hindus)<sup>14</sup> was carried away to Ghazni and placed at the Durgah. People flocked to see it<sup>15</sup>

In the year 404 A. H. (1014 A. D.), Mahmud decided to take Nanda<sup>16</sup>. When Trilochanpal, king of India, learnt about it, he sent tried veterans to the fort in order to guard the fort and himself left for the passes in Kashmir. When Mahmud reached the place, it was invested thoroughly. When the besieged felt helpless, they asked for peace and surrendered the fort. Mahmud, with some of his men, entered the fort and took away all the valuables and arms that were in the fort. Mahmud left Mir Saragh in charge of the fort and himself left for the pass in Kashmir where Trilochanpal was hiding. When he heard of the enemy's approach, Trilochanpal ran away from there as well. Mahmud so arranged matters that the forts in the pass were taken and pillaged. His army captured a good deal of property and a large number of men. Many Hindus accepted Islam. The same year he issued orders that in the places conquered, mosques be raised and Hindus be converted to Islam by men appointed for the purpose. Mahmud himself returned to Ghazni. This victory was secured in the year 405 A. H. (1015 A. D.)<sup>17</sup>.

When the year 407 A. H. (1016 A. D.) began,

Mahmud decided to attack Kashmir. From Ghazni he set out for Kashmir. When he reached the pass, winter set in. Beyond the pass was the fort of Lohkot (Loharin) strong as of iron. It was invested. When the siege was turning to be successful, the severity of winter and the snow helped the garrison which was reinforced by the arrival of fresh troops, from Kashmir. Mahmud sought safety in retirement. He returned to Ghazni in the spring.<sup>18</sup>

In the beginning of the year 409 A. H. (1018 A. D.) Mahmud decided to attack Kanauj, a very populous and prosperous country. Crossing seven waters, Mahmud reached the frontiers of the kingdom, when Bakorah, the warden of the marches<sup>19</sup>, sent a messenger and submitted. From here he advanced to Baranunder (Buland Shahr). Hardat himself fled and left his tribesmen to guard the fort. But Mahmud's armies broke their defences and overpowered them. They bought themselves back by paying 1,000,000/- dirhams and thirty elephants.

From here Mahmud advanced to Mahaban (near Muttra) on the Jumna then under Kala Chand. When he heard of Mahmud's advance, he selected his best elephant, mounted it and tried to cross the river. Mahmud learnt of his attempt at escape and ordered his men to watch the roads. In despair Kala Chand killed himself.<sup>20</sup> Mahaban was taken, 165 elephants and booty beyond imagination fell into Mahmud's hands. From here Mahmud advanced on Muttra, a very great city of the Hindus, sacred as the birth place of Krishna son of Vasudeva. Here is a great Hindu temple. When Mahmud reached Muttra no one opposed him. He ordered his men to spread over the whole kingdom, destroy all idols or burn them and take possession of all property. From the temples, treasures and property beyond counting fell into Mahmud's hands. One sapphire weighed 450



*mithgals* No one had ever seen such a stone. Gold and silver idols beyond estimate were taken. One gold idol was ordered to be broken and 98,300 *mithgals* of gold was found therein. In this way much property and many stones were captured.

From here Mahmud advanced to Kanauj where the Rai was captured. Mahmud now set out for Ghazni. On the way a peerless elephant of Chand Rai of Kanauj, which Mahmud had heard of and sought for in vain, fell into his hands. It had run away from Chand Rai's ranks and with the Mahaut was now captured. Mahmud named it Khudadad (God's gift).

When Mahmud reached Ghazni, the booty was valued at 2,000,000 Dinars, 53,000 slaves and 350 elephants.<sup>21</sup>

In the month of Tir in the year 410 A. H. (1019 A. D.) Mahmud decided to advance against Nanda. He had killed Rajpal.<sup>22</sup> He had decided to join Trilochanpal, make him victorious and bring back his armies to his own kingdom. When he heard the news of Mahmud's advance Trilochanpal crossed the Ganges towards Bari. Mahmud also crossed the river and defeated all the Hindu armies. Trilochanpal ran away with some Hindus and did not dispute Mahmud's path. Mahmud now decided to attack the city of Bari. They found it deserted. All the temples were burnt. They carried away every thing they could lay their hands on. From here, Mahmud decided to march towards Nanda's country. After crossing many rivers, Mahmud reached his frontiers. Nanda had heard of the advance of the army of Islam. He had gathered together a good many arms and a large army. It is said his army consisted of 36,000 cavalry, 124,000 foot, 650 elephants. This should give some idea of his resources. When Mahmud approached his enemy's encampments, he disposed his troops in battle array and divided them into the usual sections for battle. He encamped taking cover

to protect himself. He then sent a messenger to Nanda asking him to become a Muslim and save himself from all harm and distress. Nanda returned the reply that he had nothing to say to Mahmud except on the battlefield. It is said that Mahmud ascended a height in order to get a view of Nanda's army. He saw a world of tents and encampments, besides immovable horsemen, foot soldiers and elephants. He felt distressed. He prayed to God to grant him victory. When the night fell, God struck fear into Nanda's heart. He left camp and ran away. When Mahmud sent a messenger next day, he found Nanda's camp deserted. They had left all their arms and taken away their horses and elephants. The messenger returned and informed Mahmud who left his place of refuge and went towards the enemy's camp and found it deserted. Mahmud thanked God and ordered the camp of Nanda to be looted. A good deal of property of all kinds was thus destroyed.

From here victorious Mahmud set out towards Ghazni. On their way back a forest fell in their way. The army entered it, 580 elephants of Nanda fell into their hands which they captured and brought to the Muslim camp.

Then they brought the news that there were two strongly fortified passes, Nur and Qirat. Here the inhabitants are Kafirs and idolatrous. Mahmud resolved to attack them. He ordered that a large number of artisans such as blacksmiths, masons and stone-cutters should accompany the troops so that they might level up the roads, cut down the trees and break stones. When the army reached there, it was resolved to attack Qirat first. Qirat is a pleasant place and its inhabitants worship the lion. Its climate is cold and fruits abound here. When the Shah of Qirat got the news, he advanced to meet them, submitted and sought protection. Mahmud accepted his submission and spared his territories. The Shah of Qirat

became Muslim and many of the inhabitants of Qirat as well accepted Islam. The inhabitants of Nur, however, refused to comply with Mahmud's demands. Mahmud ordered Hajib Ali to proceed to Nur and conquer it. A fort was built here. Mir Ali was appointed Kotwal of the fort. He was ordered to put Islam round their neck by sword. Islam now made its appearance in their country. This was in 411 A. H. (1020 A. D.)<sup>23</sup>.

When the year 412 A. H. (1021 A. D.) began, Mahmud decided to attack Kashmir. The fort of Loharkot<sup>24</sup> was invested. A month was spent here. As the fort was very strong, it could not be taken. Thereupon Mahmud came out of the great pass and went towards Lahore and Takeshar<sup>25</sup> and spread his armies. When the spring came, Mahmud went back to Ghazni.<sup>26</sup>

When the year 413 A. H. (1022 A. D.) began, Mahmud decided to attack Nanda's territory. When the fort of Gwalior was reached, it was invested. It was, however, a very strong fort and Mahmud failed to take it. He remained investing it for four days and nights. The commander of the fort then sent a messenger and sought for peace. He surrendered 35 elephants. The army of Mahmud now retreated from here and advanced towards Kaliñjar which was under Nanda. Nanda was himself in the fort with his officers and near relatives. Mahmud ordered that the fort be surrounded on all sides. Many plans were thought of. But the fort was so situated that no man could scale its heights. It was not even possible to attack the fort by cutting down stones at its base. No plan seemed possible. Some days were passed in this fashion. Nanda, however, felt uncomfortable in the fort as all roads had been closed to him. He sent messengers and offered to pay the Jizya<sup>27</sup>, Hudyā, and 300 elephants. This was agreed to. Nanda gladly sent 300 elephants and drove them out of the fort without Mahauts.

ordered his men who came up to the pack of elephants, and mounted them. The garrison was very much surprised at this daring of Mahmud's soldiers. Nanda was a poet. He wrote a verse in Hindi and sent it to Mahmud. Mahmud had this recited to the Hindu<sup>28</sup>, Persian and Turkish poets. Every one liked the verse and declared that it was not possible to write more elegant or more high flown lines. Mahmud therefore had an order drawn up conferring on Nanda 15 forts in return for the verse that Nanda had composed in his honour. Besides this he sent many presents, women, jewels and dresses. Nanda also sent a good deal in return. Mahmud returned to Ghazni from there<sup>29</sup>.

When winter came, as usual, Mahmud went towards India in order to gain religious merit. Some one said 'On the seashore there is a great city, Somnath by name. Hindus regard it with the same respect which the Muslims reserve for Mecca. There are gold and silver idols in the temple. The idol Manat, which the prophet had removed from Ka'aba, had reached this place via Aden. They had bought it. In the treasury of that temple they have placed precious stones and a good deal of property. But the way thereto is very dangerous.'

When Mahmud heard this he planned to go to that city and destroy the idols. From Hindustan he now set his forces towards Somnath. When he approached the city and was seen by the Brahmanas and Sramanas, they all busied themselves in worshipping their idols. The chief officer of the city left it and taking his family and men with him, sailed down the river in a boat seeking refuge on an island where he remained encamped as long as the Muslim army remained surrounding the city. When the Muslim army approached the city, they besieged it and began to attack it. Before many days had passed a breach was effected, Mahmud's army entered the city and began

to kill. Many Hindus were killed. Mahmud asked the Muazzan to go to the camp and announce the time of prayers. As he announced the call to prayers, all the idols were broken, burnt or otherwise destroyed. The stone idol of Manat was dug out from its foundation in the ground and broken into small pieces. Some of these, were taken to Ghazni on camels where they are still found under the steps of the Mosque. There was some treasure under the idols. All that treasure was taken. A large amount of property was thus got—silver idols, jewels, and treasure of various kinds.

Mahmud now returned. For Parm Dev, Badshah of the Hindus, stood in his way disputing his path. Mahmud decided therefore to leave the right road back to Ghazni, for fear lest this great victory of his should turn into defeat. (results of this great victory be thrown away). He left by way of Mansura towards Multan. His soldiers suffered many hardships partly on account of want of water and partly on account of the Jats of Sind and on other grounds. Many of the soldiers of Islam lost their lives on the way. At last Multan was sighted and from there Mahmud marched on to Ghazni.<sup>30</sup>

Mahmud had been greatly enraged at the conduct of the Jats of Multan and Bhatias of the Indus on account of their molesting his armies when he was returning from Somnath. He wanted to take vengeance on them for their conduct and punish them. Hence in the year 418 A. H. (1027 A. D.), he collected his armies for the twelfth time and set out towards Multan. When he reached the city, he ordered 1400 strong boats to be built. They were fitted with three iron spikes each, strong and sharp, one at the bow and one each on the sides. They were so strong and sharp that they were capable of piercing, wrecking, and destroying whatever they struck against. One thousand and four hundred boats were set afloat on the river. Every

boat seated 20 well equipped soldiers with bows, arrows spears and shields. When the Jats heard of Mahmud's approach, they carried their families to far off islands. They took up arms, equipped 4000, and according to some accounts, 8000 boats. Every boat contained many well armed men. They set off to attack the enemy. When they came opposite the Muslim army, the Muslims shot arrows at them, the firemen threw rockets. When the Muslim boats came near the boats of the Jats, the spikes struck the Jat boats. In this way the Jat boats were either wrecked, drowned or damaged. On the banks of the river, horsemen, foot soldiers and elephants had been placed. When any Jat appeared on the banks, he was again thrown in. The Muslim army marched on the banks of the river, till they sighted the camp of the refugee families. They were robbed. A good deal of booty was obtained. From there the Muslim army left with flying colours for Ghazni.

### Notes to Chapter III

1 Girdizi p 62

2 Girdizi is our only contemporary or semi contemporary authority for this invasion

3 Utbi has Thursday ( below, page 39) which seems to be the correct day of the week

4 Waihind was wrongly identified as Bhatinda in the later compilations. Mahmud could not easily have penetrated so far into India in so short a time. Both Utbi and Girdizi have Waihind. It seems to stand for Hund on the right bank of the Indus about 15 miles from Attock

5 Girdizi pp 65 66 Dr Nazim (*Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni* p 67) has stated on the authority of Girdizi that 15 sons and grandsons of Jaipal were captured. The text has sons and brothers.

6 *Ibid* pp 66 67 Bhatia is probably Bhera. It is situated some 80 miles from Waihind on the Jhelum

7 Girdizi, pp 66, 67.

8. *Ibid* , pp. 67, 68.

9 *Ibid*, 68.

10 Girdizi, p. 69. He had been left at Waihind as Mahmud's governor. Dr. Nazim (p. 98) locates the rebellion of Sukhpal in the Salt Range in the Punjab and converts Kashnood into the Salt Range. Kashmir would be a nearer guess. There is nothing improbable in Sukhpal being captured and kept prisoner.

11 *Ibid* , p 69.

12 *Ibid*., pp 69, 70 Bhim Nagar is Nagar Kot, Kangra

13. *Ibid*., p 70

14. Girdizi, p 70

15. *Ibid* , pp 70, 71

16. Nandana, see below.

17. *Ibid* , p 72.

18 *Ibid*, pp 72, 73

19. Girdizi, pp 74. 76, obviously of Kashmir. Utbi calls him Sibli bin Shahi bin Bahmi See below, page 58.

20 Cf Utbi below.

21. Girdizi, 74 to 76.

22. Raja of Kanauj

23 Girdizi, 76 to 79.

24 Loharin.

25 Takeshar seems to be the name given to the plains of the Punjab to the west of the Chenab

26 *Ibid* , p 79

27. Jizya, payable by a ruler, is used here for tribute rather than a capitation tax payable by the non Muslim subjects of a Muslim king.

28 Presence of Hindu poets in Mahmud's army may imply the presence of Hindus But if Mahmud had in his army Persian and Turkish scholars who knew Hindi (or were the verses in Sanskrit?), it would imply much greater interchange of culture between the people on both sides of Hindukoh. Was an Alberuni on Mahmud's staff?

29 Girdizi, 79, 80

30 Girdizi, 84, 85

## IV

### A CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT OF SULTAN MAHMUD'S INDIAN EXPEDITIONS.

*(The following narrative of Sultan 'Mahmud's raids into various parts of northern India has been translated from the Arabic narrative of Utbi. An English translation of a Persian version of Utbi's account was published during the last century. The Persian writer, however, took considerable liberties with the text, very often burying the original under a mountain of his own additions. An English translation from the original is, therefore, being offered here as giving a contemporary version of Mahmud's achievements )*

#### Subuktgin and Jaipal

Then Subuktgin advanced towards India till he conquered many forts, lofty as mountains, full of treasure and surrounded by troops. Bringing every-thing under his control, he spent the treasure of those places on the administration thereof. He conquered such places as were inhabited by Kafirs alone till then and where Mussalmans had not yet placed their feet.

When Jaipal saw all this and realised the impending danger, he felt exceedingly grieved. In order to revenge himself, accompanied by many chiefs, he marched at the head of a large army Jaipal crossed even beyond Lamaghan<sup>1</sup> which formed a part of the territories of Amir Ghazi. Undoubtedly he was inspired by the devil, and was given over to building castles in the air.

When the Amir heard of Jaipal's attack and success, he immediately prepared himself for the encounter. The Amir gathered his advisers and courtiers and taking a large army of the lovers of Islam, marched from Ghazni to



chastise Jaipal.<sup>2</sup> This was done in order to carry on a powerful crusade on behalf of Islam and establish its victory. Between Lamaghan and Ghazni, the armies met each other. At this time the Amir was accompanied by Mahmud, who was a messenger of death for Kafirs, like the lion in the jungle and the hawk in the sky. The battle lasted for several days until at last food and water became scarce in the camp of the Kafirs; death now began to dance before their eyes.

Eager for peace and desirous of putting an end to bloodshed, Jaipal now sent to the Amir a deputation and offered some elephants and territory. The Amir made up his mind to accept the request of Jaipal. But Sultan Mahmud castigated the deputation and told them that the battle could result in nothing but an overwhelming victory. And in this lay the honour of Islam.

So the messengers returned, having studied the circumstances. Jaipal became all the more reckless by his having asked for peace and got war in reply. He addressed those present and told them that they must have realised what India's honour meant and in what disgrace and humiliation they had landed themselves. The greedy desire to plunder their property and make them prisoners was the only obstacle to peace. In the path of peace stood the (Mussalman's) greed and temptation to plunder their goods and elephants and to imprison them. But they would cheat this greed by destroying their property and thrusting themselves into the flames. Then one after another, they would jump into the fray, wielding their swords, drawing their bows and embracing death. When the Amir learnt this, he felt that in his despair (Jaipal) would do all this. He considered it advisable, therefore, to make peace with him. Sultan Mahmud also became willing to make peace on receipt of ten lacs of dirhams, fifty heads of elephants, several

forts and some territory. He (Jaipal) was also to give a relative of his as a hostage so that he might remain faithful. Elephants and cash were to be surrendered at once. The Amir sent his confidants to make him leave the crooked path and take to the right way. Instead of sending a relative or one near to him, Jaipal imprisoned the Amir's men. At first the Amir would not believe it, but when the true state of affairs became obvious, he considered that it was the will of God that the Kafirs be massacred and plundered. He saw that nothing else was open to him. A fierce battle now followed, Jaipal's men were trampled underfoot wherever they were found. They were massacred with swords and spears. Reaching the city of Lamaghan, the Amir conquered it. The Kafirs were thrown into the fire. The temples were razed to the ground and mosques were erected in their places. Advancing further, many cities were conquered and the wretches were killed. At length the Kafirs were humiliated while the Muslims were successful...

### Mahmud and Jaipal

The Sultan left Khalf bin Ahmad, as he was incarcerated in the fort and bound in chains. He had intended to proceed to Sijistan. But he preferred to fight a battle in India so that it might serve as a prelude to the object he had in view and a sacrifice in the cause he had espoused. Encouraged by the fact that by his deeds the standard of the Faith would be raised, the area of belief extended, truth uncovered and its strength revived, he entered the country of Hindustan. He trusted in God who had endowed him with His light, destined him for glory and stamped his enterprises with success. He reached Peshawar at last. Tents were pitched outside the city. He was informed that Jaipal, the king of Hindustan and enemy of God, had ventured to oppose him and had

hastened his doom by remaining a neighbour of the Sultan. Accordingly, the Sultan sent for horsemen from among the regular army, the *ghazis* and the volunteers. From his fighting forces he selected 15,000 brave and experienced soldiers. Those who had been rejected in the selection and had been found to be valueless on appraisal, were forbidden to mix up with the selected ones. Thus, when the desired number had been made up by selection, and they were found (to be brave) like the dragons of the desert and the lions of the jungle—their hearts firm like rocks and their devotion made greater by their perseverance—he, (the Sultan) made them advance to fight against that vile bastard (Jaipal).

That evil-doing infidel (Jaipal), advanced to meet the Sultan with 12,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry and 300 elephants. (As he marched) the earth groaned under their feet and became lighter (owing to the dust they raised) under the weight of their hoofs. He (Jaipal) then encamped opposite the Sultan and felt proud of the numbers of his army and its valour. He believed that superiority in numbers would supersede the will of God and emancipate him from the dictates of the Almighty. Had that ignoramus (Jaipal) read the "Book of the Lord," he would have been aware of the fact that 'Many a time a smaller group overpowers a larger one'. The infidel (Jaipal) held his ground with the intention of giving battle. But he delayed the battle by stratagem and defence to enable the troops and men of the various clans and tribes left behind to join him. Hence, the Sultan made haste and ordered an advance to battle followed by killing and pillage. Jaipal was enveloped on all sides by God's friends. Now commenced trouble on a grand scale—arrows, spears and swords all were hotly used. Fire began to burn the forts so that the army stood in battle array. Military music began to be played. The

herds of elephants were collected together and the warriors stood facing one another ready to fight. Arrows came to be aimed at one another. The sword-blades began to flash like lightning. Darkness spread and streams of blood began to flow, till God's friends (the Mussalmans) gained victory over the wretched. By midday victory veered round to the Muslims as against God's enemies, the polytheists. The Mussalmans put five thousand men to the sword and extended them on the battle-field, left as food for the beasts of the earth and birds of the air. Fifty elephants with their legs pierced with arrows and their trunks cut off by swords were killed on the battle-field. Along with members of his family, his relatives and confidants, God's foe, Jaipal, was made a prisoner. The people turned their reins towards the residence of the Sultan. The faces of the criminals were besmeared with the dust of *kufr* and the air of humiliation. Their arms were bound at their backs, their heads were hanging down in shame, their faces were overspread with despair. The necklace of Jaipal made of studded pearls, precious jewels and red rubies, was taken off his neck. Its value was estimated at two lacs of *dinars*.

God granted his friends booty beyond counting. Their efforts now bore fruit. Five lacs of men and women were made slaves. The Sultan retreated to his place of residence, accompanied by his friends and companions. All had their desire fulfilled on account of the victory and plunder and were thankful to God. God made the Sultan conquer even a larger territory in India than in Khurasan. This well-known event took place on Thursday, the eighth of Muharrum in the year 392. When peace came to be made, the Sultan thought it advisable to release Jaipal, the chief of the *kafirs*. The members of his family would find in him an ill-clad prisoner and the fear of Islam would spread in the country of the *kafirs* (Hindus).

He made peace with Jaipal in return for fifty elephants and kept his son<sup>3</sup> as a hostage that there be no breach of the treaty. Jaipal returned to his territories. From there he wrote a letter to his son telling him how greatly he was troubled and worried by the humiliation he had to undergo. After being a prisoner of the Mussalmans he was not worthy to sit on the throne. In such helplessness he shaved his head and burnt himself to death.

### Expedition to Waihind

By the time the Sultan had achieved his purpose and subjected those he desired to subdue, he entered upon another war. He marched towards Waihind.<sup>4</sup> He threw his forces against it, and after its humiliation, he made a forced entry into the city. Now followed some comfort after the hardships (experienced in the way). Information now reached him that many groups of Hindus had taken shelter in the mountain valleys, hidden in the bushes and thick forests. They harboured evil designs and were collecting together for battle. Accordingly an army was sent against them, so that those places should be conquered and those persons should be disabled before their arrival (at the rendezvous). Swords plunged into them until they became satiated with the drops of their blood and the blades refused to remain any longer in their intestines. Those who escaped the sword ran away to the high mountains, like the hill goats when they see the stars at midday and face death in all its horror. All of them (the opponents) tasted the evil outcome of their deeds. Their designs resulted in loss. After that manifestation of success, great victory and accession of strength, the Sultan's standards marched back to Ghazni.

Thus Faith smiled at this (exhibition of) strong valour and obvious (Divine) help. The Faith was gladdened and the back of infidelity and schism was broken.

### The Battle of Bhatia.

After the Sultan was free from the affairs of Sijistan, where the rebels had now been suppressed and the atmosphere cleared,<sup>5</sup> he became eager for the battle of Bhatia. Soldiers specially selected by trusted and well-instructed agents were despatched along with groups of armed guards. Thus crossing the Oxus stream he reached Bhatia from behind Multan. He found the city-wall so high and thick that even vultures were helpless to fly over it.

There was a wide and deep ditch all round that city. This city was full of elephants, with bodies like those of devils, and iron works. In those days the chief of the city was Bajrai, who was intoxicated on account of his huge army, herds of elephants and several victories. The Sultan waged a war with him for three days and nights, now in war were used flashing swords and sparkling spears in large numbers. On the fourth day, the battle became still more bloody and murderous. At sunset the pace of the attack became still faster. The friends of God fell upon the *mushriks* (Hindus) The Sultan himself was in the forefront of the army.

In this severe attack, many elephants of the Kafirs, on whom they relied very much, were killed. Both the parties were enveloped in dust. God crowned not the will of the Sultan but the will of religion with success. The *mushriks* retreated towards their city and took shelter behind its ramparts. All means of ingress into the fort were closed. The ditch was filled with the help of mysterious persons and means of communication were destroyed.

When Bajrai's men began to perish one after another in this fashion, through a mountainous path he fled away and concealed himself in a forest. The Sultan sent his great luminaries (superior officers) in quest of him so that

they might either bring him a prisoner or put him to the sword. When Bajrai came to know of this, he plunged a dagger into his heart and fell into the fire of hell which is kept burning only for those who keep neither fasts nor say prayer, nor tell the beads of God's string. Whoever came before them, was cut down to pieces by the Sultan's army, and he gained a lot of plunder. In this battle, besides gaining a victory, the Sultan took possession of one hundred and twenty elephants and a great stock of arms and riches. To wash off their pollution, the Sultan built many mosques and appointed teachers for the new Muslims to teach them the commandment of the Law and make the lawful and unlawful known to them. Thereafter, the Sultan withdrew to Ghazni.

#### Account of the Battle of Multan.

The Sultan, Yaminud-Daulat wa Aminul-Millat, had learnt of Abul Fath, the ruler of Multan's perverse faith, internal discord, wrong heretic beliefs, and his efforts to convert the people of the country to his views. For the sake of religion, Mahmud expressed his displeasure at his remaining silent, about his evil wickedness and sacrilegious activities. In this connection he sought heavenly guidance through *istakhara* (omen). (As a result) he took it to be God's order to launch a surprise attack on him. He ordered that forces from all quarters should come together and men from the valleys should muster. The horses were grouped with horses. To them were added such Muslim volunteers as had been marked by God for their good actions and set apart since the beginning of time for attaining one of the two (*ghaza* or *shahadat*) acts of religious merit.

All these forces were despatched to Multan. The nights were starry. The spring was in full bloom. The copious waters of the river were in foam. The Oxus<sup>s</sup>

prevented horsemen from crossing it, and its waters made fording difficult.

The Sultan wrote to Indbal,<sup>6</sup> the chief of India, to allow him to pass through his capital. But he refused and displayed hostility. His pride made him vile, he declined (to let Muslim armies pass) and gathered forces (to prevent their passage). Under these gathering storms of trouble, the Sultan decided that the first thing to do was to undertake his subjugation in spite of his strength. He (Sultan) would call his (Indbal's) bluff. He would clear his forests. He would break his power and disorganize his state. He would thus have two actions against the infidels to his account and would reap the fruits of two successes. Slaughter and imprisonment, plunder and distress, destruction and incendiarism, were spread in his dominion. He (Sultan) compelled him to retreat from one narrow haven to another and made him flee from one path to another. He (Sultan) rolled his cities upon him as the traders roll up their cloths in Hazrmaut. It was carried to such an extent that at last the spearsmen got tired of breaking their lances through the armour, and swordsmen had their swords slaked in blood from intestines and ribs. He (Sultan) then pushed him in the valleys and the mountains of his territories over the alluvial plains and red hills. He made the vultures of the air feast upon his (Indbal's) army in the narrow passages of the hills and the vast expanse of the waste until he hid himself in Kashmir.

Abul Fath, the ruler of Multan, heard of the sad plight of this chief of Hindustan. Indbal was an imposing personality, an honoured chief and a skilled swordsman. He himself was, so Abul Fath argued, as a digit is to two yards, or as the space between the fingers to a hand.

He became convinced that small heaps of earth cannot vie with lofty mountains nor can blue hawks be captured.



by means of small and weak birds. Thereupon he loaded his valuables on elephants and sent them to Ceylon (?). He left Multan to the Sultan, leaving its fate in the hands of God. Now the Sultan turned his reins towards it (Multan). He sought help from God for (the removal) of heresy, which had emerged, and the insult to the true Faith which had resulted. He found that the inhabitants were lost in error and blinded by their insubordination, "They wished to put out the true light of God by their breath, but God makes that impossible, however the infidels might dislike it?" He, therefore, laid siege to the place and attacked it so that he should sever their throats and cut off their hands from their arms. He (Sultan) became a source of terrible disaster to them. The city was captured after a contest. Terror and pain were heaped upon it. He imposed a fine of dirhams 20,000,000 on them so that they should cleanse themselves of the sin of insubordination and emancipate themselves from their heresy and absence of faith. His grip and the fear of his revenge made Sind tremble. In that country even the whispers of irreligion became silent. Signs of error and enmity disappeared.

### Nawasa Shah

The Sultan now decided to proceed towards India to attack Nawasa Shah the son of a ruler of India<sup>8</sup>. The Sultan had appointed him his officer in charge of a part of the territory he had conquered from among their dominions. He was to guard the frontiers and maintain the strength of the boundaries. But he had come under the influence of the devil, had reverted, as before, towards Hinduism, renouncing Islam. He had reached an understanding with the Hindu leaders with a view to his untying the collar of the Faith and severing its strong cords. Thus he (the Sultan) decided to march in all haste:

towards him to attack him at the head of swordsmen whose swords were still wet with the blood of their opponents. He (the Sultan) attacked him so rapidly that he outstripped the storm. He made short work of day and night until he drove him out of his capital and took possession of all that he had collected. In those territories the Sultan restored the grandeur of his domination and rule. He destroyed the plants of *Kufr* with the edge of his swords and javelins. The Almighty made his return to Ghazna easy now.

### Account of the conquest of the Fort of Bhimnagar

The Sultan, Yaminud-Daulat wa Amin-ul-Millat, won both victories, and having achieved both successes, turned towards Ghazna to take rest and render thanks in turn for the blessings bestowed upon him. As he rested, he was planning for another battle to extend the boundaries of Islam to throw dust over the faces of the idols. This would lower the standards of the devil tied to the saddle of misdirection and the string of misbelief. Rather against usual human nature, his great courage made him feel the soft bed-chamber hard, the thorns better than the roses, spears more attractive than the symphony of musical instruments (lute and violin) and the whiteness of the sharp edges of swords preferable to that of the cheeks of damsels with breasts like pomegranates. All this was an indication that he should acquire greatness, earn fame, reap honour, and bring himself nearer to God by his conduct. Thus when the month Rabi-us-Sani of the year<sup>9</sup> had passed he sought heavenly direction for the attainment of his aim by getting the horses saddled, and relying on the Almighty, who had always helped him and had made him perform great deeds, he started. As he reached the bank of Waihind, he was opposed by Brahmanpal,<sup>10</sup>

son of Indpal, with an innumerable host of black soldiers with white swords, bluish spears, rosy helmets and grey elephants. War opened its crooked jaws. Attack followed attack (without any design), just as the shooting stars drop on the earth or the specks of clouds appear on the sky. Every alert, brave and warlike leader set the machinery of spear-attacks and sword-thrusts in motion. The morning of battle grew into evening. The earth was soaked crimson on account of the blood-dripping from the necks and shoulders of the dead and the wounded. The infidels were about to carry the day, when with God's grace, the Sultan with a few of his chosen slaves made an attack. This broke the enemy's back and completely obliterated them from their entrenched positions. God gave in booty to the Sultan thirty elephants, like huge edifices, nay like the waves of the sea. The Sultan's followers began to slaughter the enemies wherever they found them, in streams, valleys, wilds and mounds.

In that scramble the Sultan, too, began to chase him (Brahmanpal) so that the God's promise of help to the faithful and dishonour to the infidels be carried out. In that pursuit he drove him to Bhimnagar. It was a strong fort built on the side of a high mound surrounded by water. The kings, nobles and pious sultans of Hindustan used to collect treasures for the big idol installed therein. From time to time they sent treasures of every sort there, costly pearls, light in weight. They considered it an act of piety, which would bring them religious merit and earn them a place near God. The Sultan acquired here so much of the best that had been gathered here for ages, that there were not enough camels to carry it, nor other means of transport either. The clerks could not prepare an inventory and the imagination of the accountants failed to grasp it in their number. With a brave heart, honourable learning, wise determination, firm grip and with such

counsels as lit up the fire of equanimity, the Sultan now gathered his forces here, fixed his standards nearby and came out to fight against its guards. When they saw the mountains filled with this great plundering horde, with the arrows flying on all sides like sparks of fire, fear and dismay made them lose heart, consternation and dread made them lose their senses. They considered their own means powerless against such heavy odds. The Sultan's might overpowered them and they were smitten with poverty and disgrace. Desire for peace made them seek safety from all quarters. All now proclaimed adherence to the Sultan and opened the gates of the fort to him. Onwards they came seeking peace like birds driven by a hawk or showers of rain poured forth by the flashing clouds. The favour of God in its grace bestowed the fort on the Sultan and as much booty as could be ever imagined—precious metals, pearls, necklaces and ornaments for the chest, all that had been lying there for a long time.

Abu Nasr Ahmad bin Muhammad Fari'uni, governor of Juzjan, with some of his selected followers went inside and appointed two of the chief gatekeepers Tuntash and Asikhtigin, to mount guard over the treasures of gold and silver. He himself took charge of the other precious articles and the stock of jewels. The Sultan himself took out of it as much as the camels could carry. The remainder was allowed to be appropriated by his chiefs. The silver coins numbered 7 crore royal dirhams and the gold objects weighed 7,00,400 maunds. Such a great quantity of silk and other fine cloth was acquired that the aged, as well as the learned, were compelled to declare that they had never before seen nor heard of such vast quantity of such fine materials. Among other things there was a house made of silver built like the houses of the rich. It was 30 yards long and 15 yards wide. It had collapsible sheets which could be rolled up, opened, supported and

closed again. There was a canopy of Greek silk, 40 yards long and 20 wide. It had two supports of gold and two of silver. The Sultan appointed one of his trustworthy officers to guard the fort on his behalf. He now returned towards Ghazna, rich, carefree, powerful and helpful. When he reached there, he ordered all the treasures to be displayed in the courtyard of his palace. There were pearls that had been brought by the invaders, glittering like stars, diamonds flashing like live coals or solidified fire, emeralds crossing the sides of myrtle or soft like the leaves of the wild ivy, pieces of diamond as big and heavy as big pomegranates. All (who had come to witness this) from various quarters agreed that the records of classical writers bore witness that such vast wealth had not been acquired either by the great chiefs or by the kings of Persia and Greece. At this display the ambassadors of Tugha Khan, king of Turkistan and brother of I-lak, were also present. They saw what eyes had never seen before nor imagination thought possible. Even Qarun had not possessed so much wealth. It was the work of God, who "whenever He intends a work to be done, orders it be done and it is accomplished"<sup>10</sup>

#### **Account of the Battle of Narayan.**

In 400 A H the Sultan, Yaminud Daulat wa Aminul-Millat, in order to acquire religious merit and approach nearer God, desired to fight a battle in Hindustan to open the wound of (their) chastisement. He now set out, spurring his horses and traversing hills and plains till he reached the centre of Hindustan. He conquered it, imprisoned its refractory (chiefs), overturned its idols and placed the evil-doers on the point of his sword. Spreading terror, he marched towards his objective<sup>11</sup> (Here) he fought a battle against the leader of idol-worshippers wherein, by God's grace, their property, horses and elephants fell into his hands as booty. The swords of his

partisans reigned supreme among them. They slew them down in the valley and up in the mountains and killed them as they were climbing up or coming down. With all this booty and accompanied by his followers, by God's favour he turned to Ghazna.

The king of Hindustan<sup>12</sup> saw the scourge of God which his subjects had had to bear through the Sultan, Yaminud-Daulat wa Aaminul-Millat. He further noticed how Mahmud had dealt with the rulers of neighbouring and distant lands. He felt certain that he had neither the power to defeat the Sultan, nor to stand his pressure. He sent some selected relatives and confidential servants of his to solicit for peace with great humility so that the Sultan should not wage war against him. He prayed for the Sultan's success and undertook to remit a large tribute every year. He would send fifty elephants at once, each equal to two in bulk and speed. He would send a lot of presents along with (elephants), equal in value to the profit of his territories and the plunder of his cities. Two thousand soldiers from his armies would be sent by turn every year. (He solemnly assured the Sultan) that the promised yearly tribute would be sent by all those who (after him) would sit on his throne or run the government of his successors. The Sultan granted his request; in his humiliation and peaceful payment of a tribute, Islam stood exalted.

He (the Sultan) sent his agents to take charge of the tribute and bring the elephants. The king paid what he had promised. He carried out his undertakings by sending the promised contingents for service and as a token of his subordination. Thus the peace terms were carried out and a large fine was realized. Between Khurasan and Hindustan the caravans now began to travel both ways in peace and security and, therefore, in gratefulness.

The Battle of when they advanced for the king of Hindustan,<sup>15</sup>

The Sultan, Yaminul-Dau, this sudden calamity cleared the frontiers of Hindustan. Sardars and helpers neither the standard of Islam had ever - difficult to climb, its religious teachings ever heard. From these ~~places~~ he washed away the dirt and garbage of infidelity and dispelled the darkness of unbelief. He built mosques here in which the *muazzin* called the faithful to prayer—a distinctive sign of faith. Then it occurred to him that through these territories he should make a thrust to the middle of the country to take revenge on the polytheists, who instead of praying to God, bow down and pray to others. The Sultan wished to flash among them his swords, made keen edged with Islam's fervour, cooled in its waters, preserved in the scabbard of God's faith and tied fast by the pious and saintly. He sent for his people; he distributed riches among them. Having sought assistance of God, he made up his mind. He started with a large army,<sup>13</sup> towards the close of winter so that he should avail himself of the clear air of the south. By chance there was such heavy snowfall in this country that year that the like of it had not been seen before. The mountain passes had, therefore, been blocked and the slopes and heights had become levelled. The air became so biting that it affected even the hoofs of the horses, not to speak of the naked portions of the human body or its sides. The wide passes became obliterated. *It became difficult to make out right or left, the van or the rear* This state of things obliged him to return until God permitted advance. "Everything has its fixed time and a preordained extent."<sup>14</sup>

The Sultan once more started making preparations and collecting provisions. From all over the country he sent for Muslims, firm in their daily prayers. When

partisans reigned supreme. They felt proud of its unique collection as they were climbing bare-headed and bare-footed all this booty and accumulated together like the clouds of autumn. They revelled with the delights of the midday siesta and the mild cold of the morning and evening. The Sultan sought heavenly guidance for his march, (and having received a favourable sign), he set out. The army on the march looked like the blue ocean (whose waters were) gently rocked by the wind or like a settled affair drawing likewise to its pre-ordained fate. As he moved, the wild beasts of the earth became prisoners and the birds of the air felt overpowered. If the earth could have felt it, it would have groaned under the weight of iron, (the heavy burden) of the congested crowds, and of the daring young men on horse-back. As an advance guard, he despatched men capable enough of finding their way into the country. They were bright like the sun in his full effulgence and travelled straight like stars.

For months the cavalry rode in the valleys of the country, in wilds, where even the herds of wild cattle go astray and flights of birds become amazed at its vastness. As he drew near his destination, he divided the horsemen into groups and organized them properly. He split them into *kakabar* (companies of 100 to 200) and assigned them their duties. He put his brother, Nasr bin Nasiruddin, in charge of the right wing which included able officers and peerless veterans. The left wing, which comprised black-coloured and seasoned men, was placed under Arsalan Jazib. Mohammad Abdullah bin Ibrahim was placed at the head of the van which consisted of Arabs, proud to fan the fire of battle and sticking to the back of their horses like horsecloth. In the centre was appointed Jazib Tuntash with household slaves and picked warriors. These men resembled a lofty mountain when they stood



in line and the rushing sea when they advanced for attack. When the enemy of God, the king of Hindustan,<sup>15</sup> learned (of Mahmud's invasion), this sudden calamity upset him and taking his Thakurs, Sardars and helpers with him, he withdrew to the hills, very difficult to climb and accessible only through narrow and troublesome passes. Instead of facing (the enemy) in the open, he sought safety behind stones and placed guards in the face of this danger. He closed the pass between the two mountains by elephants which, to an onlooker, appeared to be lofty hill-tops and mountains standing upright. To all parts of the country he addressed a general call to all persons capable of throwing a stone, drawing a bow or wielding a sword. Thus he evaded the issue for long, so that he might fight when he had sufficient forces and was fully strong, or (he hoped that) coming to grief the friends of God would disperse or that, due to the small target offered, they would not like to fight. But he did not know that God is at the back of the Muslims and verily weakens the designs of the infidels

When the Sultan learnt of the enemy's intention to evade engagement and delay battle, he marched towards the enemy of God with soldiers made braver by their monotheism, cheered up by the promise (of success to Muslim arms), and afraid of God's wrath. With the Dailamite infantry and the devils of Afghan spearmen, he inflicted great losses on the enemy. His soldiers were as sure of killing their victims as preordained Death. They were sure of humiliating those trying to look bewitching.

These soldiers resembled hungry lions driven out and unwilling to return to their offsprings. They pierced into the hills like a saw in a (piece of) wood and a pick axe in a wall. They climbed up the lofty mountains like the ibexes and came down from there like the flood. The Sultan continued this assault for several days in order to get

them into the open, just as the magnet draws the iron and fire draws the (oil in the) wick. As the enemy came out of their narrow passes, they were set upon by picked horsemen just as the mounted gamesmen checkmate the foot gamesmen. This continued for some time. (But) the wretched one was joined by many allies and most of the forces he had summoned now came. Then placing the mountains in the rear and surrounded by elephants (protecting him) like the rocks, he made preparations for coming out into the open. The battle was now joined and scenes of slaughter followed. The oven (of death) now became hot, soldiers and chiefs became mixed up. The battle developed into a general slaughter. The combatants started hitting direct at the armour or over the head like the cranes. Attacks were levelled (against one another) from head to foot. In order to establish their prestige, the elephants were instigated, trampling under their feet and by their tusks, the *zamats*, coiled like snakes, were used on them, reaching the pupils of their eyes and the edges of their throats.

As the infidel found Abi Abdulla Mohammad bin Ibrahim brave and working havoc, he (the Raja) turned upon him his most stubborn and best armed soldiers. They made repeated assaults on him from the back and front and wounded him, but like the *Hur* he remained steadfast and unwavering in his noble duty and his sword remained sharp even though used repeatedly. He was prepared to lay down his life for the victory of the Faith and in the service of the Sustainer of the World. When the Sultan saw the enemy pressing hard against him, he tried to relieve the pressure by sending to his (Abi Abdulla) help a *kukaba* of his chosen slaves. Even though he was badly wounded with sword-thrusts and scarred by spear-points, like words with dots, they relieved him and sent him to the Sultan. On account of his wounds the

Sultan ordered an elephant to be given to him. This served as an emblem for him and thereby he became exalted above the other leaders of the army. The battle continued raging. At last God blew the favourable wind of his favour for His friends and enveloped the enemy in a circle of ills. At the top of every mountain at every turning of the streams, in every vale and hollow, in out of the way places as well as on extensive highways, the swords did their work of slaughter. They captured the elephants which had served the enemy as citadels for their defence, and the elephants now became a source of permanent trouble for them. The Sultan and his allies got so much booty that their hearts were relieved of all jealousy. All became equal by gaining their objectives and sharing in the abundance of all materials. The conquest of Nardin<sup>16</sup> became the covering garment of Islam. From the time of the Prophet till the day of the Sultan, the right hand of the kingdom and the keeper of the peace of the fraternity, the standard of Islam had never been carried so far. This honour God had reserved for him. Such a deed God had ordained to be accomplished by him. In the temple they found a stone-idol which bore an inscription declaring it to be made 40,000 years ago. The Sultan expressed his surprise at the ignorance of these people. For the people of the bright Revelation and the believers in the truth received from God, declare that the world is 7,000 years old and we are in its last millennium. When the Sultan questioned the scholars, they unanimously rejected the inscription and asserted that the evidence of such stones was not worthy of credence<sup>17</sup>.

The Sultan returned<sup>18</sup> from there with all the spoils of war, and a large number of men and women were made prisoners. Their prices fell so low that not to speak of the shopkeepers, even the unknown labourers bought

them All men bought slaves for themselves. By the grace of God the faithful overpowered the infidels and humiliated the jealous and the faithless. Praise be to the Lord, the Sustainer of all creation.

### Account of the Events at Thanesar.

The Sultan, the right arm of the kingdom and the keeper of the peace of the fraternity, had learnt that in the territories of Thanesar there were some famous war elephants of the Ceylonese type. They made the owner strong in his battles, infidelity, and denial (of Islam's truth). His rebellious designs and enmity knew no bounds. It was necessary that he should drink once from the Sultan's cup (of punishment) and be dragged on the coals of his retribution to make him realise that Islam has to be respected everywhere, and that, like other Rajas of Hindustan, he too deserved being made the target of Divine attack. The Sultan accordingly decided to attack him in order to make the standards of Islam fly high and make the idols lose their miracle-working power, so that infidelity be completely paralysed. He selected for his soldiers such among the faithful as had grown on swordsmanship as the child grows on milk, and had fed on the blood of the infidels as the hawk does on small and weak birds. On his way to Thanesar he passed through valleys as had not been covered by any creature except birds and fugitive animals. He passed over such wilderness as had never known a pedestrian's foot fall or heard the sound of the hoofs of a horse. Their throats got parched and their bodies became dry during this harassing march in these wild areas, of the scarcity of other provisions the less said the better. The Lord had mercy upon them and they reached a place which lay near their destination. On the other side ran a stream. The ground was hard and the

stones sharp as the edge of the sword. They found a mountain on its other bank. The infidel had posted his elephants with his back to the mountain and was proud of his foot-soldiers and cavalry. The Sultan proposed that his soldiers should cross the stream to the side of the God's enemy and attack him. Accordingly they crossed the stream at two points and engaged the enemy in battle at both places.<sup>19</sup> As the battle proceeded, the Sultan ordered that an attack on the infidels be made across the stream at the fordes through the roaring swiftness of the stream. He wanted to drive them from the banks of the river into the mountain-valleys. A pitched battle followed, swords were used in cutting throats and daggers in severing shoulder-blades. But at last the faithful were victorious and the infidels were worsted. In the second half of the day the Muslims made an attack whereby the enemy was pressed into the crevices of the mountains on account of his nervousness. They left the elephants (behind) of which they were so proud. And the faithful chased them. They captured the prominent among them and brought them to the Sultan's camp. Only those made good their escape who ran swiftest and made rounding them up impossible. So much blood of the polluted ones was shed in the stream that, despite its charity, the sparkling stream became putrid and its water became unfit for drinking. Had not the night covered their tracks, most of them would have been slaughtered. The Sultan acquired plunder, obtained success and help and gathered praise as his name signified.<sup>20</sup> The Sultan returned with his friends. He got so much wealth that the fingers of description became tired of counting it and the office-boxes were too small to contain their records. The tidings of this spread to the neighbouring countries.

### The March Towards Kanauj and the Area around Kashmir.

The Sultan completed the battle of Khwarazm. Those territories, too, became included in his dominions where his rule and justice were established. And he decided to suspend the operations for the year so that the soldiers and horses may have rest. Having changed his mind about the battle, he turned towards Bust like the sun itself which had turned towards the north. The whole world thereby became agreeable as if it had been garlanded or like a damsel reaching adolescence.

Hindustan had now been ravaged at the frontiers and on the sides by plunder and enslavement. The plains and mountainous areas had been taken into possession. There remained only the territories concealed in the womb of Kashmir. Its wilderness was unfamiliar to the voice of both man and spirits. Even the wind would lose its way without guides here.

It so happened that about 20,000 volunteers from the far and near parts of Mavara-un-Nahr came together under the Sultan. Their swords on their shoulders, they were ready for the holy war. They were willing enough to lay down their lives for God's way (Islam). Their own lives as their offering (*mahr*), they were ready to enter into a marriage contract with paradise. They were out to extort gifts by the keen edges of their swords. They stirred their fellows to action and stimulated the hearts of the Muslims with their godly intentions. The Sultan decided to lead them against Kanauj. It was the city that had rendered futile the efforts of all earlier monarchs except Gushasp.

It was a three months' journey from Ghazna to Kanauj on long-necked animals marching with their black necks held aloft. The Sultan sought God's guidance.

He gave up sleep and rest and marched with all those who were present. He safely crossed the Oxus, the Jhelum, the Ravi and the Sutlej. The depth of these rivers cannot be ascertained and both their banks cannot be seen at the same time. Some of them were so deep as to engulf even the elephants, much more so the horses. (In their swift current) even huge rocks stumbled and the ordinary animal's plight may well be imagined. The Sultan was able to cross them all by the grace of God bestowed on his followers and those endangering their lives for the sake of His good will. The Sultan had not to wage war in any of these territories—everywhere faithful<sup>21</sup> envoys waited on him with offers of services. Sibli bin Shahi bin Bahami, the gate-keeper of Kashmir, approached the Sultan. He well understood that the Sultan's army was the army of God which could only be won over by conversion to Islam or the blunting of the swords. He professed allegiance and undertook to show the rest of the way. He proceeded slowly and crossed one valley after another. The order for the march used to be given at the dead of the night by the beat of drum. The faithful then mounted their horses, and facing hardships would march onwards, now slowly, now swiftly, till sunrise. By the 20th Rajab 409 A. H (December 2, 1018), they had crossed the Jamuna.

### Submission of Hardat

The Sultan consecutively conquered the forts situated on the tops or on the sides of hills so lofty that necks had to be strained for having a look at them. Thus they reached the fort at (Buland-Shahr) which was situated in the territories of Hardat, one of the mighty *ranas* (an Indian term for rulers) of Hindustan. He came out to meet the Sultan, surrounded by God's chosen followers with the helmets on their heads and looking like angels. The Rana's

feet stumbled and he became afraid lest his head should become legally a prize. He thought of seeking safety from God's wrath through acceptance of Islam even though the Sultan had drawn out his sharp sword and had unfurled the banners of retribution. He came out with his 10,000 followers eagerly seeking conversion to Islam and renouncing idolworship. Thus God kept His promise and tully helped the Sultan by His favours.

### Defeat of Kulchand

Then the Sultan marched towards the fort of Kulchand who was a great evil-doer and chief among the accursed. On account of his untarnished fame, he used to take pride in his status (as if it was) even higher than that of monarchs. He looked askance even at great chiefs. He had spent his entire life in infidelity. The fear of his rule and the vastness of his resources had rendered him unmindful about the use of helmet and spear. None dared confront him, whoever did was defeated. He would untie all the knots of his enemies. He was respected and prosperous. His forces were powerful, his elephants numerous, his forts strong, and his government immune from popular resentment and slackness. When he found that the Sultan had turned towards him and was making open preparations to challenge him, he (the Raja) stationed his horses and elephants behind thick forests, the thorns and leaves of which would not allow even a needle thrown therein to fall to the ground. The Sultan sent a section of the vanguard to discover his whereabouts. They began to search for him, piercing through the bushes as a comb through the hair or as the awl of the cobbler passes through the leather. The Sultan discovered a path above the before-mentioned fort. He (the Sultan) did not frighten the people, except with the loud cries of 'Allah-o-Akbar' and the blue waves (of the



advancing army). The swords neither spared all nor did they destroy (everything). Their opponents, however, fought on steadfastly and bequeathed the tradition to fight bravely to the survivors among themselves, up and down flashed the swords, and cut their bones and flesh into tiny pieces. Their attacks continued unceasingly close upon one another. Their assaults fell (in swift succession) like the drops of rain. When the humiliated ones saw that their swords were blunted and that the swords of the faithful were sharp, that their (strokes) were slow and those of the faithful were rapid and came in quick succession, they began to whisper among themselves that those people (the faithful) were not human beings. They lamented that the swords which made themselves felt even against mountain sides were ineffective against them. When their defiance resulted in defeat and wretchedness, they took counsel among themselves to jump into the great waters at their back, hoping thereby to save themselves from revenge and death.

Undoubtedly the terrible swords entered into conspiracy with the waves with the result that many of them were imprisoned, killed, drowned and thus despatched to hell. The total number of the dead and the drowned probably exceeded 50 000, who fell a prey to the vultures or the iguanas, the alligators or the fish.

Kulchand did penance by killing first his wife and then himself.<sup>22</sup> God gave the Sultan 185 robust elephants in addition to other precious spoils.

### March to Mathura

When the battle was over and the booty had been gathered, the Sultan set his reins towards the place of pilgrimage popularly known as *Mathura* of India on account of the fortunate time of its foundation. They believed it was the abode of spirits, not of men. Its foundations were of the strongest, its roofs of the best; it had marvellous

compounds and corners. All that the Sultan witnessed here would have been unusual and unbelievable, not only without authority but without actual sight. He came across a city girt round with walls built of massive stones with two outlets towards the waters which surrounded it. All houses were built on raised ground so that they were safe from floods and heavy rains. On both sides there were one thousand rooms (on the city walls) as strong as the rest of the building. In the city there was a temple. Its corners were fastened with nails that reached the level of the house and were so well-set that the cutting for drying the nail could not be detected. In the heart of the city there was another temple as beautiful and strong, or even more beautiful and stronger, than the other temples. Neither the writer's pen nor the painter's brush can do adequate justice to its beauty, attractiveness, and the loftiness of its lovely design. The king had put an inscription on it declaring that no one could succeed in his design of erecting another such building. 100,000,000 *ashrafis*, spent in 200 years (made it possible to build this temple) by expert master-craftsmen and architects.

Five of these idols were cast in pure gold measured five yards in height and were suspended in mid air. For eyes, one of them had two rubies so valuable that the Sultan would have bought the idol for 50,000 *ashrafis* without giving the matter a second thought. In another idol was a blue ruby whose scintillating beauty reminded one of sparkling waves. It weighed 450 *musquals* (about 5 lbs). From the feet of another idol 4430 *musquals* of gold were obtained. All the idols yielded 98,300 *musquals* (1010 lbs) of gold and 200 times this weight in silver. The silver had to be broken for weighment, and even then, resort had to be taken to conjecture (to prepare possible estimates). By the Sultan's order, with oil and flames the rest of the idols were brought down to the ground.

### Advance to Kanauj

Victory showed him the way to Kanauj. He considered it as one of the blessings promised by God to him. He left behind a large portion of his forces. Mahmud's small army would induce the king of the country, Rajyapal<sup>23</sup>, to remain firm in his own territory and prevent him from running away in disgrace before facing Mahmud. Despite their pride, resources and large forces, the Rajas of Hindustan acknowledged themselves feudatories of the Raja of Kanauj on account of his high status. They were being deceived by his exalted office. The Sultan levelled to the ground the forts which he came across. 'Islam or death' was the alternative he placed before the people. So many prisoners, so much property and such valuables fell into his hands that no one could count them all. On the 8th of Sha'ban, Mahmud reached Kanauj. Feeling that being defeated (by Mahmud) was nothing dishonourable and the shame (of running away) no disgrace, Rajyapal, when he learnt of the approach of Mahmud, left the city, and crossed the Ganges where it is called *Kund*<sup>24</sup>. The Hindus speak much in its praise and worth. According to their belief it fills its lap from an everlasting spring of heaven. After cremation, the ashes of their dead are thrown into it, this, it is considered, cleanses them of all sins. Very often a pious man will come from far away and throw himself into its water in the belief that such a death will lead to his salvation. In fact he loses his life in this world and in the next he goes to hell where he will be disgraced, there will be neither life nor death for him then.

The Sultan sought out the forts of Kanauj and found that there were seven of them situated in the midst of water which was like the ocean. There were about 10 000 temples which the infidels believed had been in existence for two to three lakhs of years. A white lie, a

concocted tale, a departure from the path of truth! On account of their antiquity, they worshipped them and prayed to them tearfully. Afraid of (leaving their wives and children) widows and orphans, many of the people had fled on this descent of terror to their deaf and dumb gods. Some on account of their speedy flight escaped; but those who remained were killed and could not be protected either by the earth or the sky against the swords of truth. The Sultan conquered the whole place in a day and passed it on to his followers so that by plundering it they may inflict chastisement on and humiliate the infidels.

### Conquest of Munj and Asi

*From there he marched towards Munj<sup>25</sup> Arufra which was a fort of the Brahmans. Those people were very stubborn and so hot-headed that they only knew how to create disturbances in the country. Tall giants and insolent devils, they prepared themselves for a grim fight till they could fight no more. Safety made them humble and they realized they were no match for the Muslims, who would undoubtedly shed their blood. In accordance with God's will, regardless of the danger to their lives, they began to throw themselves down from the windows and lofty roofs on to the sharp spears and keen swords (of the Mussalmans), the swords made the earth lap up their blood and left their bodies for the vultures.*

The Sultan marched towards the fort of Asi<sup>26</sup>. The Raja of the place was called Chandpal Bhur—a powerful Hindu chief of great resources, large army, and vast dominions. He, too, like the king of Kanauj, decided to give battle, this only tired his friends and made him withdraw unsuccessful. Around the fort, the bushes grew thick, like the hair in the mane of a horse, offering stiff resistance as the brush of the weaver. The dragons in them defied the jugglers; the

full moon failed to light the path of the travellers. It was surrounded by deep and wide ditches. This rendered the fort invisible, but there was no other way to the fort.

As the Raja saw the Sultan approaching with his forces he lost heart, his pulse slowed down and he found himself staring at death. He had no alternative but to fly. The Sultan ordered the fort to be destroyed from its very foundations. He followed the Raja with his brave soldiers. Onward they marched, robbing, plundering, murdering and making prisoners until the infidels realized that they were the losers. The wretch had thought that his followers would prove veteran soldiers, earnest defenders and vanquishers of armies. At last he (the Raja) saw the Sultan's forces appear on his own roads and learnt of their deeds with spears and swords, bows and arrows, raining like the clouds. He (the Raja), therefore, realized that the blows of an amateur were different from those of a revengeful enemy and that the bow of a cotton-thrasher was different from that of a bowman.

### Defeat of Chand Rai

When the Sultan had done with the affair of Chandpal, and had taught him a lesson for his incurable malady of a fugitive, he turned towards Chand Rai. He (Chand Rai) was one of the great rulers of Hindustan and lived in the fort of Shroah.<sup>27</sup> He pretended as if the poet had said of him in the couplet '*I sneezed in pride, and my two hands without my getting up overpowered the Pleiades*'.

Such pride had kept him from surrendering to others and he knew nothing of things unworthy. In the previous days many battles had taken place between him and Raja Jaipal, in those battles many were killed and numerous veterans lost their lives. At last both were compelled to sue for peace to avoid bloodshed on both sides. Trilochanpal married his son

Bhimpal to the daughter of Chand Rai so that mutual goodwill may be established, estrangement be removed, enmity ended, and the swords remain sheathed. Accordingly, relying now on their matrimonial relation, trusting to the prevailing peace and the coming together of their two families and states, Trilochanpal sent his son. But the moment his son-in-law fell into Chand Rai's hands, he made him a prisoner and put him in chains. He demanded from him the restitution of property which had been destroyed by his father. Trilochanpal failed in reducing Chand Rai's fort, in conquering his territories or getting his son released from prison. The feud continued. Meanwhile, the Sultan's standard appeared in those territories. Thinking of seeking safety from his pursuers, Trilochanpal went to Bhim Chand, who was one of the great rulers of the time. His fort was strong, the way thereto inaccessible and its heights unassailable. Chand Rai prepared for opposition. Proud of the strength of his fort, he collected his forces for opposition. But had he remained in it, his own fort would have thrown him out. Bhimpal wrote to him : "Mahmud is not of the genus of Hindu Sirdars and is not the leader of black followers. It is difficult to save one's life from such a man as he. At hearing his name and his father's, armies fly away. I have known rulers with larger resources and greater status than yours who could not stand against a single blow of his sword. They would succumb against even a portion of his army. If you wish to humiliate yourself, you might do as you like; but if you desire safety, you should leave your place." The Raja realized the truth of Bhimpal's advice. He was afraid that if he went against it, he would be ruined. He removed his property, elephants, treasures and valuables to such high mountains as touched the cluster of the Pleiades, and to forests such as hid the face of earth from the sun. He kept his movements secret and it could not

be known where he had gone, or in which direction he was lost. The aggrieved Bhimpal had advised him to seek flight and leave the city because he was afraid that he, like his (Bhimpal's) uncles and relatives, might be compelled to accept Islam by falling into Mahmud's trap when suing for peace.

The Sultan, therefore, besieged the fort and despite the strength of its foundations and the force of attack from its embrasures, conquered it. He secured a large booty and valuable goods of various kinds. But he felt all these acquisitions of little value because the main object, the infidel, had escaped. The Sultan would not be content without his pursuit and capture. He, therefore, chased him for forty-five miles through prickly trees, that scratched the faces of those who passed through them and on stones that rendered the hoofs of the horses that struck upon them useless. By Sunday night, the 25th of Shaban, in the first watch of the night, he overtook them. The ignorant enemy had sought to render pursuit difficult by clasping the earth as they went up or down. The Sultan called on the devotees of Islam and on those who strictly observed fasts and said all their prayers to chase them at night with the shroud of darkness to help them and by the grace of God many died before the hot iron touched them, or became prisoners before they felt the Mussalmans' hands on them.

At last the faithful became satiated with fighting these infidels and killing the worshippers of the Sun and the fire. For three full days the friends of God went on capturing the booty left behind by the accursed. All this was permissible to them, because the infidels had procured it all in unlawful ways.

All elephants were brought to the Sultan, some by force and others by being made to turn their backs (on the Hindus). It was God's grace who continually appor-

tioned His gifts to him so that even the elephants were overpowered and came to him (the Sultan). For the same reason He is known as God, the Dispenser.

He thanked God because he directed the elephants; otherwise they are caught by means of iron bars and in jungles they are overpowered with great cunning and tact.

Whatever had been recovered from the fugitives—gold, silver, red precious stones, and peerless white pearls—were valued at about 30,00,000 dirhams in price. With regard to the prisoners, their abundance may be indicated by the fact that they were sold for from dirhams 2 to 10 each.

### Notes

1. At present called Laghman, often also referred to as the Lamghanats: i. e., the two Lamaghans on either side of the Kabul river. It is a fertile territory compared to the surrounding *dasht* or wilderness (M. H.)

2 Tradition says that the battle was fought near a place called Nimla, where a beautiful garden, first laid out by Jahangir, still stands. I have heard that an inscription to this effect was put up there by the late Amir Habibullah Khan. The tradition is probably correct. A large army, encamped on the banks of Kabul river would find it difficult to proceed beyond Nimla, and an army marching from Ghazni across the waterless *dasht* to Lamaghan (the present Jalalabad) would meet the enemy's advance guard near this spot. (M. H.).

3 Sukhpal, who was converted to Islam and later on appointed Mahmud's governor of Washud. Dr. Nazim wrongly makes him governor of Multan.

4. Hund See above, Girdizi, page 32, Note 4.

5. In 1003 A. D.

6 Anandpal See above, Girdizi, Page 23

7. The Quran.

8. Sukhpal, of note 3, above.

9. In 404 A. H., 1003 A. D.

10 Bhimpal of Alberuni and Nidar Bhim of Firishta, son of Trilochanpal.



11 Narayan has been identified as Narayanpur in the former state of Alwar, near Delhi Alberuni describes it as the capital of Gujrat Sachu, I, 202

12. Dr Nazim has suggested that this embassy was sent by the ruler of Narayanpur who had been subjugated a little earlier.

13 In 1013 A D

14. The Quran

15. Trilochanpal of Alberuni, II, 131

16. Nandana is in 'Pind Dadan Khan Tahsil of Jhelum district, 14 miles west of Choa Saidan Shah, situated in a remarkable dip of the outer salt range ' Imperial Gazetter, XVII, 349

17 This reflects the Muslim (and Christian) medieval thought on the subject

18 In 1013 A D

19 It is difficult to follow Mahmud's route to Thanesar as described by Utbi Girdizi's account is brief and does not describe the route. The stream on the banks of which the battle was fought could only have been a local stream and not the Satluj

20 Mahmud means the praised one

21 Janki, raja of Kotli

22. Cf Girdizi above page 26.

23 Rajyapal, raja of Kanauj

24. Probably Hardwar is meant

25 Munj has been variously identified as Majhawan ten miles south of Kanpur, (Elliot) Manaich near Jaunpur, (Dr. Vost) and 14 miles north east of Etawah (Dr. Nazim) The first two identifications place Munj on the onward march of Mahmud, while Dr. Nazim makes Mahmud turn back to Ghazni after his conquest of Kanauj No traditions (local or literary) exist in any one of three places about its being a military stronghold of the Brahmans, It is possible that Utbi is describing not a ruling power but a local corporation or authority Majhawan (now in ruins) is in the heart of the country of the Kanauj Brahmans

26 Asi is probably Asni 10 miles north east from Fathpur Tradition has it that it was named after Aswini Kumar, the physician of Gods

27. It is difficult to locate Shroah or Sharwa correctly Its ruler is not a local chief but one of the great rulers of Hindustan who had tried conclusions with redoubtable Jaipal It is more likely that wherever Shroah was situated, it was included within the territories of Chand Rai of Kanauj

## APPENDIX A

**Suggested Chronology of Mahmud's expeditions to India.**

- 986-7 Subuktigin defeated Jaipal.  
 995 Sukhpal taken prisoner and converted to Islam.  
 997 Death of Subuktigin.  
 Sept. 1000 Mahmud's first expedition to Indian territories on his side of the Indus.  
 27. Oct. 1001 Jaipal defeated, Waihand captured  
 Oct. 1004 Defeat of Bajrao, Raja of Bhera.  
 April, 1006 Defeat of Anandpal, capture of Multan, Sukhpal appointed governor of the frontier  
 1008 Sukhpal's rebellion, his defeat, capture and imprisonment.  
 1009 Anandpal defeated near Waihand.  
 1009 Fall of Nagarkot.  
 Aug. Sept. 1009 Spoils of Nagarkot displayed at Ghazni.  
 1010 Conquest of Narayanpur,  
 1011 Mahmud's second expedition to Multan.  
 1014 Mahmud's discomfiture at Nandana.  
 1014 Defeat of Bhimpal, fall of Nandana.  
       Defeat of Trilochanpal.  
 1012 Expedition to and capture of Thanesar.  
       or  
 1015  
 1015-16 Mahmud attacks Kashmir in vain.  
 1018 Submission of Janki of Kotli and of Hardat of Bulandshahr,

1019 Rulers of Mahaban, Asi and Munj  
defeated, Sack of Mathura and Kanauj.

1019 Alliance between Trilochanpal and  
Nanda, Mahmud takes Bari.

15 Dec. 1019 Trilochanpal defeated

1020 *Flight of Nanda.*

1020 Subjugation of the valleys of the Nur  
and Qirat.

1021 Second unsuccessful invasion of  
Kashmir.

1022-3 Conquest of Gwalior. Submission of  
Nanda.

18 Oct. 1025 Mahmud left for Somanath.

Jan. 1026 Capture of Somanath.

Mar. 1027 Mahmud leaves Ghazni to punish the  
Jats.

30 April, 1030 Death of Mahmud.

## APPENDIX B

### Contemporary rulers mentioned by Utbi and Girdizi.

#### I Local rulers.

1. Bajrao of Bhera.
2. Raja of Kashmir; Janki, his warden of marches.
3. Daud of Multan.
4. Hardat of Bulandshahr.
5. Raja of Thanesar.
6. Chandpal of Asni.
7. Ruler (?) of Munj.
8. Ram of Dha (?)

## II Imperial rulers.

1. Jaipal, Anandpal and Trilochanpal of Hindushahi dynasty.
2. Kulchand of Mahaban (Mathura) with a status higher than that of monarches.
3. Chand Rai of Kanauj, having the rest of Indian Princes as his feudataries.
4. Ruler of Narayanpur, king of Hindustan.
5. Padamdev (of Gujrat), Badshah of Hindus
- 6 Nanda of Gwalior and Kalanjar.

The existence of four rulers in the Doab, exercising imperial sway is doubtful. It seems that to exaggerate the extent of Mahmud's victories, the status of his opponents has been very considerably raised. From the accounts of battles, it seems that besides the Hindushahi rulers, Nanda was the only ruler in the Doab and central India who could claim a more than local status. Padamdev of Gujrat seems to have exercised authority over a considerable area in the west.

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## V

### THE NATURE OF THE STATE IN MEDIEVAL INDIA

It was the fashion at one time to divide the History of India into periods called after one of the main religions in the country. Vedic India and Buddhist India were duly followed by Muslim India. Major Basu capped it all by writing the history of the Christian Power in India. His title, however, indicated a compromise, it was obviously not Christian India he was concerned with, but the Christian Power in India. A similar change was noticeable when writers of text books professed to write on 'Muslim Rule in India' or more picturesquely, "The Crescent in India."

The difference, however, is less real than it seems to be at first sight. India had not gone Vedic, Buddhist, Muslim or Christian by turns. That its rulers were Christian, Buddhist, Jain, Shaivite or Muslim at any period, did not provide enough explanation of either the nature of their rule or the condition of the people under it. Strange as it may seem at first sight to western students of Indian history, it did not often matter very much in India what particular brand of faith its ruling dynasty professed. If a Harsha could do honour to Buddha and Shiva by turns, Humayun could be suspected of being a *Shia in India and a Sunni in Persia*. A Dalhousie, Asoka, Sikandar Lodi, Firuz Tughluq or Aurangzeb may have occasionally tried to leave the impress of his faith on the people but such attempts were in the nature of interludes, if not harbingers of reaction against the deviation from the normal course of Indian History. It can be safely asserted that at no time in Indian History did the faith of

her rulers mean as much to her people, as that of a Mary Tudor in England or a Henry IV in France.

When Qutb-ud-Din ascended the throne at Delhi in 1206, 'Muslim rule' had already passed through several phases. Formally elected Khalifas had yielded place to lines of hereditary rulers who could, however, be ousted from their throne by any bold adventurer. The Jizya had long ceased to be the one single tax which the non-Muslim had paid during the earlier period of Islamic history and it seemed to have degenerated into an instrument of humiliation for them<sup>1</sup>. The Qazi still pronounced judgments according to the law when authorized to do so, but he no longer had the power of ensuring that the only law was the 'Muslim Law' or that it covered the king's actions as well<sup>2</sup>. In the long history of Muslim rule ranging over four centuries and covering three continents few rulers had lost their throne by acting contrary to the 'Law'. The law itself stood divided into several schools<sup>3</sup>. Its basis was the traditional memory of what the Prophet or his companions had done under certain circumstances, rather than the Quran. Many spurious traditions were in circulation and some of them, if rejected by one school, found their way into the text-books of another. The public law, governing the organization, the authority and the functions of government and its relations with its citizens had everywhere superimposed on Muslim foundations local customs and traditional practices<sup>4</sup>. It was not surprising, therefore, that the field of personal law had also been invaded by local customs, tribal practices and even by non-Islamic religious usages.

It is necessary to emphasize that the various Muslim States dotted all over Arabia, the Middle East, North Africa or elsewhere were in no sense theocracies. A theocracy presumes an infallible religious head, a corps

of official interpreters of the law and domination of the State by an organized church. At no time in the history of Islam had all these three elements been present together. None of them had the backing either of Muslim law or Muslim practices. No Khalifa had ever claimed to be a Pope—an inspired infallible interpreter of the law. Islam had no organized church. It has none now.

It is, however, well to remember that the Muslim rulers were expected to act as agents of Islam and thus help in spreading it as well as in encouraging the maintenance of the Muslim way of life<sup>5</sup>. There was, however, no institution, religious or political, designed to measure their performance of these two duties, much less censure them for their failure or lukewarmness in the execution of the task. It was all left to their conscience. In many cases Muslim rulers interpreted these two duties to include making war on the non-Muslims as well as converting them to their own faith. But in this the Muslim rulers did not form a class apart from their Muslim subjects. They shared these two duties with them and were very often influenced by the contemporary interpretation thereof<sup>6</sup>.

The Arab attacks on Sind had, however, brought the Muslims face to face with a new set of circumstances in India. The Hindus or the Buddhists in Sind showed no signs of accepting the faith of their conquerors. Some of those who were converted relapsed into their old faith. The Muslim law, as interpreted at the time, held these apostates guilty of a capital crime. But the governor of Sind found it impolitic, if not dangerous to enforce such a law in an area which was preponderantly non-Muslim. He proposed to the Khalifa that the provisions of this law should not be enforced in Sind. The Khalifa was realist enough to perceive that he should not endanger Arab rule in Sind by executing unwilling recruits and half-baked

converts The permission sought was granted and the first exception to the application of the Muslim law to non-Muslims in India was sanctioned.<sup>7</sup>

How and when the second exception arose we do not know at present on authentic evidence. But when Qutb-ud-Din ascended the throne of Delhi, we find no attempt made to enforce the prohibition current outside India against the public celebration of non-Muslim religious festivals.<sup>8</sup> A pilgrimage tax was, however, levied. There is nothing to suggest that he was responsible for the change. He seems to have allowed the practice to emerge.

The third exception goes back to the conquest of Sind. When Dahar's kingdom became an Arab Province, the Brahmans were excused the payment of the Jizya on the plea that they were exempted from payment of all other taxes.<sup>9</sup> Whether the amount due from them was foregone altogether or added to the imposition on other classes we do not know.

These earlier deviations from Muslim law in Sind may not have been known to the Ghoris. We find, however, that they adopted the third variant. The second too was in operation under them and their successors. Instances of capital punishment being awarded to apostates are so few and far between in the chronicles of the time, that we shall not be straining historical credulity to assume that the first exception was also known to them. The Ghoris had supplanted the Ghaznavis in the Punjab, who earlier had conquered Multan from Muslim rulers who traced back their authority to the Muslim conquest of Sind.

The kingdom of Delhi was founded in 1206 by Qutb-ud-Din Aibak. His son Aram succeeded him in 1210 but was put aside and murdered by Iltutmish within a short time.<sup>10</sup> Iltutmish and his successors ruled in Delhi till



1266 when, on the death of Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud, his prime Minister Balban ascended the throne <sup>11</sup>

Balban's grandson, Kaiqubad was murdered in the interests of Jalal-ud-Din Khilji in 1290 <sup>12</sup> The Khiljis continued to exercise sovereign authority in Delhi for thirty years. In 1320 Nasir-ud-Din murdered Qutb-ud-Din Khilji and ascended the throne as Nasir-ud-Din Khusru Shah <sup>13</sup> He failed to found a dynasty, however, as he was defeated by Ghias-ud-Din Tughluq within six months of his usurping power <sup>14</sup> The Tughluqs continued to rule till 1413 but the backbone of their authority was broken in 1398 when Timur conquered and sacked Delhi and claimed to leave his Viceroys in Multan Punjab and Sind. In 1413 when the last of the Tughluqs died Daulat Khan assumed power in Delhi without, however, claiming royal honours <sup>15</sup> But he was soon displaced by Sayyid Khizr Khan who claimed to rule as a viceroy of Timur <sup>16</sup> Ala-ud-Din the last of the Sayyids was probably saved from going the way of other displaced rulers of Delhi on account of his alleged descent from the Prophet. He was allowed to retire to Badaon in 1451 and Bahlol Lodi ascended the throne <sup>17</sup> The Lodi dynasty was brought to an end by Ibrahim Lodi's defeat and death in 1526

Out of these nine dynastic changes in three hundred and twenty years only two were bloodless. Balban and Daulat Khan were the only two occupants of the throne of Delhi who founded or attempted to found a new line without recourse to violence. Iltutmish, Jalal-ud-Din Khilji, Nasir-ud-Din Khusru and Bahlol Lodi got rid of the last representative of the reigning dynasty by intrigue accompanied with violence rather than open revolt. Ghias-ud-Din Tughluq and Khizr Khan broke into open revolt against the occupant of the throne and succeeded in ousting the ruling dynasty. In almost all cases the founders of new dynasties had held public office under

the old dynasty. The period may thus be well called as one characterised by recurrent and chronic revolt.

A dynastic change may well be the result of violence. But members of a ruling dynasty could have been expected to live in accord. But here again the story is as bloody as before. Iltutmish's children, Rukn-ud-Din, Raziya and Bahram were assassinated one after another, each usually in the interest of his successor<sup>18</sup> His grandson Masud died in prison. Ala-ud-Din was responsible for the murder of his king and uncle, Jalal-ud-Din. He is alleged to have been poisoned in the interest of his son<sup>19</sup> Ala-ud-Din's son, Shahabudin, was done away with in the interest of his brother Qutb-ud-Din<sup>20</sup> Muhammad-bin-Tughluq is alleged to have murdered his own father, Ghias-ud-Din<sup>21</sup> Of the five grandsons of Firuz Tughluq who followed him on the throne, Ghias-ud-Din was murdered, Abu Bakr passed his last days in prison, Nasrat Shah died a fugitive in far away Gujarat. Firuz Shah's son, Nasir-ud-Din, was kept out for two years in favour of Firuz Shah's grandson. He ascended the throne in 1390 but was again turned out in 1394 in favour of his son<sup>22</sup> Two of Firuz's grandsons Nasrat Shah and Mahmud claimed to be ruling at the same time<sup>23</sup> Sikandar Lodi's death was followed by a civil war<sup>24</sup>

Thus within a dynasty or outside succession to the throne was usually an affair accompanied by violence or intrigue, if not murder. Of the thirty two rulers spread over nine dynasties, only three succeeded, peacefully and without challenge, to the authority wielded by their predecessors<sup>25</sup> Only 15 died a natural death<sup>26</sup>

Under such circumstances a law of succession could not possibly be evolved. Claims to the throne were based variously on election, birth and nomination by the reigning monarch<sup>27</sup> But none of these was ever a decisive factor, some times they clashed with one another, but very

often only an appeal to force decided the issue. Attempts have been made to suggest that kingship was elective during the Sultanate<sup>28</sup> Though violence so often preceded a succession, it was always found possible to claim that a ruler had been 'elected' by some of the 'faithful'. Neither the number nor the qualifications of such 'electorate' had ever been precisely, if at all, laid down with authority<sup>29</sup> and any such claim could as easily be controverted by another. Firuz Tughluq's assumption of power after a so-called process of election well illustrates the hollowness of a claim of this nature. When a mission on behalf of Muhammad-bin-Tughluq's son reigning at Delhi called upon him to surrender power and swear allegiance to his 'Master', he did not confront it with his claim to 'election' to the kingly office and tell it to be gone. Instead he set up a commission of his own to enquire into the claims of the occupant of the throne at Delhi. The commission reported against the 'impostor' at Delhi but said not a word about Firuz's claim due to his election<sup>30</sup>.

Another fiction made the rulers of Delhi governors on behalf of distant Khalifas<sup>30a</sup>. Since appointment as governor followed long after acquisition of power, and the Khalifa could do little except send 'robes of office' in return for costlier presents, it added nothing to the stature of a reigning monarch that he had been recognized by the Khalifa. Never was an unfortunate ruler who was vanquished in civil strife or pursued by relentless enemies, able to improve his prospects with the help of the Khalifa's blessing. So hollow was the authority of the Khalifa in his Indian 'Viceroyalty' that though the Mughals murdered al-Mustasim in 1258,<sup>31</sup> his name continued to be inscribed on the coins of Indian rulers till 1296<sup>32</sup>. Claims based on nomination by one's predecessor found little acceptance. Ilutmish nominated Raziya as his successor<sup>33</sup> but she was

kept out, Firuz claimed to have been nominated by Muhammad-bin-Tughluq as his successor but so thin was such a claim in popular opinion that he dared not act on it.<sup>34</sup> Balban nominated Kaikhusru as his successor but he was easily ignored by the nobles<sup>35</sup>

Government was thus a personal acquisition. One enjoyed it as long as one had the strength of arms to do so. The contemporary attitude to royalty is well illustrated by the reaction of Ala-ud-Din's army to the claim put forward by Iquat-Khan—he declared he had murdered Ala-ud-Din and demanded that Ala-ud-Din's generals and administrators should recognize him as their king. They expressed no horror at the regicide but safeguarded their interests by promising him support provided he could show them the murdered Sultan's severed head.<sup>36</sup> Even Amir Khusru, the most cultured of the medieval Muslims in India, has not chosen in his works to refer to, far less to comment on, 'Ala-ud-Din's crime in murdering his uncle and king, Jalal-ud-Din Khilji'.<sup>37</sup> Babur in his *Memoirs* attributed a strange law of succession to Bengal where he said a king always came to the throne by murdering his predecessor.<sup>38</sup> He might have said the same of the large number of the earlier occupants of the throne of Delhi.

The rulers of Delhi were Muslims just as the occupants of most of the thrones in contemporary Europe were Christians. In Europe, the Christian rulers usually ruled over Christian subjects. It would be as accurate to describe contemporary European kingdoms as theocracies as to apply the same term to the Indian kingdom of Delhi under its Muslim rulers. In fact the term is less accurate when applied to Indian conditions where no organized church hierarchy existed, where the rulers were not, even theoretically, bound to an outside religious head and

where they ruled over a preponderantly large non-Muslim population<sup>39</sup>

Muslims by faith and upbringing, these rulers were familiar only with the Muslim way of doing things, this alone appeared to them the normal way. They followed it as best as they could. But the obligation to do so was personal and not institutional. If at any time any ruler felt like being a little slack in the performance of his duties, there was no institution in the Sultanate that could bring back an 'erring' Sultan to the right path. Whatever of Muslim tradition or law was made applicable to their subjects in India, was defined and limited by the personal predilection of the ruler.

But the Sultans never attempted to impose the civil law of Islam on non Muslims. For deciding civil disputes among themselves, and even criminal cases the vast majority of their subjects had recourse to courts of their own and were thus outside the pale of the Sultanate's institutions<sup>40</sup>. So far as the Muslims were concerned, they were supposed to follow the Muslim law. But this supposition was true only of non Indian Muslims. The Indian converts to Islam were content to marry according to the Muslim injunctions, the marriage had to be valid in Muslim law and was performed according to the Muslim rites by a Qazi who also acted as the registrar-general. In other matters—particularly in the matter of succession to property—the new converts very often continued following their local, tribal or caste customs<sup>41</sup>. Disputes arising thereunder could have been settled by the Panchayats of one type or another. The Qazi could not have been expected to lend the dignity of his office to support practices that had no sanction in Muslim law. It was probably on account of this curtailment of the authority of the Qazis in India that Shams-ud-Din, a great Muslim jurist from Egypt, returned home from Lahore and refused

to accept Ala-ud-Din's invitation to take office under him<sup>42</sup>

A vague responsibility rested on the Sultans to make their Muslim subjects conform to Islamic practices in their daily lives. This was done by the appointment of Muhtasibs who had also certain purely secular duties to perform. Contemporary records reveal no great activity on the part of the Muhtasibs. The attempts made in this direction by rulers like Firuz Shah Tuguluq, Sikandar Lodi, Muhammad-bin Tughluq or Balban<sup>43</sup> seem to have been inspired by the personal zeal of the King. The best that can be said of Firuz Shah Tughluq in this connection by his panegyrist Afif, is that he prohibited visits by Muslim women to the tombs of the saints<sup>43a</sup>. Sadr's office figures occasionally in the pages of contemporary chroniclers, but without much to show by way of supervision of either the morals of the people or the personal conduct of the King. The Sadr was the Chief ecclesiastical officer in the State but in the chronicles of the Sultanate, he finds prominence as the King's religious preceptor rather than as one who superintends obedience to the public law. The only thing that we learn about a great Sadr of Firuz Shah is the fact that he never made a direct request to the King to do something but by a ruse ensured the King's interest in himself finding out what was needed to be done. When he would take leave of the king, he would allow a slip describing what he desired done to fall out, as if accidentally, from his turban. He would make no attempt to retrieve it, but the king would hasten to get possession of it and act accordingly<sup>44</sup>.

As the government was despotic, the kings recognized no obligation in practice not to go against 'the law' however interpreted. Ala-ud-Din was curious to learn what the Muslim jurists thought of his administrative innovations. When told that most of his administrative

practices labelled 'legal sanctions', Ala-ud-Din was enraged and Qazi Mughis-ud-Din trembled. Ala-ud-Din was impenitent and showed no disposition to mend his ways maintaining that whatever he did was done for the benefit of his subjects<sup>1</sup>. The Qazi did not proceed to condemn him straightway though he conveyed to Ala-ud-Din the enormity of his offence. He disavowed any intention of sitting in judgment on the Sultan's ways of administering his vast kingdom and declared that, in spite of their being 'unlawful', the Sultan was free to govern the country as he thought best<sup>45</sup>. Khusru<sup>46</sup> and Barni<sup>47</sup> clinch the matter by calling Ala-ud-Din, "the Shadow of God on Earth". It has been claimed 'about Firuz Shah Tughluq that the theologians were satisfied with him for he never did anything that was declared unlawful by his theological advisers<sup>48</sup>. But the only instances of his strictly following the tradition that Afif records consist of his allowing the soldiers to keep four-fifth of the plunder as their share and the remission of certain taxes totalling 30 lakhs of tankahs.<sup>49</sup> It is interesting to notice that the remission took place in 1375 in the twenty-seventh year of Firuz Shah's reign. Till then he had continued going the ways of his predecessors and collected the taxes not sanctioned by the law<sup>1</sup>. Judging by the 'general laxity of administration during the concluding years of his reign, it is not likely that the order announcing these remissions was ever enforced, particularly as some of the taxes happened to be perquisites of certain offices. This is clearly proved when we analyse Firuz Tughluq's orders about the imposition of the Jizya on the Brahmins. Firuz began by being very severe with the Brahmins who had been enjoying an exemption not mentioned by law. But in the end other castes were, - are, allowed to undertake to pay for the Brahmins. One would have assumed that this would result in the imposition of an additional

cess on other castes. Actually the Jizya was reduced from its minimum rates of 10 tankahs per head to 50 tankahs for ten for the rich and poor alike.<sup>50</sup>

Sikandar Lodi is credited with abolishing the pilgrimage tax as pilgrimages were considered 'unlawful'. Again, despite the steps which Sikandar Lodi is said to have taken to enforce this prohibition, it is not likely that he was able to stop pilgrimages to all the sacred places of the Hindus.

Ala-ud-Din's reign was an experiment in totalitarian administration under a dictator who deliberately defied all religious limits on his authority. To the vast majority of his subjects this claim made no difference. But it is interesting to remember that this attempt occasioned no religious protest.<sup>51</sup> Even Amir Khusru was content to speak of him as "God's Shadow on Earth".

Almost all the Sultans showed an anxiety to pursue a policy towards Hindus which should bring them no discredit in the eyes of the exponents of the 'Law'. Conversions to other faith were punished as apostasy though not many such cases are recorded.<sup>52</sup> Jizya was levied on all able-bodied Hindu men as a capitulation tax though the rate seems to have been uncertain.<sup>53</sup> Pilgrimages and religious fairs seem to have been usually permitted on payment of the pilgrimage tax. Places of Hindu worship were generally let alone except when they were desecrated after the first conquest or occupation of a territory.<sup>54</sup> No attempt seems to have been made in India at enforcing a distinctive dress on the Hindus.<sup>55</sup> They did have a distinctive dress of their own, but if a Hindu copied the dress of the Muslim rulers, he seems to have been permitted to do so. As a result it showed that he was coming nearer to the Muslim way of life. New public temples are known to have been built, old temples were continually repaired.<sup>56</sup> Ala-ud-Din Khilji needed a vast



army of civil servants to make his experiment in totalitarianism a success. So the monopoly of government offices enjoyed by the Muslims and foreign Muslims at that was destroyed and Hindus were admitted in large numbers as public servants.<sup>57</sup> Muhammad-bin-Tughluq is accused of giving office to the unworthy,—unworthy in the eyes of the canon law jurists—that is to say Indian Muslims as well as Hindus.<sup>58</sup> It is a curious commentary on the Sultanate that its last champion to challenge the Mughal right to refound a dynasty in India was Hemu, the Hindu minister and commander-in-chief of Muhammad Shah Adil of the Sur dynasty.<sup>59</sup>

Of course, many of the Sultans made Delhi the cultural centre of Islam. Balban, Ala-ud-Din, Muhammad-bin Tughluq, and Firuz Shah Tughluq maintained a large number of Muslim scholars, both Indian and non-Indian. Many of these enriched the Muslim lore, both sacred and profane. The public servants who, after rebellion, founded dynasties of their own in the provinces, set up courts where they emulated the Sultans. Painting and architecture in India were both enriched by the introduction of new media and the execution of new types of work. Dancing and music were kept alive by royal patronage.<sup>60</sup>

Two other institutions must also be noticed, slavery and the grant of hereditary jagirs. Both made the State feudal. Firuz Shah kept 1,80,000 slaves.<sup>61</sup> Ghias-ud-Din Tughluq is said to have reinstated the descendants of those to whom Ala-ud-Din had granted jagirs, including the husbands of their daughters.<sup>62</sup> In case of failure of heirs, jagirs were revived in favour of capable slaves of the original grantee. Firuz would not hear of the resumption of any jagir whatever the reason for it.<sup>63</sup> Coupled with the division of the kingdom into 'parts' divided among administrators bound only to pay the Sultan an agreed surplus,<sup>64</sup> these two practices made it almost

impossible for any healthy administrative practice to arise or for an honest administration to flourish,

The very origin of some dynasties destroyed all the mystery and prestige with which rulers like Balban tried to surround royal authority<sup>65</sup> Jalal-ul-Din would not sit on the throne after his accession, having been a servant of Balban<sup>66</sup> Bahlol would not sit even on a raised platform and claimed to be only one of the Afghan chiefs occupying a place of pre-eminence among equals<sup>67</sup> No wonder Ibrahim Lodi's ill-timed attempt to revive the royal prestige made him unpopular<sup>68</sup>

It is thus difficult to sum up the nature of the State in Medieval India. Exercising sovereign authority yet owing allegiance to an outside power, professing to be a Muslim State yet ruling over a vast majority of Hindus and leaving them to their own ways repressive to its non-Muslim subjects in theory yet treating them much better in practice than contemporary rulers anywhere else in the world treated subjects belonging to a different faith, allowing slaves to rise to the places even of rulers yet keeping a vast horde of them in bondage! These contradictions make it difficult to apply any well recognized label to the nature of the State. They defy any attempt to submit it even to the Aristotelian classification, it was neither a monarchy, as it was not hereditary, nor an aristocracy, as the officials who ruled never formed a class. It was simply a medieval despotism under rulers who professed Islam and who remained on the throne only as long as they possessed strength to retain authority. The great public officials usually functioned as king makers placing now one prince, now another on the throne some times doing so in a spirit of mockery<sup>69</sup> But now and again an Ala ud-Din or a Muhammad-bin Tughluq could so assert himself on the throne as to carry everything before him. The Government then became unrestrained despotism approaching at times totalitarian dictatorship.

## Notes

- 1 Mawardi, *Ahkam-us Sultania*, 235 ff, Tritton, *Caliphs and Their Non Muslim Subjects*, 21 Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 119, 171, 218, 28 to 45.
- 2 *Ma alim ul Qurba*, edited by Levy, Cf. *Fiqh-i-Firoz Shahi*, *Ahkam*, pp 116.
3. *Fatawa : Alamgiri* (Urdu Translation), differing opinions of various schools cited in almost every articles
- 4 Nizam ul Mulk Tusi *Siyasat Nama* especially pages 110 and 111, Barni, 511
5. Cf Von Kramer, *Politics in Islam in Islamic Civilization* by Khuda Bukhsh pp 43 to 118.
- 6 Cf *Tarikh-i Fakhr-ud-Din Mubarak Shah* on contemporary thought on Monarchy.
- 7 Elliot and Dowson Vol I, 125. Cf *Conversion and Reconversion to Hinduism* Muhammad-bin Qasim allowed the temple at Aror in Sind to stand, 'because, said he 'a temple is just like a church, a fire temple or a synagogue, *Futuh ul Buldan* II, 190
- 8 Al-mawardi holds that the sounds of non Muslim worship should not come to the ears of the faithful Many places of pilgrimages in India were far from normal centres of the Muslim population and could have been easily held to be protected under this statement of Muslim practices prevailing till the fifth century of the Muslim era
- 9 *Futuh ul Buldan* (II, 220) mentions the levying of Jizya for the first time in Sind after 221 A. H but *Chach Nama* mentions that Muhammad bin Qasim levied the Jizya Elliot, I, 182 *Tuhfat ul-Kiraam*, 181 (quoted in Elliot I, 476, n, 3) mentions a special agent sent to Sind for the collection of Jizya, *Chach Nama* (in Elliot, I, 183) seems to imply exemption for Brahmans
- 10 *Tabaqat : Nasirs*, 141, 170, Yahya 16.
- 11 *Firishta*, 74, Barni, 27 to 29, Yahya 40
- 12 Yahya *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 59, *Firishta*, 88, Barni 183.
- 13 Ibn Batuta II, 80, 81 *Tughluq Nama*, 22 to 26, Barni, 408, Yahya, 87 to 91, Isami, 365 *Firishta* 128, Cf *Nasir-ud Din Khusru Shah*, below.
14. *Tughluq Nar a*-151. Isami, 380, *Firishta*, 129.

- 15 Firishta, 161
16. Firishta, 161.
17. *Tarikh-i-Daudi* (Dorn) 44, Firishta, 172,
18. *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, 181, 182, 184, 190, 197, Firishta, 68, 69, 70, Yahya, 17, 21, 23, 28, 34.
- 19 Barni, *Tarikh-i-Firuzshahi* 234, 369, Firishta, 122.
20. Khusru, *Tughluq Nama*, 18, Barni 381 to 391, Yahya, 83, 86, Isami, 347.
21. Ibn-Batuta, 100, Cf. Barni 452, Yahya, 96, Isami, Nizam ud-Din, *Tabaqat-i-Akbar Shani*, 128 ff., Badaoni, I, 224, 226, Firishta, 123.
22. Firishta, I, 151, 152, 154 and 161.
23. Ibid, I, 159 to 161.
24. Dorn, 70 ff, Firishta, I, 188.
25. Balban, Kaiqubad, Sikandar-Lodi.
26. Qutb ud-Din Aibak, Iltutmish, Nasir-ud-Din, Mahmud, Balban, Ala-ud Din Khilji (? alleged poisoned), Muhammad-bin Tughluq, Firoz Shah Tughluq (twice poisoned), Nasir-ud-Din Tughluq, Sikandar, Mahmud Shah, Sayyid Khizar Khan, Ala ud-Din, Bahlol Lodi and Sikandar Lodi
27. Cf. Tripathi, *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration Chapters*, III to VIII.
- 28 Cf Tripathi, 25, 39, 64.
- 29 *Ahkam* quotes authorities laying down the number from 5 to 1.
30. Cf. Accession of Firuz Shah Tughluq below.
- 30a. Iltutmish began the custom of seeking recognition by the Khalifa and most of the later Sultans followed in his footsteps. Cf. Wright
31. *Tarikh-i-Guzida*, 81.
32. Cf. Wright, pages 58, 66, 83, 84
33. *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, 185
34. Cf. Accession of Firuz Shah Tughluq below
- 35 Barni, 121-22, Yahya, 53; Firishta, 83.
- 36 Barni, 273 to 215; Firishta, 106.
- 37 Cf. Khusru's works.
- 38 *Rabur Nama*, II, 482. 'A surprising custom in Bengal is that hereditary succession is rare .. It is indeed the peculiarity of the

royal office itself that any person who kills the Padashah and sits himself on the throne becomes ruler himself'.

39 Cf. *Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperor*, by Sri Ram Sharma.

40. Cf. *Ahkam*, 118 where appointment of non-Muslim Qazis is permitted.

41. Cf. the Muslim law in India today where tribal law and local custom overrides Islamic law methods of succession among many Indian converts to Islam.

42 Barni, 299.

43. Barni, 511, quotes with approval earlier authorities allowing a king to award the death penalty for seven types of crimes. Out of these seven only three had the support of law.

43 a *Futuhāt-i Firuz Shahī* quoted in *Firishta*, I, 151.

44 *Aḥf Tarikh-Firuz Shahī*, 283, 284.

45 Cf. *Memoirs of Muhammad bin-Tughluq in Rise and Fall of Muhammad-bin-Tughluq* where it is declared that during Ala-ud-Din's reign no trace of Islam remained in India. Barni, 295, 296, 445, *Firishta*, I, 110, 111.

46 Cf. *Khazain ul-Futuh*, I.

47. Barni, 168.

48 *Aḥf*. 373.

49 *Aḥf*, 375 to 379, but compare *Futuhāt-i-Firuz Shahī* as quoted by *Firishta*, I, 150, 151.

50. *Aḥf*, 382 to 384.

51. Cf. however *Memories of Muhammad-bin Tughluq*

52 *Ahkam*, 239. Cf. Firuz Shah's ordering a Hindu to be burnt because he had converted a Muslim.

53. *Ahkam* (235 ff) gives the rates as 12, 24 and 48 dirhams but cites various authorities giving differing rates. One of these puts the minimum at a dinar (=20 dirhams). From Barni it appears that the rates usually current in India were 10, 20 and 40 tankahs.

54 *Futuh-ul Buldan*, II, 190 records that in conquering Almoravids in Sind Muhammad bin Qasim allowed the old temples to stand. Cf. *Firishta*, 187.

55 *Ahkam* holds that this could be done only if the conquered people undertook to do it by a special agreement.

56 Cf. *Reports Archaeological Survey of India* for temples newly built or dating from earlier times.

57. Cf. Afif, 217.

58. Barni, 499 ff.

59. Hemu deserted his master's standard and after his conquest of Delhi claimed to rule as an independent king.

60. Firishta, I, 120 to 122, 76, 75, 130, 151, 133.

61. Afif, 270

62. Barni, 438.

63. Afif, 96.

64. Cf Afif, 95

65. *Tabaqat-i-Nasari*, 900-11, Barni, 22, 39, 25.

66. Barni, 178, 179.

67. Firishta, I, 179.

68. Firishta, 188, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 133.

69. Shihab-ud Din Khilji 'was placed on the throne by amirs and maliks in a spirit of showmanship' Barni, 382.

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## VI

### A MEDIEVAL EXPERIMENT IN TOTALITARIANISM

Ala-ud-Din presents the spectacle of a medieval king strutting about in almost modern trappings. Though the idea of a ruler exercising 'sovereign' authority in his state must have been foreign to his age, Ala-ud-Din did exercise what would today be described as sovereign authority. Custom, tradition and religion effectively assigned to all individuals their specific sphere of action. The rulers were no exception. His predecessor on the throne of Delhi, Jalal-ud-Din Firuz, would not have dared to claim any special privileges for the king. Ala-ud-Din was made of sterner stuff. He had treacherously murdered his uncle, benefactor and king in order to ascend the throne. When once he had seated himself there, he soon discovered that there were others who, whether inspired by his example or otherwise, were anxious to play the game he had made so profitable. He was driven to devise methods for preventing successful rebellion. When the Mongols camped in Delhi his anxiety became all the greater. He decided upon so completing his measures as to make him safe both against internal rebellion as well as foreign enemies.

Barni records that every time Ala-ud-Din embarked upon a campaign of controlling the activities of his subjects, *he called his advisers together*.<sup>1</sup> It has even been suggested that Ala-ud-Din was merely a tool in the hands of others in these matters and that he contributed nothing to these discussions himself<sup>2</sup>. The first 'conference' was followed by the imposition of such a harsh regime on the 'nobles', that they could have hardly inspired its decisions.

Howsoever welcome the humiliation of nobles may have been to the theologians, it is difficult to believe that they could have been instrumental in devising such uncanonical, such 'unlawful' measure. Hindus were the main targets of his policy, they could not have given him advice against themselves. It is thus difficult to imagine who these 'conferees' could have been to lead Ala-ud-Din to this novel path. Theologians could certainly have inspired a campaign against drinking but these regulations were not confined to matters of prohibition alone. Yahya<sup>3</sup> suggests quite a different reason for Ala-ud-Din's embarking upon a policy of prohibition. He is said to have executed one of his bosom friends one evening. The order was issued when Ala-ud-Din was drunk. He discovered his mistake next morning and gave up drinking himself and imposed prohibition on his subjects. It is interesting to note that contemporary records do not give even a single name of these advisers. It may well be questioned whether they really existed at all. It may be more correct to hold that, pressing upon most classes of his subjects as these measures did, they may have been more the results of Ala-ud-Din's own 'inventiveness' than inspired by unknown advisers.

When all his regulations were in force they aimed at controlling the social life and economic activities of the larger section of his subjects. It has been suggested that the measures controlling economic activities were confined to the capital alone.<sup>4</sup> The contemporary accounts and later compilation do not however bear this out. It seems more probable that there was no distinction made between the capital and the rest of the Khilji territories. Of course, his regulation could apply only to the settled territories directly governed by his own administrators.

The first set of regulations controlled social life, ostensibly of the 'nobility'. They were forbidden to



extend or accept hospitality from one another. No matrimonial alliances could be made without obtaining royal permission<sup>5</sup> Manufacture, transport, sale and taking of intoxicants were prohibited Ala-ud-Din himself set an example to usher in the new dispensation. The entire royal stock of wines and liquors was publicly destroyed, drinking vessels followed suit. When stills were installed in private houses or wine transported from elsewhere in secret, the Sultan always managed to 'receive information' and his officers acting on it made a public example of the offenders But 'drinking' had become too serious an affliction to the 'higher classes of society to be easily shaken off' Imprisonment, flogging and heavy fines failed to cure either the offenders or the panderers to this vice It was finally decided that private manufacture for personal use in the privacy of one's home was permissible but neither its sale nor its use in public or in parties was to be allowed<sup>6</sup>

Either along with the enforcement of prohibition or separately, another set of orders was issued All 'grants' of land are said to have been resumed This included grants made to theologians, scholars and pious men.<sup>7</sup> Jagirs held by the public servants and army officers and other ranks are also supposed to have been all resumed<sup>8</sup> But jagirs continued to be granted hereafter under Ala-ud-Din One of the complaints against Muhammad Tughlaq is that he resumed the jagirs of the descendents of those who had been originally granted jagirs by Ala-ud-Din.<sup>9</sup> Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq is said to have restored all the Alai jagirs to the descendents of those to whom they had been originally granted<sup>10</sup> We read of the grants of jagirs to Ala-ud-Din's officers by the emperor<sup>11</sup> Ala-ud-Din may have preferred payment of official salaries in cash. But to assert that he assumed all the *jagirs* granted in lieu of cash salaries seems to be wrong and the assertion

is not supported by contemporary authorities. He resumed 'Inam, Malik and Waqf' grants<sup>12</sup> These were all rent-free holdings held without any obligation of public service attached to them. There is nothing to indicate that assignment of land revenue in place of payment of cash salaries was discontinued

The wording of the order as it has come down to us seems to indicate that the classes which had hitherto acted as intermediaries for the collection of land revenue for the State were also dispossessed of whatever 'rights' they had in the land.<sup>13</sup> This is indicated by the fact that Ala-ud-Din is said to have introduced the assessment of land revenue by measurement and collected it in cash at rates fixed per biswa<sup>14</sup> If the new assessment had been enforced, there would have been no room for such traditional functionaries as Muqqadams and Chaudharies who seem to have been lumped together here as Khots. But both the suggestions are open to doubt. The village functionaries, we are told, continued to discharge their public functions, but were not paid for the performance of their official duties in rent free lands<sup>15</sup> Reading between the lines, it seems that Ala-ud-Din, probably correctly, held that these functionaries were being paid otherwise and their enjoyment of rent free lands was a recent and unauthorised usurpation. They were compelled to pay land revenue for the land that they held. A percentage of the collection, as at present, seems to have been a more normal method of remunerating them and might have continued. Some 10,000 holders of rent free lands are said to have been reduced to penury as the result of these orders<sup>16</sup>

In order to secure that all these regulations were successful and the social life of the 'higher' classes was effectively regulated, Ala-ud-Din set up a corps of informers who seem to have acted so effectively that all

social intercourse came soon to be stifled. Not a word was said, nor a movement made, without the king's receiving accurate information thereof. To add to the effectiveness of his system, Ala-ud-Din started, it is said, confronting parties concerned with an accurate account of what they might have said to each other. Such effective demonstration soon had its reward. The nobles' ceased to have any social life. 'No one', naturally, 'had even the time to pronounce the word rebellion'.<sup>17</sup>

Either the success of these measures or the alleged necessity of paying for a large standing army at a lower scale of expense led to Ala-ud-Din's attempt at controlling all the economic activities of his subjects.<sup>18</sup> As discussion below will show,<sup>19</sup> the salaries were not lowered very much. The salary of a soldier remained substantially what it was before. Barni<sup>20</sup> cites Rs 234 as the salary of a soldier before Ala-ud-Din is alleged to have lowered it, but it remains the same after the so called reduction of salaries as well.<sup>21</sup>

The first step in the new economic policy was fixation of prices. This was accompanied by rationing. The two could not be successful without securing the essential supplies. So Ala-ud-Din set about doing every thing that was needed to make his scheme successful.

So far as the control of prices was concerned, a very comprehensive list of rates was drawn up. Wheat, barley and rice seem to have been the three food grains in common use. Along with them were common pulses lentils, grams, and vetch. Their prices were fixed at 5 jitals a maund (of 12 seers) for unhusked rice, grams and vetches, 4 jitals a maund for barley and  $7\frac{1}{2}$  jital for a maund of wheat. The second group covered such requirements for the kitchen as oil, ghee, salt, and sugar. The rates for their sale were also laid down. Another,

group of essential commodities was formed by various types of cloth. Here again a detailed tariff was drawn up covering some nine different kinds of cloth. Then came cattle. Cows, goats and mules seem to have been in common demand; their prices were also fixed <sup>22</sup>

Probably to complete the picture, the prices of slaves, handsome boys, serving girls and concubines were also laid down <sup>23</sup>. That this was thought necessary is an interesting comment on the court culture in medieval India.

Horses were mounts for the army, carriers for men and beasts of burden. The last class carried the lowest price, ten pack horses could be bought for one good army mount. Horses were graded in prices which ranged from 10 tankas to 120 tankas <sup>24</sup>. This must have left a very large margin to sellers.

In order to enforce these prices, buying and selling in various commodities were confined to special markets. There was a market for food grains, another for cloth and a special market for horses. Buying and selling elsewhere were prohibited <sup>25</sup>.

Prices could be artificially manipulated by short measure. Weights and measures were therefore fixed and selling short was made a very serious crime <sup>26</sup>.

Prices could not be maintained long if the supplies fell short. Arrangements were made therefore to keep every one of the commodities controlled in sufficient supply. Corn and food stuffs formed the first essential commodity. The Doab formed the main field of supply for the capital and its suburbs. It was decided to levy *land revenue in kind in place of cash in the Doab*. How cash demands were converted into demands in kind has not been explained by contemporary writers. It is however reasonable to assume that in this area assessment in cash may have been entirely

given up and one half of the produce accepted as land revenue in kind. This 'collection' was stored in huge granaries and formed the reserve.<sup>27</sup> The second source tapped again arose as the result of the activities of the collectors in areas where land revenue was collected in cash. The collectors almost became purchasing agents for the government. They insisted on prompt payment of land revenue in cash. Naturally the cultivators were obliged to sell their produce under pressure. Now the purchasers nearest at hand were the registered corn merchants bound to keep the corn market in good supply at proper prices. They would naturally offer the cultivator a price which would keep them going. As in the recent experiment in rationing and price control in India the price for procurement was naturally lower than the selling price. But as this was the only price obtainable the cultivator was bound to accept it. There were no other buyers and hence no chance of securing cash for payment of land revenue in any other way.

The corn merchants and collectors of revenue between them kept the markets well stocked. The huge stock the government built up were released to keep down the prices when they threatened to shoot up on account of scarcity.<sup>28</sup> The government stocks acted as the guarantors of prices.

The cloth market required to be supplied differently. Here supplies were of two types: cloth in common use and fine cloth. The first variety of cloth was sold unrationed at controlled prices; the distribution of the fine variety was regulated by permits issued to persons of substance for personal needs proved to the satisfaction of the issuing authorities. Here the object was to prevent resale at a profit. Merchants from Multan seem to have specialised in cloth trade. They were entrusted with the duty of keeping the cloth market well stocked. Fine

variety of cloth had to be purchased from various places. They were therefore given advances for the purpose of purchasing such cloth at various manufacturing centres and keep the central market at Delhi and possibly some other markets outside, in supply.<sup>29</sup> It has been suggested, but wrongly, that these merchants were put to great loss, if not greater inconvenience, as they were compelled to purchase cloth at prevailing rates and sell it at a loss.<sup>30</sup> There is nothing to indicate that this was so. Fine cloth only was controlled by permits. There is no reason to believe that Ala-ud-Din was so much interested in the supply of finery to his public servants as to fix very low prices for it. If any thing, all indications are to the contrary.

Cloth and corn both had to be transported. It seems that means of transport were also registered and their tariff controlled.

Horses formed a very important 'commodity'. Ala-ud-Din abolished profiteering by middlemen in this trade. The horse breeders could sell them to users only. All speculative traffic in horses was straightaway abolished. All sales were to be affected in the market places.<sup>31</sup> It is impossible to believe that horses were permitted to be sold in the horse market at Delhi alone. Direct dealings between horse breeders and users seem to have been permitted outside the capital.

Afif has suggested that Ala-ud-Din gave very large amounts of money to merchants and gave them allowances in order to help them in making his policy successful.<sup>32</sup>

To make this huge superstructure stand firmly a large number of civil servants was needed. Ala-ud-Din appointed the requisite number under a Superintendent of Markets. He was given the necessary staff, consisting of agents, messenger boys, mounted soldiers and clerks. Three separate reports of prevailing prices were submitted

to the emperor by the superintendent of markets, by collectors of sales tax and by informers. Surprise checks of transactions were made it is said, several times a day. Some times bogus purchasers, masquerading as ignorant boys or rustics, were sent to the market to tempt the merchants to take advantage of their apparent ignorance and thus overcharge them or give them short measure. If they succumbed to the temptation they were severely punished for their crime.<sup>33</sup> It was the duty of the superintendent of markets to maintain supplies and secure that all the regulations were strictly observed. His failures or the failures of his subordinates were severely punished.<sup>34</sup>

Ala-ud-Din's system of assessment and collection of land revenue was as much an essay in public finance as in controlling the peasantry. The state demand was fixed at one half of the gross produce to be paid in cash at so much per Biswa. The medieval chroniclers were not administrators and understood the intricacy of assessment and collection of land revenue as little as men of letters do today. When Akbar levied land revenue in cash, he had to make a series of experiments. He did ultimately devise a system where cash rates were made applicable to cropped area every season. But these rates varied with crops. Ala-ud-Din seems to have levied cash rates fixed by measurement without any of those elaborate calculations with which the *Ain-i Akbari* has made us so familiar. His cash rates seem to have been based on area, rather than cropped area. They do not seem to have varied with the crops. They probably represent what later on came to be called the Nasq assessment and what Muslim rulers elsewhere had levied as Kharaj.<sup>35</sup> But the half of the gross produce left to the cultivators had to bear the burden of the jizya, a grazing tax and a house tax.<sup>36</sup> No wonder the result was that the cultivator was left to live from hand to mouth. He had no money to spare for

anything but the bare necessities of life. He was lucky if he and his family could subsist on what was left to them.

The rate of land revenue and other dues indicate the limits within which the lowering of prices could have taken place. The revenue demand had been fixed in cash at half the purchase price of the total produce. If the new lowered price was half the normal price, the peasant would have had to sell all his produce to pay the land revenue alone. Ala-ud-Din had not intended foregoing either the *jizya*, the grazing tax or the house tax. He must, therefore, have left a margin for the payment of these dues. Not only that, the peasant must live on his produce. Ala-ud-Din could not have desired that land should go out of cultivation, as it certainly would have been, if he had left nothing to the cultivator. Despite the tall talk of the contemporary writers<sup>37</sup> and still taller talk of their modern interpreters,<sup>38</sup> Ala-ud-Din's revenue assessment made it impossible for him to lower prices considerably. The definite statement that he charged land revenue at one half of the gross produce is more reliable than the vague statement that he cheapened necessities of life in order to have an army at a lower cost. The *jizya*,<sup>38a</sup> the grazing tax and the house tax must have taken at least another one fourth of the share of gross produce left to the cultivator. It would have been hard to live on about one third of the gross produce left to him if the normal prices had been maintained. Any considerable appreciation of money would have entirely wiped out the peasant's share of the produce and could not be—and was not—attempted. Ala-ud-Din had not much margin to play with prices. If he had lowered them by about 10% he would have thereby increased his demand in cash to about 55%. By lowering prices by another 10%, the land revenue would have formed 60% of the entire produce. If we add our conjectural 12-1/2% for house tax, *jizya* and



grazing tax at the increased rates the state demand would have amounted to another 15% leaving only 25% to the cultivator. Anything less than this would have hardly supported a peasant and his family. Even Ala-ud-Din could not have made it possible for them to live on less. We must hold therefore that there was no substantial lowering of prices of corn at least under Ala-ud-Din. This is borne out by the rates which are said to have prevailed under Firuz Shah Tughlaq<sup>38b</sup>. Wheat, barley and gram fetched almost the same price which they did under Ala-ud-Din.

But Ala-ud-Din aimed at creating 'Bai Zari' in the kingdom. There was to be no surplus wealth in hands other than his. Much less was there any scope for spending the surplus wealth. The nobles had been forbidden social intercourse among themselves. The old hereditary revenue collecting classes had seen their remuneration cut considerably by the resumption of their revenue free lands. The malik, the inam and waqf lands had all been resumed leaving their erstwhile holders to hard work. He ground down the peasant by an abnormally high land revenue accompanied by several other taxes. In the beginning of his reign, he had bought loyalty by showering his gold indiscriminately in all directions. But the moment he felt safe, all the known benefactors of his large heartedness were made to disgorge their ill gotten gains<sup>39</sup>. He tried to render everybody helpless so that there was no time, in the language of the medieval chroniclers, to even utter the word rebellion. His regulations controlled all classes of society in almost all their activities. The Hindus were selected for further humiliation, this was curiously the only part of his policy with which the cannonists—the men of law—were in sympathy. He would not allow them to wear fine clothes, nor ride good horses or live well<sup>40</sup>.

Ala-ud-Din seems to have founded a new class of civil servants. So many of them were there now, 100,000 surveyors and assessors, probably an equally large number of informers, those engaged in more orthodox governmental duties must have formed another large block. He had 87,000 masons and labours. He is supposed to have maintained a large standing army, though for how long, we do not know. He expected efficient and honest service from his public servants, if it was not forthcoming woe betide them who were the offenders<sup>41</sup> His successor released 17,000 imprisoned public servants after his death<sup>42</sup>

But totalitarian methods as well as totalitarian aims usually fail in the long run because those who undertake them cannot always provide for keeping a watchful eye on the entire population all the time. Ala-ud-Din failed conspicuously here. Towards the end of his reign, he seems to have become almost fatuous. It is not surprising that both power and authority slipped through his fingers<sup>43</sup> His system must have come to an end much before his own end came. It failed because it could not perpetuate itself. It failed, as it was bound to fail, because it was not founded on anything except fear. It failed because it failed to gain any loyal supporters.

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## Notes

A. Muhammad Tughlaq in his autobiography describes Ala-ud-Din's reign thus

'During Ala ud Din's reign no trace of Islam remained. What was legitimate was made illegitimate and *vice-versa*'. Quoted in the *Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughlaq*, Dr. Mehdi Hasan, page 172. Cf. Barni, 288, 294, 295, 296, 227, 338.

1. Barni, *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, pages 282, 287, 303, 304 cf *Firishta*, Vol I.

2. P. Saran, *Studies in Medieval Indian History*, 151.

3. Yahya *Tarikh-i-Mubarak-Shahi*, 73.

4. P. Saran 165, cf Lal, *History of the Khaljis* pages 272 ff.

5. Barni, 286, 287.

6. Barni, 284 to 286, 298

Yahya, 73

Isami, *Fatuh-at-us-Islam*, 305 to 307.

7. Barni, 283, 284 cf Lal, 242

8. P. Saran, 151 cf Tripathi—*Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, 256

9. Cf. Barni.

10. Barni, 438, 439

11. Barni, 305, Barni would have us believe that the entire army was paid by Jagirs i. e. grant of the right to collect land revenue. But Afif, *Tarikh-i Firoz Shahi*, page 95 says that no village was given as a jagir by Ala-ud-Din. But Afif does not single out Ala-ud-Din for this. He says no predecessor of Firuz Shah had ever made grants of lands for this purpose.

12. Barni, 283

13. Barni, 287, 288.

14. Barni, 287, 288 299, 306, 312, 323.

15. Barni, 287, 291

16. Barni, 296.

17. Barni, 284.

18. Barni, 304, 303

19. See below

20. Barni, 293

21. Barni, 303

22. Barni, 305, 308, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316

23. Barni, 314, 315.

24. Barni, 312, 313, 314.

25 Barni 313 314, 310 311, 309

26 Barni, 313, 318 319.

27. Ibn i Batuta, (English), 42.  
Barni, 305, 307

28 Barni, 309, 311,  
Ibn i Batuta 42

29 Barni, 311, Afif, 294

30 P Saran

31 Barni, 313

32. Afif, 206

33 Barni, 308 306, 295 292, 289 318, 319, 298

34 Barni 306 308, 318 319.

35 Barni, 287, 306

36 Barni, 287

37 Barni 304 to 319 Afif 293, 294

38 P Saran

38A Tripathi (Pages 266, 267) seems to suggest that jizya was not levied under Ala ud Din Barni (Page 291) implies that it was levied Qazi Mughis ud Din declares that Hindus should be allowed to live under a Muslim ruler only if they paid the jizya He does not however, find fault with Ala ud Din for not having levied it

38B Cf Afif, 294 295

39 Barni, 242 to 244 247, 248 250, 251 Yahya, 67, 283

40 Barni 287, 288, 290 291, 292, 297, 298

41 Barni, 291

42 Barni 291

43 Khusru, *Dawalrani*, 239 ff

## VII

### NASAR-UD-DIN KHUSRU SHAH

One of the enigmas of medieval Indian history is Nasar-ud-Din Khusru. His origin cannot be easily determined, his earlier career is unknown, the nature and the extent of revolution which his accession to the throne brought about is shrouded in mystery. It is time an attempt was made to state the questions that arise in this connection even though it may not always be possible to get all the answers.

Till recently it was possible to dismiss the whole episode as the story of 'a wretch' who had bewitched Mubarak and thereby succeeded ultimately in desecrating the throne of Delhi by occupying it<sup>1</sup>. The earliest published account we had was that of Barni. It was added to and embellished later on by Badaoni, Bakshi Nizam-ud-Din and Firishta. Eliot's translations provided the last stick that broke the camel's back.

Khusru was described as a Parwari (scavenger) from Gujarat enslaved and converted to Islam during Ala-ud-Din's reign<sup>2</sup>. He might have been brought to the Court between 1299 and 1306 A. D., the dates of the two invasions of Gujarat. The next we hear of him is when he was conducting the government of the country as Prime Minister of Mubarak and successfully leading the royal armies in the south. When we come to the end of Mubarak's reign, Khusru changed colour and became 'a vile wretch' till he ultimately ascended the throne. Then he became something still more sinister till Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq had him killed.

As it was, this account left two things unexplained. How was it that a beautiful youngman with his comely

face alone to recommend him to his master carried on successfully the burden of administration during Mubarak's reign? Even if we dismiss Barni's statement that there was neither rebellion, nor Mughal invasions, nor famine nor floods to trouble the people during Mubarak's reign as too sweeping a generalization, the fact remains that whatever disturbances there were in the country, Mubarak was easily successful in putting an end to them. It is a great tribute to Khusru's talents that Mubarak was able to keep the entire south under him besides the whole of northern India. Not a square inch of territory did he lose to any aspiring rebel. If anything he riveted Delhi's authority all the more firmly on Gujarat, Maharashtra and the south. When we remember that Mubarak demolished in its entirety the all too comprehensive totalitarian state of Ala-ud-Din, Mubarak's—or Khusru's—success in keeping peace in the country was a great achievement, all the more so if we are to believe Barni who described Mubarak as a licentious youth entirely given to pleasure.

Khusru's accession to the throne cannot be dismissed simply as an unwelcome interlude which was soon over. If he had only brother 'Parwaris' to support him on the throne of Delhi, he could not have ascended it, let alone occupy it for five months—or a year and five months according to certain accounts.

Luckily some new material is now available—it has in fact been available for several years past—to enable us to reconstruct the story. The publication of the text of *Tughlaq Nama* of Khusru, the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* of Yahya, and the *Fatuh-us-Salat* of Isami helps us now in evaluating earlier authorities better and thus fill some, at least, of the gaps left in the story as told so far.

Khusru was by origin a Hindu enslaved during the military expeditions of Ala-ud-Din's reign in Malwa.<sup>3</sup> His original home seems to have been in Gujarat. He

was Baradau, Parau, Parwar or Parwari by caste. The original Hindu designation seems to have become a victim of Arabic script. But Baradau in Khusru's *Tughlaq Nama* seems to be the nearest approximation. Isami describes him as a Parau.<sup>4</sup> Baradaus were no unclean pariahs whose touch was defilling to the sanctimonious Hindus of the day.<sup>5</sup> No Persian authority describes this caste as unclean. On the contrary Amir Khusru describes Khusru and his fellow castemen as belonging to a tribe that was usually employed by princes as their bodyguard and was known both for its devotion to princes and its bravery.<sup>6</sup> Firishta describes him as a wrestler from Gujarat.<sup>7</sup> Khusru's original name is unknown but he was named Hasan on his conversion to Islam. He served under Malik Shadi, deputy bājib of Ala-ud-Din's armies. He was a beautiful young-man by all accounts. We know nothing of the office he held at the time of Malik Kafur's death. One authority describes him as a door-keeper or a watchman.<sup>8</sup> This term however seems to have been used more as an antithesis to the exalted office Qutb-ud-Din conferred on him than a factual description. Not even Qutb-ud-Din's infatuation could have fashioned a successful commander-in-chief and a great prime minister out of a mere watchman. On Qutb-ud-Din's accession to the throne on April, 1, 1316 he became the commander-in-chief and prime minister and was now styled Khusru Khan.<sup>9</sup>

He had no light task to face. The totalitarian government of Ala-ud-Din had been followed by Malik Kafur's virtual rule during Ala-ud-Din's dotage. Thousands of public servants were in jail. Ala-ud-Din's irksome restrictions seem to have held the people in their grip, the Hindu masses were suffering under the grinding poverty which Ala-ud-Din had imposed on them. Khusru undid all that. More than seventeen thousand prisoners were let off. All galling restrictions on trade and property were

removed Social intercourse became free, Hindus heaved a sigh of relief now that overtaxation and anti Hindu measures of Ala ud-Din became a thing of the past. Reversal to pre-Ala ud-Din's policy must have constituted a peaceful counter-revolution as great in its comprehensiveness as Ala-ud-Din's totalitarian scheme. All this was accomplished successfully without a single incident<sup>10</sup>

Mubarak had succeeded to an empire which embraced the whole of India. Khilji authority had not yet been consolidated over all this vast territory, particularly in western and south India. Khusru had no easy task to perform here. Khilji authority was challenged in Gujarat though not successfully, thanks to Khusru and ultimately to his brother's resourcefulness. In the south Khusru accompanied Mubarak in one expedition and served as a leader in another. The objective of the second expedition seems to have been attained<sup>11</sup> though there are contradictory statements as to who nursed rebellious designs against Mubarak. It is difficult however to believe the story told by Barni that Khusru Khan when he was in Malabar harboured rebellion against Mubarak<sup>12</sup>. We are asked to believe that Khusru did not intend returning to Delhi, that the loyal Muslim officers forced him to go there according to the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* they brought him to Delhi and if Isami is to be believed they brought him in fetters<sup>1</sup>. They hoped that on reaching Delhi Khusru would be suitably punished for his evil designs. But this account accords ill with Barni's supplementary story that when Mubarak heard Khusru was coming he had a posse of palanquin bearers stationed on the road from Deogarh to Delhi in order to speed Khusru on his journey<sup>13</sup>. Both the stories cannot be true. If Khusru had been forced to return to Delhi he could not have sent word of his return thereto to the king. Without such advance information it could not have been



possible for the king to have made all the arrangements he is said to have made. It stands further to reason that if Khusru informed the king of his projected return to Delhi his opponents could as well have informed the king about his evil designs. This they obviously did not, because they were only hoping that when Khusru reached Delhi he would be severely taken to task.<sup>14</sup> Barni had no occasion to invent the story of the arrangements made to bring Khusru speedily to Delhi, he could easily have invented the story of Khusru's intended rebellion writing as he did after Khusru's death. Isami declares that Khusru intended decamping, with the treasures he had collected, across the seas. The watchfulness of his subordinate commanders led him to change his mind and he came to Delhi. When Khusru reached Delhi he complained against the conduct of his subordinates to the king who punished them all. Despite several rebellions of Alai nobles Khusru succeeded in keeping his master firmly on the throne.

Khusru's main prop during this period was the large number of his kinsmen from Gujarat whom he gathered round him. The chronology of Mubarak's reign is a little confused but it does not seem probable that Khusru invited them to Delhi after his return to the capital. While in Malabar he is said to have consulted his 'fellow-travellers' about his alleged designs.<sup>15</sup> As said earlier they formed a martial group. When his brother was in Gujarat as its governor, he is said to have surrounded himself with a large number of his kinsmen in the fashion of the day.<sup>16</sup> It seems improbable that Khusru should complain, after fighting several successful actions, that unlike other commanders he had no troops of his own as Barni makes him say.<sup>17</sup>

That Mubarak spent all his time in pleasure is probable. But the ridiculous and indecent scenes of which

Barni speaks could have happened, it at all, towards the end of his reign only. This is borne out by the fact that Mubarak is said to have met his death less than a month after ordering Shaikh Nizam-ud-Din to attend his court once a month. It is difficult to believe that Amir Khusru would call a ruler Khalifa if, during his reign, Muslim ceremonies had been altogether banished from the court. He certainly could not have given him that designation to Mubarak—as he frequently does in the *Nuh Sipihr*—if he had known Mubarak to be guilty of the practices of which Barni accuses him. The *Tughlaq Nama* mentions no backsliding in his observance of Islamic rites by Mubarak, nor does it make any reference to the strange and indecent behaviour of Mubarak in court which Barni delights in describing. The worst that Amir Khusru says about Mubarak is that he was unkind.<sup>18</sup> Yahya is also silent about it all and so is Isami.

Khusru at last got disgusted with the sodomic practices of the Sultan.<sup>19</sup> He gathered round him a group of discontented persons, several of them Muslims.<sup>20</sup> On April 14 1320 Khusru's plans were complete. Mubarak was done to death. Many of his personal attendants perished. Ibn-i-Batuta suggests that Khusru obtained Mubarak's permission to admit a large number of Khusru's followers to the palace at night on the pretence that they wished to be converted to Islam. To escape the taunts of their coreligionists, they had requested that they be excused presentation to the royal court during the day time.<sup>21</sup> Khusru could not be tenderer to Ala-ud-din's sons than their brothers had been. All the princes who had escaped with their lives at the two earlier revolutions were now done to death or blinded so that not a single scion of the house of Ala-ud-din escaped unharmed. Among those who were now killed or blinded must have been Mubarak's young son barely two years old.<sup>22</sup>

After a good deal of hesitation, Khusru at last allowed himself to be persuaded that now that he had killed his tormentor he should ascend the throne himself and proclaim himself king<sup>23</sup> He did so on April, 15, 1320 and took the title Nasar-ud-Din Khusru Shah

It was but natural that on his accession to the throne he should go back to his original faith He lived in the royal palace of his predecessors and with the accession of a Hindu king, Hindu rites of worship displaced Muslim rites in the palace Like Ajit Singh of Jodhpur in the eighteenth century Khusru did not take a Hindu title as a reigning King Just as Ajit Singh copied the Mughal emperor's titles including that of Ghazi—slayer of infidels (Hindus)—Khusru called himself Nasar-ud-Din (author of the victory of the faith) though he could content himself by saying that the religion his title proclaimed was other than Islam Contemporary historians mention some 'backsliders' among his chiefs, commanders who went back to their original faith But the stories of his desecrating mosques or treating copies of the *Quran* with contempt find no mention in Amir Khusru's *Tughlaq Nama*<sup>24</sup> All that Ghias-ud-Din charges Khusru with is his rebellion against Qutb-ud-Din or his executing descendants of Ala-ud-Din, male and female<sup>25</sup> It is unlikely that if Khusru had been guilty of the 'heinous' crimes Barni saddles him with Amir Khusru should not have mentioned them. They should have formed a part of the reasons which Ghias-ud-Din advanced in his letters to other Muslim commanders when he incited them against Khusru. Not a word is said in them about any disrespect shown either to Mosques or the *Quran*<sup>26</sup> Of course Amir Khusru and Barni mention that he married some of the widows of Qutb-ud-Din<sup>27</sup> There was nothing unusual therein Malik Kafur and Qutb-ud-Din had done the

same before him<sup>28</sup> and Khusru could only have refrained from such evil practices had he been wiser than his age

As a ruler Khusru gathered round him an able group of administrators, both Hindus and Muslims. A'in-ul-Mulk Multani, Yusaf Sufi, Hatim Khan, Kamal-ud-Din Sufi, Fakhr-ud-Din Tughlaq, Mughaltı, Muhammad Shah, Bahram Abaya, Yakhlakhi, Hoshang, Shaista Khan, Khizr Khan, Kafur, Shahab, Hardev, Amar Dev, Rai Ramdhol are mentioned as some of his great administrators. His rule was accepted and respected throughout the Punjab, Sind, Oudh Central India and Multan<sup>29</sup> There is no reason to doubt that his writ ran equally successfully in other parts of his empire.

Khusru's only title to the throne lay in the length of his arm and the fullness of his purse. He used both manfully and distributed the riches which Ala-ud-Din had collected among his followers. He tried to secure the loyalty of his chiefs by exalting them in rank, by rich presents and above all, in some cases, by keeping their families in Delhi. Some modern European writers have advanced curious reasons for Khusru's failure to become the centre of a successful Hindu reaction. Khusru did no more represent a Hindu reaction at large, than did Hemu in 1556. When the test of battle came he led a large composite army of Hindus and Muslims against Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq<sup>30</sup> Tughlaq's army also contained some Hindu soldiers.<sup>31</sup> Situated as they were, Hindu rajahs who had been subdued but recently by Ala-ud-Din could have little welcomed any move at Delhi to draw them more closely thereto.

Among the Amirs at Delhi was Fakhr-ud-Din, son of Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq, governor of Divalpur. His presence at Delhi was a guarantee of his father's loyalty. He was master of the royal horse. The king found

him missing from his quarters one morning when he sent for him. Nasar-ud-Din at once sent a detachment after him in hot pursuit. His officers were however unsuccessful in capturing Fakhr-ud-Din who at last joined his father, Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq, at Dipalpur.

Ghias-ud-Din learnt from his son the details of the last turn of royal fortune at Delhi. He was told that not a single scion of Ala-ud-Din's house was living. Ghias-ud-Din had always lived dangerously on the outskirts of the empire, exposed to Mughal attacks. His mind now turned to reaping a rich harvest out of the events of the last few months. He decided to challenge Nasar-ud-Din's title to the throne of Delhi and head a rebellion for the purpose.

With this end in view, he sent his emissaries to Ain-ul-Mulk at Delhi, Mughalati governor of Multan and his own superior officer, Muhammad Shah of Sevastan, Bahram Abaya of Cuch (Sind) Yaklakhi of Samana and Hoshang of Jalore. Of these six, three refused to take part in the conspiracy. Yaklakhi sent Ghias-ud-Din's letter to Nasar-ud-Din. Ain-ul-Mulk, Nasar-ud-Din's minister, showed his copy to his master. Mughalati upbraided his subordinate at Dipalpur for his treacherous designs. Bahram of Uch alone promised to participate readily and actively in the rebellion. Ghias-ud-Din was about to head <sup>32</sup> Ghias-ud-Din was not down hearted. He promoted a local rebellion against Mughalati of Multan and established contact with Ain-ul-Mulk at Delhi again. The vazir now declared that situated as he was in Delhi, he could do nothing to promote Ghias-ud-Din's cause but wished him well and promised benevolent neutrality <sup>33</sup>.

Ghias-ud-din's attempt to combine the governors of Sind, Jalore, Multan and Punjab thus came to nothing. This is an eloquent testimony to Nasar-ud-Din's hold on

his empire. The failure of this conspiracy is a further proof that Nasar-ud-Din had harmed not Islam but Qutu-bud-Din and the Khiljis. The refusal of his Muslim prime minister to side openly with Ghias-ud-Din rebuts the charge that Nasar-ud-Din had launched a hostile campaign against Islam at Delhi or elsewhere. Ghias-ud-Din however was not to be deterred from his path. Ain-ul-Mulk's promise to desert his master was enough for him. Bahram also soon joined his army. Ghias-ud-Din therefore decided to proceed with his preparations for rebellion. Before these were completed, however, Yaklakhi of Samana (in Patiala and East Punjab States Union now) moved towards Dipalpur and attacked Ghias-ud-Din. Yaklakhi was however defeated and had to return to Samana <sup>34</sup>

Nasar-ud-Din at Delhi was not sitting idle all this time. It is probable that the attack made on Dipalpur by Yaklakhi was inspired by him. Rather than wait for Ghias-ud-Din to move, Khusru Shah decided to take the offensive and sent an army under his brother Khan-i-Khanan to oppose Ghias-ud-Din.

Khan-i-Khanan was supported by several great commanders. Qatlu Khan, Shaista Khan, Yusuf Khan and Khizr Khan are mentioned as some of the Muslim commanders who accompanied Khan-i-Khanan <sup>35</sup>. The royal army advanced from Delhi to the neighbourhood of Saraswati <sup>36</sup>. On account of their inexperience Khan-i-Khanan and Khizr Khan did not attack Saraswati which Ghias-ud-Din had strengthened. Leaving the enemy behind them, they made a detour to the banks of the river Bias. Here they encamped at Sotba (Sarsa) somewhere on the banks of the Bias <sup>37</sup>.

When Ghias-ud-Din heard of the advance of the royal army he decided to march forth. Just as he was about to

do so, a royal caravan carrying the revenues of Sind and the neighbouring territories passed through Dipalpur. Ghias-ud-Din fell upon it and distributed the proceeds to his followers, commanders and soldiers alike so that every one had an advance of two years' salary.<sup>38</sup> Thus emboldened by this stroke of good luck, Ghias-ud-Din left Dipalpur and reached the banks of the Bias. He crossed the river at Hauz-i-Bahat and encamped here.

The two armies were now separated by a waterless desert of fifteen miles. They remained facing each other for some time.<sup>39</sup> But Khan-i-Khanan had let himself into the enemy's territories. Saraswati was in the hands of the rebels and stood between the royal army and the territory held by the king.<sup>40</sup> The royal army could not afford to wait indefinitely whereas Ghias-ud-Din was not troubled by any such considerations. Khan-i-Khanan was therefore driven to take the offensive. Late one night he led his army across the waterless desert.

He had probably intended to take the enemy unawares. But the fates were kind to Ghias-ud-Din. The march across the desert took the whole night and it was only early the next day that the royal army contacted Ghias-ud-Din's forces. Khan-i-Khanan's soldiers were tired and thirsty. Ghias-ud-Din naturally jumped at the opportunity thus provided him to face an exhausted army. He ordered his forces to attack the enemy and forced an immediate engagement.<sup>41</sup>

Amir Khusru would have us believe that Ghias-ud-Din's forces were smaller in number than the imperial army.<sup>42</sup> Barni declares that in military experience and bravery the imperial soldiers—and particularly its commanders—were babe in arms.<sup>43</sup> The inevitable followed. Ghias-ud-Din succeeded in trapping the enemy. He sent an advance guard letting it appear as if this was all the

army the imperialists had to deal with. They fell upon it and drove it back successfully. Another Tughlaq contingent now appeared on the scene but before the imperialists had dealt with it, Ghias-ud-Din's main army advanced forward. The imperialists were now between two fires and were tricked into an indefensible position. They were defeated. The Khan-i-Khanan now left for Delhi in hot haste. Gulchandra, the leader of the Khokhars killed the bearer of the *chatar* (the royal canopy) and took it from his hand. He hastened with it to where Ghias-ud-Din was and spread it on Tughlaq's head.

Khusru Shah was not dismayed yet. If his commanders had been twice unsuccessful against the enemy, he was still undeterred. He decided to march out and meet the advancing rebels outside the capital. But, as Ghias-ud-Din was advancing fast on Delhi, Nasar-ud-Din did not go very far out of Siri (Ala-ud-Din's Delhi) and encamped near Hauz-i-Khas near where later on was built the tank of Firuz Shah Tughlaq. A ditch was dug in front and a mud wall put up at the back of the camp to minimize chances of a surprise night attack.<sup>44</sup> The old fort lay on one side and the royal gardens on the other side of the camp.<sup>45</sup>

Meanwhile Ghias-ud-Din was advancing fast. His initial success added to his self confidence. The large amount of booty that fell into his hands as the result of the flight of the Delhi army fed the cupidity of his followers. After resting for a week<sup>46</sup> at the scene of battle, he led his army towards Delhi. Passing through Hansi, Madina, Rohtak, Mandauti, Palam and Kishanpura, he reached the plains of Lahravat with the Jumna to his east and the old Delhi to his south<sup>47</sup> and encamped near the tomb of Raziya.<sup>48</sup>

Both sides now busied themselves in preparations for the mortal combat. Khusru Shah was supported by



several great commanders including the governor of Oudh, Yusuf Khan Sufi, Kamal-ud-Din Sufi, Shaista-Khan, Amir Kafur, Randhol, Khan-i-Khanan, Shahab, Kaisar, Amir Umbar, Baha-ud-Din and Maldev. Here again we find that most of the administrators under Nasar-ud-Din are Muslims. The Barbak, the Hajib and the Wakil-i-Bab were the highest officers in the state and were all filled by Muslims. The prime minister's office was filled by Ain-ul-Mulk Multani.<sup>49</sup>

While Khusrū Shah was busy making his preparations, Ain-ul-Mulk, his prime minister, quietly deserted him and slunk away to Central India. The *Tughlaq-Nama* suggests that Ghias-ud-Din so arranged his armies in three commands, that they should be able to join battle at intervals.<sup>50</sup> It involved taking risks, but Ghias-ud-Din was willing enough to take them. His plan was successful. His first army was defeated and driven away and the fortunes of battle seemed to be going against him when his second army joined in the fray. The appearance of the third command helped him in gaining a complete victory.<sup>51</sup> Isami's account however seems to be nearer the truth. He declares that when the two armies met the royal forces defeated and drove away the division under Fakhr-ud-Din who ran away. This led to a general flight in the army of the Tughlaqs. Nasar-ud-Din now sent an army to attack the camp where Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq's family was. The battle was almost lost when Tughlaq succeeded in gathering together his flying remnants and made a dead set at Nasar-ud-Din's army. The Khakhars under Gulchandra fought bravely to restore the balance of battle. Nasar-ud-Din's armies were defeated and he ran away.<sup>52</sup> Ibn-i-Batuta suggests that Nasar-ud-Din's defeat was due to the fact that flushed with their earlier victory, his army was busy plundering when Tughlaq fell on them.<sup>53</sup>

Khusru Shah now fled away and sought refuge in a garden. He was traced thereto and brought before Ghias-ud-Din. He requested his captor to spare his life and be content with blinding him. Ghias-ud-Din would have none of it. He asked Khusru Shah why he had been so cruel to his master, Mubarak. Khusru replied that it was Mubarak's sodomy that had driven him to seek his revenge in his own fashion. 'Had Mubarak been not so foul towards me, Khusru Shah declared, 'I would not have committed such deeds.' Ghias-ud-Din paid no heed to Khusru Shah's entreaties and had him executed at the very place where Khusru had murdered Mubarak.<sup>54</sup> Thus passed away Khusru Shah after a stormy reign.

Khusru Shah is usually credited with a short reign of four months and a few days. His accession is put on April, 15, 1320. His date of death, however, has become a matter of dispute. The *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* places it in the year 721 A. H., Firista followed the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* and many modern writers repeated him. The year given by the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* is obviously wrong and goes against Barni and Amir Khusru both of whom place the accession of Ghias-ud-Din in 720 A. H. Even Yahya accords Khusru a reign of four months and some days. But the chronology is confounded again by Isami's statement that Nasar-ud-Din ascended the throne in 719.<sup>55</sup> This would give Khusru a reign of more than a year and four months. But Isami himself assigns a reign of 'some months' to Nasar-ud-Din. It seems possible that contemporary historians were so much upset by the rise of Nasar-ud-Din that in order to belittle him they tried even to shorten the time when Islam was not in ascendance at Delhi.

Nasar-ud-Din Khusru Shah presented a successful example of a man from the ranks, and a Hindu at that, rising to the highest office in the state. His stewardship

of Mubarak Shah's reign is a great tribute to his administrative abilities and military leadership. Amir Khusru in his *Nuh Sipihr* declares that he richly deserved all the honours that the king bestowed on him. He was defeated because Ghias-ud-Din proved himself a greater tactician and strategist. In both the engagements with Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq, the royal armies carried everything before them for a considerable time. It was the greater tenacity of purpose of Ghias-ud-Din that ultimately brought him victory. Isami describes Ghias-ud-Din's success to the bravery of the Khakhars under their leader, Gulchandra.

Nasar-ud-Din's reign is notable for his own reconversion to Hinduism as well as that of a large number of his kinsmen. They must have been accepted as Hindus before they could find Brahmin priests to perform Hindu rites in the palace. That in itself represented a revolutionary change in the Hindu society. As said before, the loud complaints of the later writers that Nasar-ud-Din treated Muslim sacred books or Muslim mosques with disrespect are not tenable. Isami's declaration that Islam stood defeated under him means no more than that Nasar-ud-Din was a Hindu king. It is not surprising that orthodox Barni should exhibit so much antagonism against Khusru Shah.

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## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### 1. Amir Khusru :

- ( i ) *Nuh-Siphr*, MS.
- ( ii ) *Tughlaq Nama*
- ( iii ) *Ishqiya*.

These contain the earliest contemporary accounts of the events described above. Amir Khusru died in 1325 A. D.

### 2. Isami :

*Fatuh-us-Salatn* was completed in 1350.

### 3. Barni :

*Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi* was completed in 1357.

### 4. Ibn-i-Batuta

He came to India in 1333 A. D., thirteen years after the last event described above. The date of the composition of his *Travels* is not certain. There is nothing to suggest that they were compiled while he was still in India. I have cited the complete Urdu translation rather than the abridged English version.

### 5. Yahya

The *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* seems to have been compiled about 1433 A. D.

6. Firishta, Badaoni, Bakshi Nizam-ud-Din and several other later writers in their histories of India give an account of some of these events but add little to our knowledge.

## Notes

- 1 *Cambridge History of India*, vol. III, 120.
2. *CHI*, III, 120
- 3 *Tarikh-i-Mubarak-Shahs*, 86
- 4 Isami 362.
5. Cf. *CHI*., III, 120.
- 6 *Tughlaq Naam*, 19
- 7 *Tarikh-i-Firishta*, 126
8. *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahs*, 82.
9. *Tughlaq Nama*, 18 *Tarikh i Firoz Shahs*, (Barni), 381 to
- 391 *Tarikh i Mubarak Shahs*, 83, 86 Isami, 347, only gives the
- year 716 A H
- 10 *Tarikh i Firoz Shahs*, 382, 383, 385. *Fatuh-us Salatin*,
- 346 to 360.
11. *Fatuh us-Salatin*, 356 to 360, *Mubarak Shahs*, 84, 85
- 12 *Tarikh i Firoz Shahs*, 399, 400. *Mubarak Shahs* 85 .
- Fatuh us-Salatin*, 360, 361
- 13 Barni, II, Yahya, 85.
14. Barni, 400, Yahya, 83,
15. Barni 39
16. *Firishta*, 126
- 17 Barni 402
- 18 *Ishqiya*, 273
- 19 *Tughlaq Nama* 149
- 20 *Firishta*, 127, Isami 364
21. Ibn i Batuta, II, 80 81
- 22 *Tughlaq Nama*, 22 to 26, 47, Barni, 408, Yahya, 87 and 91 ;
- Isami, 365.
23. *Tughlaq Nama*, 150-21
- 24 Cf *CHI*, III, 125 which asserts that Muslim historians
- record with indignation the gross insults offered to their faith The
- only contemporary writer mentioned in the Bibliography to this chapter
- is Barni
- 25 *Tughlaq Nama*, 149.
26. *Tughlaq Nama*, 57 to 70. Cf. *Fatuh us-Salatin*, 367 368
27. Yahya, 86, Barni, 410-411.
- 28 *Ishqiya*, 274, 275, mentions that Qutb ud Din demanded that
- Khizr Khan should send his wife Kanwal Devi to the royal harem.

29. Cf. *Tughlaq Nama*.
30. Isami, 365.
31. *Tarikh i-Mubarak Shahi*, 26, *Tughlaq Nama*, 131, *Fatuh-us-Salatin*, 369.
32. *Tarikh i Mubarak Shahi*, 8 to 91, *Tughlaq Nama*, 57 to 70.
33. *Ibid.*, 67
34. *Ibid*, 69, *Fatuh-us Salatin*, 370.
35. *Tughlaq Nama*, 97.
36. *Ibid*, 83, Barni, 416
37. Barni, 416-417 *Tughlaq Nama*, 80. *Fatuh us-Salatin*, 371
38. *Tughlaq Nama*, 77-78, Yahya, 90.
39. Barni, 416 *Tughlaq Nama*, 92.
40. *Ibid*, 83, Barni, 416
41. *Tughlaq Nama*, 92-93
42. *Ibid*, 89-90, Isami however says (370) that it was only when Tughlaq had gathered a large army that he risked engagement.
43. Barni, 415, 416
44. Yahya, 91 *Tughlaq Nama*, 78 Isami, 371 to 373.
45. *Ibid*, 115, Yahya, 91, Barni, 418.
46. Barni, 417
47. *Tughlaq Nama*, 113-115
48. Yahya, 91.
49. *Tughlaq Nama*, 117-118
50. *Ibid*, 121 to 131.
51. *Ibid*, 131, Yahya, 91
52. Isami, 377, 378.
53. Ibn i-Batuta, II, 87
54. *Tughlaq Nama*, 151, Isami, 380.
55. Isami, 367

## VIII

### CONVERSION AND RECONVERSION TO HINDUISM DURING THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

It used to be the common belief even among students of history that Hindus never admitted people belonging to other religions to their fold. But a more careful study of our sources has now changed that view and it is no longer fashionable to think of Hinduism as a religion wherein only those had a place who were born into it. Most of the evidence from the Hindu period in this connection has been brought together by Prof D R Bhandarkar in his article on *Foreign Elements in the Hindu Population*<sup>1</sup> and those interested in the subject may turn to its pages for fuller information.

But it is still commonly held that admission of non-Hindus to Hinduism stopped with the advent of the Muslims in this country. The following pages make an attempt at investigating this problem from the pages of Muslim chronicles intent more upon recording the victories of their co-religionists than the conversions of non-Hindus to the Hindu fold. They were not at all interested in this question and when we get some light shed upon this aspect of affairs it is but accidental. Another thing must be remembered in this connection. Under Islamic law the conversion of Muslims to other faiths was a capital crime<sup>2</sup>. One has therefore to appreciate the courage and the fate of those Hindus who tried to convert Muslims to their own faith. Even the reconversion of converted Hindus from Islam was a crime and thus if we do not find any great movement for the

conversion or re-conversion of non-Hindus to the Hindu fold we should not be very much surprised. We should hold these artificial barriers created by the Muslim law responsible for this state of things rather than hold Hinduism responsible for its being forced to shut its doors to non-Hindus

But the surprising thing is that even under these adverse conditions we do find recorded examples of conversions of non-Hindus to the Hindu fold and of the reconversion of the Hindus to their old religion after they had once accepted Islam. The cases recorded by Muslim chroniclers are no doubt few and far between, but they make for the belief that a larger number of cases might have occurred which these annalists did not try to record. Any way, it is no longer possible to believe in the face of the instances quoted below that Hinduism had exhausted its proselytizing energy before the advent of the Muslims in India,

1 The Arabs conquered Sind in 712 A. D Under Caliph Umar II (717 to 724 A. D ) many Hindus in Sind were converted to Islam But when under Caliph Hisham (724 to 743 A. D.) Tammim was the Governor of Sind, many of these Hindu converts to Islam were reconverted and admitted into the Hindu fold. We have no details of these conversions, the Arab chronicler of the early conquests of Islam, Al-Biladuri, is content to record the fact that Tammim's successor, Hakim, found that the people of India except those of Kassa had returned to idolatry<sup>3</sup> This could have happened only if there was no bias among the Hindus at this time against the reconversion of their co-religionists who had given up their religion in favour of Islam.

2 But the Hindus in Sind were not simply content with welcoming their erstwhile Hindu brethren alone They converted many—how many we have no



means of estimating—Muslims as well to their faith about this time. 'After the recall of Muhammad bin Qasim,' says Sir Denison Ross, 'the Muslims retained some foothold on the west banks of the river Indus, but they were in such small numbers that they were gradually merged into the Hindu population. In Mansura (the capital of Sind) they actually adopted *Hinduism*'. Under Hakim the Muslims retreated from Sind as "they had no place of security in which they could take refuge". He built a town on the other side of the lake facing India. 'This he made a place of refuge and security for them and gave it the name of Al-Mansura, the secure.'<sup>4</sup> We can well imagine what must have happened. When the retreat was ordered many of them may have either been left behind or cut off from the main army. Naturally they had to make the best of their position. Cut off from their co-religionists, they could not, so they may have argued, exist in security. Their only salvation, it must have appeared to them, lay in their absorption into the Hindu population among whom they were dwelling. Contrary to popular belief the Hindus must have been prepared to welcome them in their midst and thus they were converted to the Hindu faith. Again we know nothing of the actual process that preceded their admission into the Hindu fold but they were admitted into Hinduism no doubt and the Hindu population received a Muslim element.

3. A Muslim friend of mine, the learned editor of the *Urdu Encyclopaedia* was some years ago called in for the purpose of giving literary form to the history of an important Muslim family in the district of Rawalpindi in the Punjab (Pakistan). While there he examined the genealogical tree of another old and influential family, that of Raja Sultan Khan Dhond of Ghoragali. The tree goes considerably back to the beginning of the eleventh century.

My Muslim friend was surprised to find in that tree three Hindu names that were to be referred, according to the family tradition, to about the middle of the eleventh century. There are Muslim names at first; then about this time come Hindu names of two or three generations which are again followed by Muslim names. My friend was told that the probable explanation of these Hindu names in a Muslim genealogy was that those ancestors of the family served some Hindu chief who conferred on them these Hindu titles. I think the more reasonable explanation is that, as we saw above, these ancestors of theirs were converted to Hinduism from Islam.

4. When we next turn to Mahmud's expeditions to India, we find history repeating itself. When Subuktigin defeated Jaipal in 986-87 A. D., the latter surrendered certain hostages to Subuktigin. One of them was Jaipal's grandson Sukhpal. Subuktigin made no attempt to convert him. Sukhpal accompanied him in his expedition to Nishapur in 994 and remained there with Mahmud. In April 995, Abul Ali expelled Mahmud from Nishapur and it was probably at this time that Sukhpal fell into the hands of Abul Ali who converted him. In 996 however Abul Ali was taken prisoner. This or the subsequent death of Abul Ali in 997 A. D. provided Sukhpal, now a Muslim, the chance of re-entering Mahmud's service where he soon rose to eminence. In 1006 A. D. he accompanied Mahmud on his expedition to India against Daud of Multan and was appointed warden of the marches when Daud fled away. Hardly a year had passed when Sukhpal gave up his new faith and was reconverted to Hinduism. This news reached Mahmud after January 5, 1008, in Khurasan and he hastened to India to meet this new danger. Sukhpal was defeated, a heavy fine was extorted from him, and he was imprisoned. But he did not give up his Hindu religion.<sup>5</sup>

Now Sukhpal's mere lapse into Hinduism would never have made him such a danger as he is represented to be if his reconversion to Hinduism had not been accepted by his contemporary co-religionists. All contemporary or semi-contemporary accounts of Mahmud's reign are agreed in representing his readmission into the Hindu fold as a great challenge to Mahmud's power. His reconversion therefore must have been accepted by the contemporary Hindus as a matter of course.

5. Our next example of the absorption of the Muslim population among the neighbouring Hindus comes from the south. Commercial relations between Arabia and India had been established at an early date and some of the Muslim traders or their followers seem to have settled in the districts bordering on the Arabian Sea. One such group of isolated settlers lived in Madura early in the fourteenth century and was very nearly absorbed among the Hindus. When Malik Kafur attacked Madura under its ruler Ravivarman in 1311, he fled away to Kadur. Malik Kafur followed him there and ordered a general massacre after capturing the city. Here he met with those Muslim settlers—or descendants of early Muslim settlers—who had almost been absorbed among the Hindus and who on that account very nearly lost their lives along with the Hindu inhabitants. But fortunately for them some of them succeeded in repeating the *Kahma*, the Muslim creed, and were then spared<sup>6</sup>

6. Closely following this we have another instance where a very large number of people were involved. Ala-ud-din Khilji was followed by Mubarak Shah on the throne of Delhi. Mubarak was infatuated of a Hindu young man from Gujarat who came of peasant stock. This youngman had been converted to Islam and was given the exalted title of Khusru Khan

Hassan He gained so great an influence over the king that he was at last able to murder him in his palace. He now assumed the title of Nasar-ud-Din Khusru Shah. What followed may best be given in the words of Barni: 'Preparations were made for idol worship in the palace. Idols were set up. It was Khusru's desire to increase the power and importance of the Hindus. Through all the territory of Islam the Hindus rejoiced boasting that Delhi had come under Hindu rule and Muslims had been driven away and dispersed.' This episode has not received the attention it deserves. Khusru was a Muslim convert, he could not set up Hindu idols before becoming a Hindu himself. Thus not only must he have been *reconverted to Hinduism* but accepted by the contemporary Hindus as such. How otherwise could Hindus boast that Delhi had come under Hindu rule? His reconversion was accompanied by the reconversion of many thousands of Hindu converts to Islam whom he had sent for from Gujarat and enlisted as his personal troops. One of his uncles, we are assured, actually re-assumed a Hindu name. Here was Hinduism readmitting into its fold many thousands of Hindu converts to Islam.

7 Our next case illustrates the difficulties those had to face who undertook to convert Muslims to Hinduism. When Firuz Shah Tughlaq was reigning at Delhi, he received a complaint, some time after 1375, against a Brahman at Delhi. He had set up, so it was reported, some idols of wood. These were publicly worshiped by Hindus and some Muslims who could have been admitted to Hindu worship only if they had been converted to Hinduism. All doubts on this point are removed by the further assertion that some of these Muslims worshippers, ladies mostly, had been converted to Hinduism.<sup>8</sup> Thus here is a record of a Brahman converting Muslims to

Hinduism and admitting the converts to public worship in his temple.

8 Another case involving the reconversion of 2,000 Brahman men and women occurred in the south about the end of the fourteenth century. The Rajas of Vijayanagar were always at war with their Bahmani neighbours. In 1398-1399 (801 A. H) Dev Rai of Vijayanagar invaded the territory of his Muslim neighbour. He was defeated in the struggle that ensued and 2,000 Brahmans were made captives by the armies of Firuz Shah Bahmani. This compelled the Raja to sue for peace as his Brahman subjects demanded that they be restored to them from their Muslim captors. A treaty was at last signed, 1,00 000 Huns were paid by Dev Rai and the Brahmans were then released.<sup>9</sup> Now it stands to reason that as soon as the Brahmans were made captives they must have been converted, however nominally, to Islam. That the Brahmans should not only re-admit them to the Hindu fold but actually demand their restoration proves that the present ideas about the attitude of the Hindus towards re-admission of converts is of recent origin.

9. The next case occurs in the fifteenth century and involves the reconversions of thousands of Hindu converts to Islam. Zain-ul-Abadin who ruled in Kashmir from 1424 to 1460 allowed the Brahmans to reconvert those Hindus who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the reign of his predecessor or who were otherwise willing to be reconverted. As a result of the lifting of the ban, many Hindus were re-admitted into the Hindu fold. Thus the real reason why such conversions were not more common was not the reluctance of the Hindus to re-admit their co-religionists to their fold but the religious policy of the Muslim kings which made such reconversions a capital offence. So shocked are the Muhammadan annalists by the liberality of this king, that

a story had to be invented to explain it<sup>10</sup> We are told that Zain-ul-Abadin who allowed these reconversions was in reality a Hindu Yogi who had, at the death bed of the king, projected his own soul into the body of dying Zain-ul-Abadin. If anything this explanation strengthens the contention that there was no strong feeling among the Hindu against the reconversion of their brethren who may have previously given up their faith

10. Another case of the conversion of Muslim women to Hinduism is reported in *Subh-i-Sadiq* of Muhammad Sadiq Puran Mal, governor of the fort of Rai Sen in Sher Shah's reign is reported to have converted many Muslim women and this is held there as one of the causes that induced Sher Shah to attack him.<sup>11</sup> This history was composed in the year 1048 A H (1638-39 A. D.) within a century of Sher Shah's death and there is no reason to believe that it would invent such a tale without there being any foundation for the same

11 Nasir Khan, a son of Abdul Qadir, ruler of Kalpi, adopted the style of Nasir Shah and gave up Islam Sultan Mahmud of Malwa invaded his territories in order to punish him for his apostacy. Nasir Khan thereupon declared himself a Muslim But as he had deluded his Muslim neighbours by such a move before and had again adopted Hinduism, Mahmud decided that Nasir Shah would get Kalpi back if after four months his conversion to Islam proved serious<sup>12</sup> Here is a case of a Muslim ruler, son of a Muslim father, renouncing Islam and adopting Hinduism openly to the scandal of the neighbouring Muslim rulers His conversion to Hinduism must have been accepted by Hindus before it could become a danger to the Muslim faith to the extent of compelling his Muslim neighbours to invade his territories

12 But probably the greatest of Muslim converts to Hinduism is Kabir. Born of Muslim parents or adopted by them, this Muslim weaver lived to found a Hindu sect. The faithful have tried to make him a miracle child born of a widow daughter of a Brahman of Banaras whom Swami Ramanand blessed with a son not knowing that she was a widow. When her father remonstrated, we are told, Ramanand refused to modify his blessing. In due course the miracle child was born. But the Brahman was not sure he would be able to persuade the sceptics and the scoffers that the birth of a child to a widow was the result of a miracle rather than an offshoot of sin. He tried to drown the boy who was however discovered by a Muslim weaver and his wife who took him home and brought him up as a son of their own. The faithful and the less believing are all however agreed that Kabir was brought up as a Muslim. His Muslim contemporaries claimed him as one of themselves and were prepared to fight the Hindus on this issue. But he was accepted as his disciple by Ramanand, the great Hindu saint of Banaras whose greatest disciple he lived to be<sup>13</sup>. It was however not Ramanand alone who claimed him as a Hindu. The contemporary Hindus knew him as their leader and a member of their faith<sup>14</sup>. The story of the quarrel between the Hindus and the Muslims for performing his death rites according to their religious faith as recorded by Abul Fazal in the *Ain-i-Akbari*<sup>15</sup> proves that Kabir was known to be a Hindu to his contemporaries. Of course one can understand the Muslims trying to bury one born into their faith but the Hindu could not have claimed to cremate him had they not accepted his conversion to Hinduism. Tradition further records his persecution as a Hindu saint at the hands of Sikander Lodi, king of Delhi<sup>16</sup>. Further a large number of his Hindu followers are found even today in different parts

of India, particularly the Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab. In the latter state the Kabir Panthis, as his followers are called, were counted by the Punjab government as caste Hindus.

Here then is an example of the Hindus converting a Muslim and raising him to the rank of their religious leader. He is reckoned among the great Hindu devotees by Nabhaji, the author of the famous *Bhakt Mal*, the Book of Hindu Saints written in the seventeenth century and commented upon by Priya Das soon after. No greater proof is needed of the catholicity of a religion that could raise a Muslim convert to such a high position.

13 Jahangir in the *Tuzak* mentions another interesting case in his account of the fifth year of his reign.<sup>17</sup> Kaukab, son of Qumar Khan, went to a yogi who began to teach him elements of Hindu religion and Yogic practices. This at last found a place in his heart and he accepted these un-Muslim instructions. He made two cousins of his partners in this 'error'. For some time the thing was kept a secret, but they were found out at last and the case was reported to the emperor. Kaukab and one of the cousins were imprisoned, another was whipped in Jahangir's presence. Their punishment was rendered necessary, according to Jahangir, because it was feared that their example might prove catching and the contagion might spread. Obviously the danger apprehended was the conversion to Hinduism which Jahangir thus tried to prevent.

14. Shah Jahan's reign contributes several interesting examples of the conversion of the Muslims to the Hindu faith. While Jahangir was returning from Kashmir he discovered that Hindus married Muslim wives who were burnt at death. Thus it is clear that at their marriage they were regularly admitted into the Hindu fold. When Shah Jahan learnt of this custom, he



imposed a fine if such Hindus as had married Muslim wives did not abjure their faith and accept Islam. This source of admitting a non-Hindu element into the Hindu population was responsible for the conversion of a large number of Muslim women. For we find that when Shah Jahan ordered that the Hindus could keep these wives only if they accepted Islam, 5,000 conversions to Islam took place in Bhadnor alone <sup>18</sup>

15 But this custom was not confined to Kashmir alone. Down in Gujrat Shah Jahan again faced the same complaint. Here the disease was not so wide spread for only 70 women were found living in the houses of Hindus, having been admitted to the Hindu fold <sup>19</sup>

16 But other places in the Punjab were also found where this custom of marrying Muslim girls was prevalent among the Hindus. From the rest of the Punjab 400 such cases were reported on investigation.

This happened in his seventh year <sup>20</sup>

17 In the tenth year he again discovered Dalpat Rai, a Hindu of Sirhand, indulging in this forbidden practice. He had admitted one man and six women to Hinduism and given these covertly Hindu names. On the complaint of the Qazi, Shah Jahan asked Dalpat to embrace Islam which he declined to do and was executed thereon <sup>21</sup>

18 But Hindu enthusiasm was not curbed even under Aurangzeb. He received complaints on April 9, 1669, that in the provinces of Thatta and Multan, but particularly at Banaras, Hindus were using their temples as schools for Hindus and Muslims alike, teaching the Muslims their own religious books and thus taking them away from their own faith <sup>22</sup>. We are not concerned here with the steps that Aurangzeb took for the purpose of remedying such a state of things. But this statement deserves double notice. Muslims were accepted as their pupils by

Hindu teachers who so gladly taught them Hindu religious books that the matter became a scandal for a king of Aurangzeb's puritanical temper. The Hindu teachers, presumably Brahmans, did not teach their Muslim students in their own houses but along with their Hindu students in the temples which were normally used as schools. Thus they did not overlook the possibility that this teaching might incline Muslims towards Hinduism. They prepared them for such a contingency by holding their classes in the precincts of Hindu temples thus familiarizing these likely converts with Hindu atmosphere.

19 We have another case from Aurangzeb's reign. A Hindu of Hoshiarpur in the Punjab was converted to Islam and lived as a Muslim for a long period at Jullundur. He was subsequently reconverted to Hinduism. This was reported whereupon he was imprisoned. The Hindus of Hoshiarpur observed *hartal* thereon.<sup>23</sup> This case proves that Hindus not only tolerated the conversion of converts to Islam back to their original faith but sympathised with those who suffered on account of their re-conversion to Hinduism.

20 The author of the *Dabistan-i Mazahib* writing in the reign of Shah Jahan mentions several interesting instances of the conversion of the Muslims to Hinduism and their acceptance in their adopted faith. He was known to the Sikh Guru Har Gobind and was on terms of intimacy with several Hindu saints. The cases that he records seem to be based either on his own information or on reliable authorities. The cases he records occurred in the reigns of Akbar, Jahangir or Shah Jahan.

Gosain Chaturapath who was a Nagar Brahman from Gujarat and died in 1637 A. D., taught the author of the *Dabistan* the Hymn of the Sun and asked one of his disciples, Ganesh, to teach him the elements of Hindu

religion. The author of the *Dabistan* was not a born Hindu and naturally what Gosain Chaurapath did was equivalent to conversion. This Gosain seems to have been one of the foremost Hindu saints of his times. Jahangir and Abdur-Rahim Khan-i-Khanan were among those who respected him.<sup>24</sup>

The author of the *Dabistan* met another Hindu saint, Kalyan Bharti,<sup>25</sup> in 1643 at the town of Kiratpur in the present district of Hoshiarpur in the Punjab. He was a sannyasi, yet he had travelled in far off Persia, lived among Muslims, returned to India and was still respected as a great Hindu saint. There is reason to believe that when he lived in Persia he had become a Muslim. It was only the licentious life of Shah Abbas Safawi, the Great, (1583 to 1628 A. D.) that made him give up the religion which permitted such misdeeds. His return and consequent acceptance among the Hindus is therefore significant.

The *Dabistan's* list however does not end here. We are told that a large number of Muslims was converted to Hinduism and admitted as Vairagis. The author speaks as if he knew of these cases himself. Two names are mentioned as these of Muslim nobles who were admitted as Vairagis—Mirza Haidar Salih and Mirza Haidar.<sup>26</sup>

Another case that smells of the conversion of a non-Hindu to Hinduism is that of Karan who became a Vairagi.<sup>27</sup>

The enslavement and conversion of a large number of *Madaris* and *Jalalis* is mentioned by the *Dabistan* this time through the efforts of the Sannyasis. *Jalalis* were the disciples of Sayyid Jalal, a Muslim saint buried at Uch in Sind. They were Shias. The *Madaris* were Sunnis. Once it so happened that the Muslims tried to sacrifice a cow at a place of Hindu pilgrimage where Sannyasis were assembled in large numbers. The

Sannyasis rescued two cows by paying exorbitant prices for them but the Muslims brought a third and sacrificed it. A battle followed. The Sannyasis killed seven hundred of these Muslims and defeated them. Their children were enslaved and brought up in the Hindu faith<sup>28</sup>

The Sannyasis were not the only Hindu sectarians who admitted the Muslims into the Hindu faith. The Vaishnavas also admitted Muslims into the Hindu fold and converted many of them<sup>29</sup>

When Guru Har Gobind returned to Kiratpur he succeeded in converting a large number of Muslims in the neighbourhood of his place of residence so that not a Muslim was left between the hills near Kiratpur and the frontiers of Tibet and Khotan<sup>30</sup>. This happened before the conquest of Kiratpur by the Mughals in 1645<sup>31</sup>

21. In the concluding verses of the *Bhavishya Purana* we are told of Raja Ganga Singh. The first three verses make him the tenth sovereign after Bhoja and place his accession 500 years after Bhoja's death. We are then told that he was a contemporary of Raja Jai Chand of Kanauj and Anang Pal of Delhi. Under him Mlechhas began to perform all the duties of the Aryas, so much so that Kali was at last frightened and went to Krishna in order to remonstrate with him for this sorry state of things, the prevalence of so much religion in an age which he had been assured would be particularly dominated by absence of religion. Again in his lament we come across a very significant phrase. His sons the Mlechhas, he laments, have adopted the Aryan religion.

A little later on we find the *Bhavishya* recording traditions of the reconversion of Hindu converts to Islam *en masse* in different cities of India. Many converts to Islam were made. This we are told, evoked a reaction. The Aryans felt depressed. But they soon found out

a remedy. The disciples of Krishna Chaitanya took upon their shoulders the hazardous task of reconverting their lost brethren. Then follows a string of names of the preachers with the locality of their ministry. Disciples of Ramanand went to Ayudhya and converted the Mlechhas to Hinduism. Sanyogis were also admitted to Ramanand's creed. Nimbāditya with his disciples went to Kanchipur. Vishnu Swami went to Haridwar. To Mathura proceeded Madhavacharya. Ordered by Ramanuj, Shankracharya of Shaiva persuasion went to Banaras. Ramanuj went to Kanauj. Dhanvantri chose Allahabad as his centre of activities. Bhattoji, Jai Dev, Kabir, and Sadhana, helped in this good work. The efforts of the Muslim were thus undone. A large number of adherents was secured by Vaishnavas, Shaivites and Shaktikas.

A very interesting part of this description in the *Bhavishya* is the different types of Mantras these teachers gave their followers, the varying shape of the mark on the forehead (Tilaka) that they employed, the necklaces that they asked their disciples to wear. All the outward emblems of Hinduism have been exhausted in order to prove that the Mlechhas (Muslims)—Hindu converts to Islam(?)—were thus regularly and formally admitted into the Hindu fold.

Unlike the first extract cited the author here does not look upon the admission of the Muslims into the Hindu fold as something strange and lamentable. This is important when we remember the fact that the age of this part of the *Bhavishya* is uncertain. It may indeed be modern. But all this does not destroy the fact that the writer knew of an earlier tradition of conversions and was content to record it.

What exactly is the value of these facts recorded by the writer of this part of the *Bhavishya*? We would at once concede that all the facts mentioned here need not

be historically true. We admit that the preachers lumped together here were not all contemporaries. We further recognize that several of them were not disciples of Chaitanya. What, one may very well ask, is then left? The answer is simple. When all allowance has been made, we are left to face the fact that the writer of the *Bhavishya* knew of an old tradition when several Hindu preachers in different localities counteracted the growing power of Islam by reconverting Hindu converts to Islam back to the Hindu fold as also by admitting the Muslims to the Hindu fold. He may have confused the tradition, played havoc with chronology and transplanted preachers and places. What is still more important, this time his sympathies are with the reformers.

Thus from Sind to Madura from Gujrat to Kashmir, from Banaras to Thatta everywhere an almost continuous stream, however small, of conversions and reconversions seems to have been running all through the ten centuries of the Muslim rule in India. Hindus not only welcomed their brethren back to their fold from Islam but were prepared to admit Muslims into their faith and did admit them as a matter of fact. Thus another element was added to the make-up of the present Hindu population.

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## Notes

1. *Indian Antiquary*, 1911, pp 7 to 37.
2. Tritton, *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects*, pp 181 to 185. cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and Zwemer, *Apostacy in Islam*.
3. Elliot Vol. I p 126.
4. *Islam*, p. 18.
5. Girdazi, *Zainul Akhbar*, p 59, Firishta pp. 25, 26 cf. above pages 24, 33n, 43 & 44
6. Amir Khusru, *Tarikh-i-Alai*, Elliot, III, 90
7. Barni, *Tarikh i Firoz Shahs*, pp 404, 412 Cf. above pages 89 to 106 *Nasar-ud-Din Khusru Shah*.
8. Afif, *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahs*, p 388.
9. Firishta, p. 311.
10. *Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh*, pp 388-389
11. f. 1710
12. *Ibid*, f 1756 b.
13. *Dabistan*, p. 200
14. *Ibid*, p 201.
15. Vol. II, p. 129, 171.
16. *Maauhf*, VI, p. 133.
17. *Tuzak*, p. 85 Cf. the account in the *Maasiri i-Jahangiri* which supplements Jahangir's own version MS f. 65a and b.
18. Qazvini, *Badshahnama*, L 444 b, 445 a.
19. *Ibid*, f 445 h.
20. *Ibid*, f. 582 a and b
21. *Ibid*, f. 562
22. *Maasir-i-Alimgiri*, p. 81.
23. *Inshai Hamid-ud din*, p. 91.
24. *Dabistan* pp. 184 to 186.
25. *Ibid* pp. 186 to 187.
26. p. 203.
27. p 203
28. p 217.

29. p. 218.

30. *Dabistan* i. *Mazahib*. 235.

31. *Dabistan*, p. 238.

32. *Bhavishya Puran*, vol. II, Book III, Part IV, Chapter IV,  
p. 192 b, verses 52 and 53.

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## IX

### THE STORY OF FIRUZ SHAH TUGHLUQ'S ACCESSION

In spite of Sir Welseley Haig's opinion to the contrary,<sup>1</sup> Firuz Shah Tughlaq has usually been described as a genial soul 'utterly devoid of ambition' who was compelled to assume royal authority on account of 'pressure put upon him' by the Tughlaq nobles in Sind. Afif<sup>2</sup> and Barni<sup>3</sup> started the fashion and modern writers have not been slow to take up the hints dropped by these two theologians.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately for the text book writers, the facts do not support the story that they have popularized. So far as Afif and Barni are concerned if we look closely, we shall find that their conclusions are not justified by the evidence that they bring forth.

According to the story told by Afif and Barni Muhammad Tughlaq died in Sind on March, 20, 1351. For three days there was an interregnum. On March 23, Firuz Shah was proclaimed king. Barni will have us believe that Firuz was freely chosen by those competent to exercise this right.<sup>5</sup> His election was however soon disputed by the claim put forward on behalf of Dawar Malik, son of Muhammad Tughlaq's sister.<sup>6</sup> In far off Delhi, Khwaja Jahan, Muhammad Tughlaq's Deputy left at Delhi, proclaimed Muhammad Tughlaq's son as his successor and placed him on the throne.<sup>7</sup> Mubark, a brother of Muhammad Tughlaq, was still alive and could have had a fling at claiming royal authority.

Firuz Tughlaq's claim after his 'election' seems to have been buttressed by the allegation that Muhammad Tughlaq had by his last will appointed Firuz Tughluq as his successor.<sup>8</sup> Some even go still further and declare that

Muhammad Tughlaq had intended Firuz to be his successor—and obviously proclaimed his intentions.<sup>9</sup> Whatever statements might have been made by Firuz Shah's partizans to support his claim when he had once ascended the throne, they do not explain the events that took place in Sind between March 20 and March 23. If Firuz Shah was Muhammad Tughlaq's successor by his last will it should have been a matter of common knowledge and it should have led to Firuz Shah's succeeding to Muhammad Tughlaq's throne immediately. If Muhammad Tughlaq had trained Firuz Shah Tughlaq to be his successor, one fails to see why Firuz Shah Tughlaq allowed the affairs in Sind to drift dangerously before he 'was persuaded to accept unwillingly' the throne of Delhi. If Firuz Shah needed to be persuaded to accept the throne, he could neither have been trained as an heir apparent nor named as his successor in a will, if any, of Muhammad Tughlaq. The critical situation in Sind demanded that the Tughlaqs should produce a leader at their head immediately. Muhammad Tughlaq died. That this did not happen refutes beyond any doubt the statement of Barni and his supporters as to any acknowledged claims of Firuz Shah Tughlaq.

These considerations are again supported by Firuz Shah's action as also the actions of his supporters when his right to throne was challenged. When the claim of Dawar Malik was pressed neither nomination in his life time nor in a last will was used to support Firuz Shah Tughlaq's right. His mother was told that Firuz Shah had assumed royalty in order to safeguard Tughlaq government at a critical juncture in a foreign land.<sup>10</sup> When news of Muhammad Tughlaq's son being raised to the throne of Delhi reached Firuz's camp, Khwaja Jahan who had raised the son to the throne was not branded as a traitor because he had, if Muhammad Tughlaq had

nominated Firuz as his successor, gone against the proclaimed intentions of Muhammad Tughlaq. Firuz Shah contended himself by getting his noble to declare that Muhammad Tughlaq had left no son. But as if this was not enough, he submitted the question of his 'right' to the throne to theologians, scholars and pious men of his own choice and attached to his entourage. Unfortunately for Barni and those who rely on him, these authorities could only come to the comfortable conclusion that Firuz Tughlaq was a 'lawful sovereign'. They advanced no reason for the 'decree' they issued—at least none have been handed down to us by the historians who mention this. It is childish to suggest that as 'jurists' they were only concerned with the 'justice' of his election to the throne. Doubts had been raised about his claim to the throne because a son of Muhammad Tughlaq was alleged to be alive and on the throne. Their silence as to this fact may prove that they felt themselves in an awkward corner and byepassed this question. Neither Farishta nor Nizam-ud-Din mentions that Khwaja Jahan was told by anyone that Firuz Tughlaq had been nominated as Muhammad Tughlaq's successor by the late king. Such a statement would have been extremely foolish when made to Muhammad Tughluq's deputy at Delhi. If there was nomination he should have known about it. Nobody could accuse him of ignorance about Muhammad Tughlaq's intentions in the matter seeing how close he had been to the King.

Thus the story of Firuz Tughlaq's having been designated Muhammad Tughlaq's successor falls to the ground. This brings us to the question of Firuz Shah Tughlaq's ascending the throne because Muhammad Tughlaq had left no son.<sup>12</sup> Barni was disbelieved in this matter by Firishta.<sup>13</sup> Afif of course supports Barni. Yahya<sup>14</sup> however supports Khwaja Jahan. The fact that in

answer to the deputation from Delhi on behalf of the boy king, the nobles declared that Muhammad Tughlaq had left no son fails to be of much use when we find that the theologians of Firuz Shah Tughlaq's did not use this fact to refute the claim of the child <sup>15</sup> They recognized Firuz as the true king but said nothing about this depending on the fact that Muhammad Tughlaq had left no son. It is legitimate to assume with Yayha, Firishta and Badaoni that Muhammad Tughlaq had a son who was a minor and whom Khwaja Jahan proclaimed as Muhammad Tughlaq's successor.

While we are discussing our authorities, Badaoni's account <sup>16</sup> also need be taken into consideration. He tells us that Firuz was left at Delhi by Muhammad Tughlaq. There he tried to conspire to become emperor and secured the support of Yunas and Nizam-ud-Din. The conspiracy seems to have been discovered and the three conspirators were summoned to Sind by the king. Firuz's supporters were ordered to be executed while Firuz was taken into custody. Soon after, one day when Muhammad Tughlaq was drunk and his son away on a hunting expedition, the guards set Firuz at liberty. He murdered the son and on Muhammad Tughlaq's death Firuz became king. This account may not entirely be reliable but it seems to suggest that there was a living tradition present in the 16th century which asserted that Firuz Shah Tughlaq was not as devoid of ambitious as Barni and Afif have painted him to be.

Taking all the evidence into consideration it seems that when Muhammad Tughlaq died there was no one on the spot who could immediately claim the right to succeed him. It is probable that Firuz Shah allowed Tughlaq position in Sind to be endangered so that the Delhi army and its leaders could be persuaded that they

could not allow the existing state of affair to continue much longer. The interregnum would have certainly continued much longer if some body, Muhammad Tughlaq's son for example, not present with the army in Sind had to be proclaimed king. This may have been exactly what some of the nobles in the army may have contemplated. Firuz now forced their hands. Even though he was the seniormost member of the royal family in the army, he had made no move to settle the succession during these three days. On the contrary, he had failed to act as a conscientious and loy. servant of the late king. He sat still while the enemy pressed the Delhi army hard. This probably convinced the other nobles that he harboured designs on the throne. All talk of Firuz Shah's reluctance to succeed Muhammad Tughlaq seems to have been the result of a publicity manager's imagination. Barani was no better nor worse than his contemporaries.

This version of events receives supports from the account of the events given in the *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*. We are told that after Muhammad Tughlaq's death, Firuz Shah persuaded the Mughal contingent of the Delhi army to leave camp and to retire to their own proper territories. They left the camp as instructed by Firuz Shah Tughlaq carrying a good deal of property with them. They seem to have encamped only at a little distance from the Tughlaq army and soon after plundered it to their heart's content. When they attacked the Tughlaq camp, Firuz Shah did not stir at all even though he was responsible for the agreement under which they had withdrawn and which they were now breaking. It was after this plundering of the Tughlaq camp that the theologians, scholars and chiefs woke up to realize the gravity of the situation and sought a way out by approaching Firuz requesting him to ascend the throne. If

this version is correct the whole thing seems to be stage managed

But Firuz was no usurper His claim to the throne depended upon the fact that he seated himself thereon at a time of crises All talk of his having been 'elected by' those competent to elect a king is however, without substantial support. That he received the support and probably contrived to get it of those who were then in the army can be easily explained when one remembers the circumstances under which kings had been succeeding one another during the Sultanate There was no law of succession and there could be none in a State where rulers often claimed to rule as the deputies of a far off Khalifa Even murder never served to deny any claimant's right if he had sufficient force to support him. If Alla-ud-Din's nephew declaring that he had murdered his uncle could be promised unanimous support if he but produced the head of the murdered (?) Alla-U-Din,<sup>17</sup> one need not set much store by stories of a king being 'elected' Where there was no electoral register, where qualifications of the electors were most vague, when the electors almost invariably display a suspicious unanimity for the claimant in whose favour they vote, one need only say that election was a farce which not all the kings found it necessary to play. That Firuz Shah found loyal supporters among nobles and theologians the moment they discovered that he was inclined to claim the throne is manifestly clear The account of the reign by Barni and Afif proves him to be, if a theologian's delight, a noble's puppet as well But it is wrong to argue that he was a usurper because he did not allow a son of Muhammad Tughlaq to succeed.

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## Notes

1 J R A S , July and September, 1922,

2 Afif, (Urdu) 36.

3 Barni, 532.

4. *Medieval India*, Ishwari Prashad, 326

*Delhi Sultanate*, A L. Srivastava, 302

*Crescent in India*, S R Sharma 135.

*Medieval India*—S Lanepole, 153

*History of India*—Elphinstone

5 Barni 532, 547

Afif (Urdu), 39, does not mention any 'election' Tabaqat is also silent (240, 241), Tripathi (64) improves on Barni and Afif and talks of a Council of Electors which rather strangely excluded the late king's deputy at Delhi and many eminent theologians not in the Tughlaq camp at the moment. A partizan gathering if ever there was one

6 Afif, (Urdu) 37

7. Firishta, 145, Afif, (Urdu), 42, 43, Tabaqat i Akbari, Vol. I. 242

8 Firishta 144 Tabaqat, I, 240 Barni 535

9 Afif (Urdu) 36

10 Afif (Urdu), 37

11 Tabaqat, Vol I, 242 Afif, (Urdu), 44, Firishta, 145

12 *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, Tripathi, 67,

13 Firishta, 145 Afif (Urdu), 42, 43

14 Cf *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*.

15 *Tabaqat* Vol I, 242 Afif, (Urdu), 44.

16 Cf Badaoni

17 Cf above, page 78

## X

### FIRUZ SHAH'S FISCAL REGULATIONS

Our information about the pre-Mughal administrative system in India is admittedly very meagre. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that there are still many dark corners therein where it is difficult for us to gain very much even if we take a good peep thereat. The information about the numerous aspects of the administrative machinery lies scattered about in the various chronicles which give us tantalizingly few hints about the methods of administration as a whole.

One subject, however, receives more than its due attention from time to time. The fiscal regulations of various kings and rulers are described at some length either when changes are introduced or when a judgment is passed on the work of a ruler. The question of interpreting the various passages describing fiscal arrangements, however, presents many difficulties mostly because we do not know much about the background of many of these regulations. It is intended here to discuss only a part of this large question, the fiscal regulations of Firuz Shah's reign.

To understand what Firuz Shah did we have to go back a little. The traditional fiscal methods were rudely changed by Ala-ud-Din Khilji. It is not however very easy to understand what actually Ala-ud-Din did. At one place we are told that he introduced the system of measurement, that he demanded one half of the produce as the share of the state, and that in addition to the land revenue, he imposed a grazing tax as well<sup>1</sup>. Elsewhere, however we are told that the Hindus (peasants?) were so squeezed that they were not left with more than their



yearly subsistence. It is wrong to hold, as Moreland does, that these latter measures concerned the Hindus of the upper classes alone. Ala-ud-Din is manifestly describing in this passage the measures that he took for the purpose of subduing the Hindus in general. Are we right in holding then that the payment of the land revenue at the rate of one half of the produce, plus an unspecified grating fee along with the customary payment of the *Jizya*, left no more than their bare subsistence with the Hindus? But exactly what did this subsistence consist in? The passage of Barni leads one to suggest that they were not allowed to store corn, milk and other things. But how did measurement help in the assessment of land revenue? Our records are silent again. Was a schedule of demands per *Bigha* for every crop adopted? If so, how was it prepared? Was land revenue collected in cash or kind? When land revenue was paid in cash, how was it calculated? Were local prices or the standard prices used for conversion? Ala-ud-Din is said to have discontinued the payment of salaries by jagirs. How was the cash necessary for the payment of salaries in cash obtained? These are some of the questions on which one would like to have some information.

The next stage in the story of the revenue organization is reached in the reign of Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq. Again the only definite thing that we know about him is that giving up the use of measurement as an aid in the assessment of land revenue, he reverted to the method of sharing the produce of the crop. There is not much difference between what he aimed at and what Ala-ud-Din had tried to attain. The Hindu peasant was neither too affluent enough to become refractory, nor was he ground down to the dead level of poverty which should make it impossible for him to pursue his hereditary calling, cultivation. The headmen seemed

to have been paid by holding rent free lands in the villages<sup>3</sup>

When we pass on to the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq, we get either too vague or too unintelligible information. He is said to have increased the land revenue in the Doab tenfold<sup>4</sup>. As such it would have been several times the produce of the land instead of being a share thereof. No peasantry would have stood it, least of all the Indian peasantry which knew that the state depended on its income from the lands they cultivated.

We may assume then that Firuz Shah Tughlaq inherited the system of Ghias-ud-Din as modified by the practices of Muhammad Tughlaq. He seems to have ignored the fantastic experimentation of his predecessor's reign. Barni uses almost the same language in describing his system as he had used earlier for the reign of Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq. We are told,<sup>5</sup> *Kharaj o-Jaziyah Bar Hukm Hasil Hukam Shud Ki Bistanand. Qismat-o-Ziyadat Talabiha Wa Nabudaha Wa Mutadaha i Tasavvuri Bakulli Az Miyami Ria-aya Bardashtand*. This is almost a paraphrase of what had been said earlier in the reign of Ghias-ud-Din. We have there,<sup>6</sup> *Khiraj i Balad-o-Mumalik Bar Jadah i Madalat Bar Hukm i Hasil Taaiun Farmud Wa Muhad-disat Wa Qismat-i Bud o-Nabudaha Ra Az Riaya i-Balad-o-Mumalik Bardashtand*. The system described here represents 'Batai'. Ghias-ud-Din is said to have relieved the cultivation from innovations (Ala-ud-Din's use of measurement?) and division of the produce based on averages taking into consideration bumper crops and crop failures. Firuz Shah is described as having relieved the peasants entirely from sharing, increments in demands, crop failures, and figures based on surmises. Barni further adds that additional cesses on land revenue was remitted.<sup>7</sup> A'raf describes the settlement of land revenue in Delhi as being settled on the principle of the rule of observation,

and credits the king with the remission of some customary cesses like, *Rasum-i-Guzashtagan Wa Qanun-i-Paishnian* besides the remission of the advances made to the peasants by his predecessor<sup>8</sup> We are further told that the revenue of the kingdom was settled at 6,75,00,000 tankas and that this was not varied during the forty years of Firuz Shah's reign.<sup>9</sup>

We have thus three statements about Firuz Shah's land revenue system. It was based on the principle of '*Hukm Hasil*' according to Barni and *Hukm Mushahda* according to Afif. The total revenue was fixed in cash for the Doab as well as the entire kingdom and it remained the same throughout his entire reign. *Hukm-i-Hasil* and *Hukm-i-Mushahda* are two terms used by two authors. Do they imply the same thing? *Hukm-i-Hasil* undoubtedly means the principle of sharing the produce. *Hukm-i-Mushahda* would be the principle of observation. Moreland has suggested that *Hukm-i-Mushahda* might be appraisal or *Kankut*. It would then be one of the methods in use when *Batai* is practised. The state, it seemed, fixed its demand of land revenue, not by claiming a share of the harvest when it had been cut and garnered. It based its demand on an estimate of the total yield arrived at while the crops were still standing.

Now the '*Kankut*' enables the state to claim a share in kind of the crops cultivated. The money value of the revenue so collected would vary with the crops sown and the area under cultivation. It may be presumed that ordinarily the Indian cultivators, mostly practising subsistence farming, would go on cultivating the same crops and that the cropped area each season would not vary very much. Ordinarily such a presumption may be safely made. But Firuz Shah's reign came after the stormy days of Muhammad Tughlaq when the cultivators had been so much harassed and troubled and when a good

deal of the land had gone out of cultivation as well. We are assured elsewhere by Afif that as a result of Firuz Shah's beneficent reign, new villages came to be established and more land was brought under cultivation<sup>10</sup> What happened to these lands? Was any land revenue charged thereon? Of course the settlement of land revenue took six years. Naturally the lands brought under cultivation during these six years might have been included in the estimate of the total revenue of the land. But the problem of an unvarying land revenue in cash still remains unsolved. Even the same crops on a constant cropped area would not always produce the same cash value unless the prices and the produce remained constant. Are we to assume then that during the entire reign of Firuz Shah prices remained the same? That would be a very tall order particularly when we remember that Ala-ud-Din had to set up an elaborate economic organization of his own to secure that the commodity prices fixed were not interfered with. If the level of prices was apt to remain the same during the medieval period, we would not have found Ala-ud-Din taking such elaborate precautions for securing the success of his price fixing machinery. They reveal that he had the fear of changing prices constantly in his mind.

But without some such machinery it was impossible for Firuz Shah to secure the sameness of prices throughout his entire reign. If that is so, the statement of Afif about a never changing total of land revenue in cash in the Doab and also the entire kingdom must assume another meaning. Is it possible that despite Barni's statement about Batai being the method of land revenue in use, some other method of land revenue may have been adopted by Firuz Shah? Such a method would be the usual Islamic mode of levying the land revenue in cash on a particular area. We know that Firuz Shah was a

very strict follower of the Islamic regulations even in matters of raising taxes. Several unauthorised taxes were abolished by him. He levied the irrigation dues only when he had been assured by the 'Learned in Law' that these could be lawfully levied. Is it possible that he settled the land revenue to be paid to him in cash following Islamic injunctions? Now any such method could well have been described by Afif as '*Hukm-i-Mushahada*', levying of the land revenue after a scrutiny on the spot. Nothing that he says elsewhere on the subject contradicts this interpretation. It would make better sense of the statement made by him that during the rest of Firuz Shah's reign the revenue was neither revised nor raised.

Are we then to assume that Firuz Shah settled the land revenue permanently in cash? We have yet to tackle Barni's statement that Firuz Shah introduced the principle of sharing the crops and abolished demands based on imaginary surmises (*Mutadha-i-Tasavvuri*) and crop failures, (varying of demands due to crop failure). He could not, by his orders, secure that there should be no crop failures, increments and classifications. Now all these things would hold true of Firuz Shah's land revenue system as we have tried to interpret it above. All these things can with equal justice be said of the *Bilmuqta* system of land revenue usually favoured by the Muslim jurists. No, with more justice, Moreland in his notes on the translation of this passage interprets *Mutadha-i-Tasavvuri wa Nabudaha wa Qismat* as additional cesses abolished by Firuz Shah.<sup>11</sup> It is surprising to find him varying the essential meaning of *avowedly technical terms* describing two reigns only 37 years apart in the work of the same author. When some of these terms occur in the passage above cited about Ghias-ud-Din's reign, Moreland translates them as methods of assessment or considerations taken into account when assessment was made.<sup>12</sup> Herein

while translating the same terms, when employed with regard to Firuz Shah Tughlaq's reign, he considers them as cesses. Now there is nothing to suggest that during the course of the one intervening reign the meanings of these terms had changed. There is nothing else cited by Moreland, nor anything that could have been cited to support this view. We are reluctantly compelled to give up Moreland's fanciful translation of the second passage and adopt the plain meaning of these terms as he had himself done it in the earlier passage. It is not necessary to do violence to the text of Barni in order to arrive at a true meaning of the passage cited.

But if the rest of the passage in Barni is capable of supporting the thesis that Firuz Shah settled the land revenue on cash rates, the main description of the system as *Hukm-i-Hasil* still remains. It may well be either a mistake of the chronicler or a description of the system which Firuz Shah tried to introduce at first but gave up in favour of settling land revenue after a careful scrutiny, *Hukm-i-Mushahda*. It is not necessary for us to bind ourselves to Barni when we find Afif plainly implying something else.<sup>13</sup>

But one question still remains unanswerable. Who paid the land revenue to the king? Not the peasants. There is little to support the view that the Tughlaqs dealt with the peasants directly. The country, we are told, was apportioned among various types of state servants. The administrators, the soldiers, the pious and the learned realised their salaries from the portions assigned to them by the king. Afif goes to the length of saying that all the villages and *Parganahs* were given in assignments by the king.<sup>14</sup> Moreland has tried to cast some doubts on this statement by suggesting that the king must have had some revenue for himself which presumably, Moreland implies, could come from the crown

lands. It is necessary to remember that the king had several other sources of revenue. The *Jizya*, the irrigation dues, the export and import duties, and the tributes from the chiefs must have bought in a large amount of money. The chiefs were the local rulers who had not been dispossessed but were allowed to continue in their districts on the stipulation that they paid a fixed tribute—not revenue as Moreland has suggested—to the king. This must have formed a fruitful source of revenue. But the distribution of the districts under the direct control of the crown to assignees of various types does not exclude the idea of the king's getting revenue from them. We know that several assignees were given areas which sufficed not only for their own maintenance and also of their soldiers and servants, but still left a good deal of surplus. This they had to remit to the king. It seems likely that when the administrative officers in charge of the *Parganahs* or bigger units (*Iqtahs*) were given land, they stipulated to pay to the king a fixed amount as the surplus from their assignments. We find them remitting this surplus every year to the king who gave orders that the value of their presents should be considered part payment of their annual dues.<sup>15</sup>

How was the surplus arrived at? We learn that the grants were not changed during the forty years of Firuz Shah's reign.<sup>16</sup> Notwithstanding earlier practices to the contrary, Firuz did everything to make these grants hereditary. On the death of an assignee, his assignment went to his son, in the absence of a son to his son-in-law; if a son-in-law was not forthcoming, the late assignee's slaves claimed it and if everything else failed, the widow of the assignee was allowed to have it.<sup>17</sup> It would thus become feudal in nature. But was this a general order or did it concern the individual soldiers only who had got grants for their subsistence? It is likely that these orders concerned only those public servants,

civil and military, whose work was neither specialised nor of a highly technical nature. It is true we find a son succeeding his father even as a finance minister, but it is likely that this was an exceptional case. Ordinarily only individual soldiers and state servants of similar status would have been allowed to let their jagirs descend from them to their descendants. In such jagirs probably there was no surplus to be accounted for. The assignment just covered the salary due.

But surplus arose in connection with assignments where administrative work was to be performed. There the charge under a shiqdar or Muqtai was an administrative unit which also included the land held by him as jagir. He performed the administrative duties, drew his own salary, and that of his staff and dependants from his charge and was expected to pay to the state the surplus. It is possible that a scale of cash salaries may have been current at that time and that the surplus to be paid was the difference between the total revenue of an administrative unit and the cash salaries assigned to the officer in charge including his dependants. He would undertake to pay to the state this difference. Now this was not farming in the strict sense of the term. The payments to be made by the officers do not seem to have depended on any competition between various officers competing for the same charge. Yet as the jagirdar was also the administrative officer in charge of the area, he must have been left very much to his own devices for collecting the land revenue. He submitted an account to the central government. But this must have been a simple affair showing on the credit side the total revenue due as settled by the state and on the debit side the salaries due to the officer. It is not likely that the audit by the central government ordinarily went into such intricate questions of detail as the actual revenue collected by the jagirdars. Of course,



scandalous exactions ruining peasants and thus endangering the payments of the surplus due to the state would naturally attract the attention of the central government and so would any interference with the grants made to the servants and the soldiers of an administrator.

The actual collection, however, does not seem to have been made by the assignees even. They depended on 'collectors', probably the forerunner of the village numberdars, who were allowed two *Jitals* per *Tanka* of their collections<sup>18</sup> Whether this was an additional cess as now, or was deducted from of the sum due, as under Akbar, is uncertain.

Naturally then the problem changes its form. If the peasant paid the revenue to the assignee who was not ordinarily accountable to the state for what he received, the question of how the state assessed the land revenue becomes less important. That it retains some importance under Firuz Shah is due to the fact that under Ala-ud-Din, Ghias-ud-Din, and Muhammad Tughlaq, **very** bold experiments had been made for the purpose of impoverishing the cultivators. The principles underlying the assessment of the land revenue during these reigns were political rather than fiscal. Under Firuz Shah, fortunately, political considerations seem to have been thrown into the background and revenue was settled on fiscal considerations alone. The state seems to have assessed the entire countryside in a preliminary survey that is said to have taken six years. The revenue seems to have been assessed now in cash permanently probably either by a system of averages or by some rule of thumb or by mutual understanding. As it was intended to use the new settlement for getting the countryside repopled—and as this seems to have been effected—it is reasonable to suppose that the assessment made by the state was observed by the the assignees<sup>19</sup>

who were in many cases both the assignees of the revenue and the administrators of the areas. The entire territory was given to the assignees of various types. But an assignment did not always absolve the assignee from the payment of the surplus. The state thus paid for most of its establishment in this way sparing itself both the trouble of collecting the land revenue and of making arrangements for the payment of its servants. It however paid certain officers salaries in cash, witness the slaves some of whom were thus paid salaries ranging from 20 to 100 tankas<sup>23</sup>. Several other officers also seem to have been paid cash salaries. Money for these payments, as well as for the personal expenses of the king had to be forthcoming. This seems to have been provided for by the surplus of revenue over the salary assignments of the administrators in charge of *Parganahs*, besides the *Jizya* the tributes to the king, import and export duties and octroi. The chronicles do not seem to mention any crown lands. If the king kept any territory for himself, it must have been very inconsiderable in extent, mostly consisting of pleasure gardens, vegetable and fruit gardens.

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## Notes

1. Barni 287 and 292
  2. See however, above, pages
  - 3 Barni, 429
  4. Barni, 574,
  5. Ibid, 574
  - 6 Ibid 429
  - 7 Ibid 574
  - 8 Afif 91 and 94
  - 9 Ibid 296, 94
  - 10 Afif, 99, 295.
  - 11 Moreland *Agrarian System of Moslem India*
  - 12 Moreland *Agrarian System of Moslem India*
  - 13 Barni's account does not go beyond the first six years of the reign Afif's history covers the entire reign of Firoz Shah This may easily explain the difference in their accounts Barni's method may have been followed by the one described by Afif
  - 14 Afif, 95, 270 and 297
  - 15 Ibid, 268 and 269
  - 16 Ibid 94
  - 17 Ibid 97
  18. Ibid, 99
  - 19 Ibid, 99
  - 20 Ibid, 279
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## XI

### THE STORY OF BABUR'S DEATH

Historical fictions die hard and the story of Babur's miraculous death as a sacrifice for his son Humayun's life popularised by Abul Eazl<sup>1</sup> still persists in the pages not only of the text-book writers but of research scholars as well. Dr Banerji, the latest biographer of Humayun, repeats the story, makes one or two halting suggestions and ends by basing his version of Humayun's accession thereon<sup>2</sup> Dr. Rushbrook Williams was the first to question the authenticity of the tale told by Abul Fazl,<sup>3</sup> but even he left the question obviously undecided In a communication published in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, I provided what I thought was a reasonable enough version of Babur's death and followed it up by an additional note sometimes after<sup>4</sup> These were however brief and were purposely written only to question the version given by Abul Fazl In the pages that follow an attempt is made at a fuller discussion of the subject.

Humayun left Badakhshan for India early in June, 1529, and reached Agra in July, 1529<sup>5</sup> Babur was very much upset at this dereliction of duty in his son who had thus left an outlying province of the Mughal kingdom unprotected by a royal prince<sup>6</sup> He urged Humayun to go back and resume the government of Badakhshan, but Humayun, a youngman of twenty-one, was not prepared to go into exile again,<sup>7</sup> He was thereupon sent to Kalinjar in November, 1529<sup>8</sup> where he remained for some six months<sup>9</sup> He fell ill however soon after, probably in April, 1530<sup>10</sup> When his illness took a serious turn he was brought by water to Agra<sup>11</sup>, some time in April, 1530. Here the Mughal physicians did their best and tried all

their remedies apparently to no purpose.<sup>12</sup> Humayun's condition grew alarming and Babur was naturally very much upset. Recourse was now had to other than medicinal methods of curing the royal prince. Who was more likely to give a suitable advice in this connection than Mir Abu Baqa, one of the most distinguished saints of the age at Babur's court<sup>13</sup> He suggested that Babur should give away in sacrifice something that he held very valuable. Such an act of charity, it was presumed, might persuade the fates to spare Humayun. Some one hinted, rather haltingly, that the Koh-i-Nur gem, worth half the daily expenses of the world, might be given away. The romantic side of Babur's nature however welled out and he decided that he would give away in sacrifice the thing he held dearest—his own life itself. 'A life for a life,' he may have argued, was a more suitable method of persuading the fates to let Humayun escape from the jaws of death. Some courtiers tried to dissuade Babur from this supreme manifestation of his love for his son. Babur was only forty seven then. He had been in India as its emperor for about four years only. The Mughal dominion, though extensive, had not yet taken root here. His death just then would have created many problems for the Mughals. Humayun was not the only son of his father, Babur had other sons who could as well—or as ill—fill Humayun's place as Babur's successor. But did then Babur really believe that his prayer would be accepted? It was to expect a miracle of no mean order and though to pray for a thing is to expect a miracle, Babur had not manifested any miracle working powers yet. It is true that earlier Babur had, at the battle of Khanwaha, invoked divine assistance to some purpose and this resolve to sacrifice his life was well in keeping with his romantic nature. He had in his own illness once vowed to give up the writing of profane verse and had instead taken to

attempting to deal in religious mysteries. Babur may have well believed that the gods on high would save Humayun after such a supreme manifestation of his father's love for him. He may have, in despair of Humayun's life, intended this as a great gesture of his own love towards his son. But it is difficult to say definitely whether Babur was sure that the fates would take him at his word and in saving Humayun doom Babur to die an early death. Indeed Gulbadan Begum's account makes it very doubtful whether Babur entertained any such belief.

His motives apart, his emotions led him to manifest his love for his son in this peculiarly romantic fashion. A day earlier he had sought the intercession of Ali for the life of his son. Now he went round Humayun and prayed, "O God, if a life can be exchanged for another life, I, Babur, give away my life and remaining years to Humayun." <sup>14</sup> He kept this up throughout Wednesday.

Not as soon as Babur uttered these words, but some time during that day, Humayun was able to pour water on his own head and come out of the zenana where probably he had been throughout his illness. <sup>15</sup>

Babur's incessant prayers and the emotional excitement through which he had passed proved too much for him; He was taken ill and carried inside the harem sometimes the same day <sup>16</sup>

This illness of Babur however was not very serious. He soon got well enough to attend to business. So little anxiety was felt for Babur's health that Humayun was sent away to Sambhal leaving his father well <sup>17</sup>

While Humayun was away at Sambhal, Babur got ill again probably in July, 1530. <sup>18</sup> Even when the disease became serious, Humayun was kept in ignorance of his father's health. Amir Nizam-ud-Din Ali Khalifa, Babur's chief administrator of the state, had some cause, real or

fancied, to dread Humayun's accession. Most likely, he desired to play the part of a king maker and make his nominee dance to his own tune. Passing over all the royal princes, he picked up Mahdi Khwaja, 'a generous and liberal youngman'—and therefore not likely to interfere much in the affairs of the state—and the Emperor's brother-in-law. He promised to raise him to the throne. But the youngman of his choice was not so foolish as the astute Khalifa wanted him to be. Once on the throne, he harboured other desires. Unfortunately for him Mahdi Khwaja let his feelings outrun his discretion after an interview with the minister when he thought himself to be alone. He gave full vent to his future plans about the minister but was horrified to find that he was not alone. He did his best to cover his slip when he discovered Muhammad Maqim, Diwan-i-Bayutat, in his room. He did not succeed however. Maqim had never had much use for this youngman and now he hastened to the Khalifa whom he apprised of all that had happened. Babur was dangerously ill and the Khalifa now thought better of his plans. He sent a messenger to bring Humayun back to Agra.<sup>19</sup>

Humayun came post-haste. He was horrified to find his father in such a condition and at once exclaimed "I left him well. What has happened all at once?"<sup>20</sup> After some time, Babur seems to have got better. He had the betrothal of two royal princesses performed.<sup>21</sup> But once again his condition became serious. Humayun thereupon called a medical council and asked his physicians to think of some remedy to cure his father's increasing distress. There was no end of consulting. At the end of it all they came and reported that Babur's disease was due to the poison administered to him several years earlier by Ibrahim Lodi's mother. They declared their powerlessness to fight the disease.<sup>22</sup>

Babur now appointed Humayun his successor and three days later he died on Monday, December 26, 1530<sup>23</sup>

Babur's death was concealed for some time.<sup>24</sup> Arāsh Khan, an Indian official, however suggested that this might create complications. On his advice it was given out that Babur had renounced the world and appointed Humayun his successor. Three days after Babur's death, Humayun was proclaimed the emperor on December 29, 1530<sup>25</sup>

Now this plain narrative of events leaves no place for any miracle that was wrought at the bedside of Humayun. To begin with, Babur did not expect his prayer to be accepted. Gulbadan Begum puts it in the form of a conditional offer. Though Babur was taken ill the same day and carried into the palace, he certainly got well soon after. Had Babur been ailing, Humayun would not have left Agra for Sambhal. Not only that, when Humayun came back to Agra, he asserted that he had left Babur well and complained about the illness which had all at once overtaken Babur, presumably in Humayun's absence. Gulbadan Begum's account seems to suggest that Babur did not live for more than a week after Humayun's return. Even though Amir Khalifa had been intriguing on behalf of another candidate, it is unlikely that Humayun's mother should have allowed Humayun to be kept uninformed of Babur's illness, particularly when it was so serious as to endanger his life. It is likely therefore that this illness had not taken a turn for the worst more than ten days before Humayun was called for. This would place Babur's serious illness sometime in the second week of December. This seems to be borne out by *Tarikh-i-Khandan-i-Tamuriye* which dates Babur's illness in Rajab.<sup>26</sup> (In Rajab Babur had been dead two months. Rajab seems to be an error for



Rabī-'ul-Sanī ) This would place Babur's serious illness towards the end of November or the beginning of December. That this did not follow immediately upon Humayun's recovery we are told by Ahmad Yadgar who asserts that Babur fell ill two or three months after Humayun's going to Sambhal.<sup>27</sup> Gulbadan Begum asserts that Babur remained in bed for two or three months. He must have fallen ill in October, 1530. Further, Babur's physicians did not connect his illness with the act of sacrifice Babur had performed. They would have been as willing to believe in this act of God as Babur himself, yet they reported to Humayun that Babur was suffering from the effects of a poison. The silence of such writers as Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Abdul Qadar Badayuni, Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad, and Firishta is suggestive. Thus there is no reason to believe the fantasy told by Abul Fazl that Babur died as the result of the sacrifice he performed for his son. Not only was Babur's last illness not connected with Humayun's trouble, the contemporaries saw no connection between the two.

Indeed nemesis seems to have overtaken Humayun. A modern French writer has invented another equally fantastic tale and accused Humayun of having murdered his father by poisoning him.<sup>28</sup>

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## Notes XI

- 1 Abul Fazl, I pp 116-17.
- 2 Journal of Indian History XIV 362.
- 3 *An Empire Builder* 175
- 4 J R A S , 1926, pp 295-98

5 According to *Akbar Nama* (Vol I p 111), Humayun left for Badakhshan on 11th April, 1527. He reached Badakhshan probably in June. The first despatch from him is recorded by Abul Fazl (Vol I, p 113) to have been received on Monday 10th Rabi ul Awwal, 935 (Nov 22nd 1528). Another despatch came after 3 Jamadi ul Awwal (3rd January). His mother met Babur on Sunday, 26th June, 1529 according to Babur's own account (*Memoirs*, 686). Gulbadan (page 103) places Humayun's illness a short time after Alwar Mirza's death. Abul Fazl places Humayun's arrival from Badakhshan just after Alwar's death. Humayun could have reached Agra some time after 27th June 1529 for when he came his mother had been in India for some time. Babur in his *Memoirs* (page 687) seems to imply that Humayun was with him in Agra on 8th July, 1529. Humayun thus seems to have reached Agra towards the end of June or the beginning of July, 1529. But Haidar's statement (page 388) that when he reached Badakhshan in September 1529 Hindal had been there only twelve days suggests that Hindal came in the beginning of September, 1529. Humayun took a day to reach Kabul from Badakhshan. He is said to have sent Hindal from Kabul himself. If Hindal reached in September 1529, Humayun could have left only in August 1529. Haidar who came with the Khan of Kashghar is likely to have known the date of Hindal's arrival. Humayun remained in Badakhshan for two years.

6 Haidar Mirza states (pages 387-402) that Humayun had been called for by Babur. Firishda probably on his authority, repeats the statement. Abul Fazl reproduces it (Vol I p 115), but apparently without conviction. Abul Fazl's account of Humayun's journey conclusively proves that Humayun had left without orders. When Humayun leaves the only reason he assigns for his departure is a desire to see his father (*Akbar Nama*, I, 114). When Kamran is surprised to see him Humayun's only excuse is a desire to see his sovereign in flesh (*ibid*). The reasons for Humayun's recall assigned by Haidar falls to the ground when we find Babur ordering Humayun back to Badakhshan (A N I 115).

- 7 *Akbar Nama*, I, 115

8 Humayun left for Sambhal after he had refused to return to Badakhshan. Babur asked him to proceed to Badakhshan when he heard of its occupation by Sultan Said Khan who, according to Haidar (page 388) left Kashghar for Badakhshan early in the Muharram of 936 (September, 1529). The Khan arrived in Badakhshan towards the end of September, 1529. Babur could have heard of it sometimes in October, 1529 only. So Humayun could not have left for Sambhal earlier than the beginning of November, 1529. Cf. *Akbar Nama*, I, 115

9 *Akbar Nama*, I, 116

10 Humayun's illness

*Akbar Nama* (I, 116) assigns six months to Humayun's stay in Sambhal. He could not have left Sambhal earlier than April, 1530. This is said to be borne out by a rock inscription at Kalinjar, bearing Humayun's name and the last date of Rajab, 936, i.e., March 30th, 1530 (quoted by Banerji, *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XIV, 360). I doubt however the genuineness of the inscription. In Rajab, 936, Humayun could not have styled himself Badshah-i-Ghazi as this inscription does.

11. Gulbadan Begum pp 20-21

12 *Akbar Nama*, I, 116

13. *Akbar Nama*, I, 116

14 *Humayun Nama*, 21.

15 *Ibid*, 21

16. *Ibid*, 21

17 *Tarikh-i-Salatin Temuriya*, 273

18 Babur's last illness

*Tarikh-i-Salatin Temuriya* gives Rajab, 936, as the date of Babur's illness. Firishta repeats the statement. Rajab is either, as suggested in the text, a mistake for Rabi' us San'i or it refers to some earlier illness of Babur. Both these writers omit any mention of Humayun's illness. In their concise account they have omitted much that happened between March and December, 1530. Babur's illness could not have lasted ten months as a fatal malady leaving Humayun unaware of it.

19 *Tabaqat*, p 199. *Akbar Nama*, I. Dr S. K. Banerji has erroneously located this intrigue after Babur's death. Babur could not have risen from the grave to proclaim Humayun as his successor as Gulbadan Begum asserts (p 24) that he did, nor could Mir Khalifa have left Mahdi Khwaja to answer the summons of a dead Babur, as *Tabaqat* declares. Babur was alive. He summoned Mir Khalifa. It

was some time after this that Humayun was sent for. Three days before his death Babur proclaimed Humayun, who was present round his death-bed, his successor.

20. *Humayun Nama* 23

21. *Ibid*, 23.

22. *Humayun Nama*, 23, 24

23 *Ibid*, 24 Gulbadan Begums gives, Monday fifth Jamadī ul  
Awal but Monday was on sixth

24 *Ibid*, 25

25 *Ibid*, 25

26 Page 273.

27. If 52 b Ahmad Yadgar, however, seems to be speaking of only one visit of Humayun's to Sambhal. He does not, however, mention Humayun's illness, return from Sambhal, or his expedition thereto again the second time. It is likely he omitted to notice the first visit of Humayun's and is speaking of the second visit only.

28 Grenard, *Babur, First of the Mughals* 232

## XII

### HUMAYUN AND MALDEV

When Sher Shah and Humayun were fighting out their claims to the empire of India, Rao Maldev of Jodhpur was busy in conquering the larger part of Rajputana. Succeeding to the throne of Jodhpur on 5th June, 1532<sup>1</sup> when he was barely twenty,<sup>2</sup> he had by the middle of the century converted Jodhpur into the greatest state of Rajputana. When the battle of Kanauj was fought, he was already master of the whole of Jodhpur, Nagor, Ajmer, Merta, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and had made incursions into Mewar as well. Besides, he held some districts in Jaipur.<sup>3</sup> As Persian historians are agreed in stating, he was at this time the greatest Hindu Ruler in the country.<sup>4</sup> His territories marched within an easy distance of the imperial dominions.

When the battle of Kanauj sent Humayun a fugitive for his life, Maldev felt that an opportunity had been offered him for intervening in the affairs of India. He sent an invitation to Humayun when he was in Bhakkar towards the end of January, 1542.<sup>5</sup> He offered to join him with a force twenty thousand strong.<sup>6</sup> Maldev thought he might thus be able to persuade Humayun to join his forces with him and challenge the might of Sher Shah. Though the battle of Kanauj had been fought a year earlier, Sher Shah had not yet had time enough to consolidate his power in India. He had expelled the Mughals from the Punjab, he held the Doab Bengal was under him, yet the greater part of India had still to be conquered. His army was busy subduing the Baluchi chiefs and the Ghakkars in the Punjab.<sup>7</sup> Mirza Haidar was disputing the throne of Kashmir against Sher Shah's

nominee<sup>8</sup> Bengal was up in arms against him under his own governor Khizar Khan and Sher Shah had hastened there to conquer the province that had made him Emperor of India<sup>9</sup> Malwa lay unsubdued with Humayun's governor, Abdul Qasim in possession of Gwalior in the neighbourhood Mallu Qadar Shah of Malwa was also hostile to him.<sup>10</sup> The smaller chiefs in the neighbourhood were not likely to be well affected towards him with the bigger ones in open hostility.

This was Maldev's chance. With the unsuccessful example of Rana Sanga's invitation to Babur before his eyes, he was prepared to attack the Muslim dominion in India through a puppet Humayun had been defeated and driven out, he had only an army 3,000 strong with him Maldev on the other hand was the strongest Hindu chief of his times, his armies had never yet been defeated. He had moreover an army of 50,000 Rathors, brave in battle. If Humayun would but join his fortunes to the resources of Maldev, the Rathor chief was sure he would be more than a match for any other ruler of India. Sher Shah who, with an army ten times as strong, had to run away at the mad rush of a handful of Rathors later on, would have been no match for his Rathor antagonist who was as much a master of diplomacy as the Pathan Chief. When the Pathan was defeated—so Maldev must have argued—why Humayun would have had to be content with a subordinate position as independent governor of the frontier provinces of the Punjab, Sind, Multan and Kabul, or, be nominal emperor—like Shah Alam under the Sindhia later on—of India that would know Maldev as her master.

But the best of it was that Sher Shah could not have offered the Rathors and their Mughal allies, a speedy battle. He could not leave Bengal in arms behind him, the Ghakkars left unsubdued would have provided for

him a rather tough problem. The call to battle against the Rathors could only have been answered by retreating from a position where retreat would have meant a definite setback to his fortune. It would have been just the game that he had himself played against Humayun.

But Humayun was a blunderer. He did not even deign to return an answer to this invitation<sup>11</sup>. He had always mocked at his good fortune and now proved that oft repeated judgment on his career that he was his own worst enemy. Was he afraid of joining his fortune with this wily Rathor who was as much a master of guile as Sher Shah? Is it possible that Humayun was afraid of falling from the frying pan into the fire? He may have thought he still had some remote chance of conquering India from Sind. He may have doubted the wisdom of owing his throne to such a powerful prince as Maldev. The Mughals as yet had never joined issue with the Rathors of Jodhpur. But Kamaran's invasion of Bikaner in 1535 had been followed by an inglorious rout<sup>12</sup>. Anyway Humayun did not accept this invitation which was repeated several times during the course of the year<sup>13</sup>.

But Sind was an inhospitable country. Humayun's siege of Sehwan was not successful. Mirza Shah Hussain had turned against him, his cousin Yadgar had deserted him and Humayun was thankful to get back to Bhakkar with the loss of his baggage only. Here again his ill fortune dogged his footsteps. He was not sure even of his safety here. Despondent, he talked of leaving the world and retiring to Mecca. Now his companions bethought of Maldev's invitations<sup>14</sup>. Deserted on all sides, hunted by his friends and foes alike, he decided to proceed towards Maldev's territories<sup>15</sup>.

It was easier said than done. There was a direct route from Bhakkar to Jodhpur, but it was discovered that it was too dangerous for Humayun to attempt

it just then. It was decided, therefore, to march by way of Uch and Jaisalmer into Maldev's territory.<sup>16</sup> Humayun left Rohri on May 7 reaching Arud soon after. Here a great quantity of corn and fodder fell into Humayun's hands.<sup>17</sup> Passing Mhow, Humayun was well out of the territory commanded by the governor of Bhakkar, and he thanked his stars that he had escaped unhurt.<sup>18</sup> Soon after Uch was reached. The privations of Humayun's companions were increased by the scarcity of supplies, they had to live on *bers* and other wild fruits. Bakhshi Langah, the governor of Uch, assumed a threatening attitude and Humayun made haste to escape with safety from his dominions.<sup>19</sup>

A wandering mendicant now came to the rescue of the royal party. He told them that the fort of Dilawar in Maldev's dominions was well provisioned, and that they would do well to march thereto.<sup>20</sup> This led Humayun to march in that direction. Dilawar was duly reached. Here the royal fugitive remained for three days. Abul Fazl and Gulbadan Begam assert that this did not help the royal party very much whereas Jauhar declares that they were able to get abundant provisions here.<sup>21</sup> Naturally Jauhar's statement is worthy of more credence.

Humayun had now entered Maldev's territory. It would have been best for him to encamp here for some time and to wait for Maldev's response to his approaches. But Sheikh Ali Beg, one of his commanders, counselled otherwise. He proposed that Dilawar be attacked and taken by surprise. Humayun wisely rejected this treacherous advice.<sup>22</sup> But it seems the news of a projected attack spread far and wide, and Humayun had to slip away from Dilawar. So great was the distress into which the Mughal party had fallen at this time, that for once Humayun departed from his usual generosity. A Mughal merchant to whom Humayun was in debt was found to



be dying of thirst on the roadside Humayun coolly marched up to him, demanded the cancellation of his debt as the price of a pitcher of water and when the Mughal nodded assent asked three of his courtiers to stand witness The mockery gone through, Humayun gave the Mughal water who was then able to reach the camp<sup>23</sup>

Humayun now set his face towards Jaisalmer After three days' hard marching, the party was approaching Jaisalmer The Rawal of Jaisalmer, Lun Karn, disputed their further advance A skirmish followed When the Raja's party discovered that Humayun had slunk away, they gave up the fight and returned to the fort<sup>24</sup> Humayun however found the position so dangerous that the party rode hard for life and traversed 120 miles that day in order to leave the territory of this hostile ruler far behind<sup>25</sup>

This took them into the territories of Rao Maldev again Wasilpur was sighted first and then the party reached Bikaner<sup>26</sup> Humayun stayed at Bikaner for some time and sent Rai Mul Soni as an observer to Rao Maldev's capital He was to discover Maldev's intentions secretly by freely mixing with his chiefs and report to Humayun the result of his endeavours If he found communicating his answer in writing difficult he was to do so by signs already agreed upon<sup>27</sup>

From here the party marched on to Phalodi about 120 miles from Jodhpur It had not yet been incorporated in Maldev's dominions<sup>28</sup> but the local Rai was a Rathor and he affected to be subordinate to Maldev now when such a powerful prince was encamping in his territories

Meanwhile news of Humayun's approach had already reached Maldev Humayun had first entered Maldev's territories at Dilawar about three weeks ago Maldev must have heard of it and seems to have watched Huma-

yun's movements since then. When Humayun's party reached Phalodi, Rao Maldev's messengers came bearing presents of fruits, arms and gold. Maldev further added that Humayun could have Bikaner.<sup>29</sup> Humayun accepted the gifts graciously like a Mughal Emperor, and, not content with Maldev's delicate hint, now despatched Mir Samaud as an imperial envoy to Maldev's court.<sup>30</sup> Mir Samaud gone, Humayun stayed here for some time and then marched on towards Jodhpur.

Maldev meanwhile was not idle. He wanted to get an exact estimate of Humayun's resources. Just as Humayun had sent Rai Mal Soni secretly to Maldev's court, the Rajput ruler sent Sanga, a trusted officer of his, to Humayun's camp. Sanga appeared in the Mughal camp when it was marching towards Jodhpur and passed as a merchant. He displayed a costly diamond among his wares. Suspicion was excited and a searching examination revealed the true character of Sanga. Humayun however could not pick up a quarrel with Maldev on these minute particulars of ceremonial and was content with letting Sanga go with a warning.<sup>31</sup> This was probably due to the fact that one, Raju, Humayun's doorkeeper, had left the Emperor's camp about this time and gone to Maldev. He had reported that Humayun carried a large amount of wealth on his person in the shape of jewels. In order to ascertain the truth of this piece of news, Maldev may have sent Sanga to Humayun's camp.

Marching swiftly Humayun reached Kaul-i-Jogi, about 8 miles from Jodhpur. Here Humayun finally pitched his tents.<sup>32</sup> Maldev had not yet informed the Emperor of his intentions. Humayun thought it best to send another envoy to his court in the person of Shams-ud Din.

Meanwhile Maldev found himself in difficulties. He had invited Humayun no doubt, but that invitation had been sent almost a year earlier. As said above, Sher Shah at that time was away elsewhere and Maldev could have easily helped Humayun. Now, however, the tables were turned. Sher Shah's officers must have learnt of Humayun's intentions in May, 1542, when Humayun had been obliged to leave Bhakkar and seek refuge in Maldev's territories. His movements in Jaisalmer, Bikaner and Jodhpur must have been watched anxiously by Sher Shah. Now when Humayun was encamping in Jodhpur territories, Sher Shah showed his hand. He invaded Nagor<sup>33</sup> which had been a part of Maldev's territories since 1535<sup>34</sup> and occupied its outlying part. He followed this expedition to Maldev's territories by sending an ambassador to Maldev's court.<sup>35</sup> Thus Shams-ud-Din and Mir Sammud, Humayun's envoy and Sher Shah's representative were at Maldev's court at the same time.

Maldev had a difficult decision to make. Humayun was no doubt his guest. But to help this royal fugitive was just now impossible for him. His unopposed march into Jodhpur territory had already cost Maldev Nagor. If he joined his forces with Humayun he would have to face an immediate war with Sher Shah whose armies were already in Nagor. He had no chance of taking Sher Shah by surprise as would have been the case had Humayun accepted his invitation the previous year. To clinch it all, Sher Shah's envoy was holding out promises of immediate withdrawal from Nagor and cessation of additional territories in the neighbourhood.<sup>36</sup> Faced with these alternatives, it is not surprising that Maldev was at last persuaded into agreeing to Sher Shah's suggestion of not helping Humayun.<sup>37</sup>

But there was Humayun within his borders encamping only 8 miles from the capital. How was Maldev to send him away? Diplomat as he was, Maldev let his intentions be known. Rai Mal Soni, Humayun's jeweller, thereupon sent a messenger to him at Kaul-i-Jogi to tell him that there was no hope of help from Maldev. Meanwhile Mulla Surkh who had once been Humayun's librarian and was now in service with Maldev, probably in charge of his Persian secretariat, also wrote to the Emperor to Kaul-i-Jogi to tell Humayun that Maldev was entertaining Sher Shah's envoy and that he had better not trust him<sup>38</sup>

Maldev wanted to frighten away Humayun; but he had no intentions of delivering him into Sher Shah's hands as the latter's envoy had demanded. He had therefore to convince Sher Shah's representative that he was in earnest in his intention not to help Humayun so that Sher Shah may be induced to withdraw from Nagor. He ordered therefore that Shams-ud-Din and Mir Samaud, Humayun's two envoys, be carefully watched<sup>39</sup>. This frightened them all the more. They slunk away from Jodhpur one fine morning escaping the none too careful vigilance of Maldev's guards. Maldev connived at their escape so that they were in time to warn Humayun and persuade him into moving away, and that was exactly what Maldev intended<sup>40</sup>.

Shams-ud-Din reached Kaul-i-Jogi and there told Humayun of the danger of waiting any longer for Maldev's answer. Humayun at once struck camp and left Kaul-i-Jogi.

But now that Maldev had fallen in with Sher Shah's views, his representatives demanded more. He asked Maldev to pursue Humayun so that he may not escape. Maldev appeared to fall in with this view, but so delayed the sending of his men that Humayun had put many

miles between him and his pursuers before Maldev's troops started in pursuit.

Humayun had set out for Amarkot this time. His way lay through a country which his men hardly knew. It was necessary therefore to obtain guides. Two villagers who were found riding their camels close by were brought in. A Qazi in Humayun's camp explained to them that they would best serve their interests if they faithfully guided the imperial party to Amarkot. All his persuasions however failed to make them consent to take up this unpleasant task, they declared that they knew nothing about the road Humayun wanted to travel by. At this they were made prisoners and threatened with death. This was too much for them and they soon managed to escape their captors. Dagger in hand they fell upon their guard and killed him, and before the Emperor knew what was happening, they had stabbed seventeen living beings, men, women and beasts. But two men could not after all hold up the whole imperial cavalcade, they were surrounded and put to death.<sup>42</sup> This dare devilry of two Rathors increased the Emperor's distress. Many of his followers deserted him<sup>43</sup> and the lack of riding beasts created difficulties of its own. Even Humayun was without a mount till one of his followers offered him a horse which his mother was riding.<sup>44</sup> Humayun now told off some of his men to cover his own retreat and ward off any attack that may be made.<sup>45</sup>

The cavalcade at last passed Phalodi and reached Satalmair. But meanwhile the covering party had got separated from the main body in the dark. They remained wandering all night. When the dawn was approaching, Humayun's main body discovered they were being followed. Their pursuers at last came up with Humayun's stragglers near Satalmair. Their number has been put at 1,500 by Jauhar, but even Abul Fazl did not give cred-

ence to his story. Humayun's covering party numbered less than ten, the two parties met as the Rajputs were issuing forth from the mouth of a pass. Humayun's men under Shaikh Ali were able to check their advance and after a show of earnestness the Rajputs retired with some loss<sup>46</sup>. It is preposterous to assume that these soldiers whom the Mughals were able to put to flight even though at the mouth of a pass, were Maldev's soldiers sent in hot pursuit of Humayun. Of course it is possible that to beguile Sher Shah into the belief that he was earnest in his desire to head off, if not capture Humayun, Maldev may have sent a detachment of his soldiers. But to say that 1500 soldiers of his were put to fight by a group of half a dozen Mughals is to put too much strain on our faith. Of course it is possible that Maldev may have sent a detachment of 1,500 soldiers in pursuit. Anyhow the covering party now overtook the main body of Humayun's followers.

They now marched into Jaisalmer. Here two representatives from Rawal Karn's court met them demanding that Humayun ceased injuring the feelings of the Hindu inhabitants of these places by killing cows in this Hindu territory. They further submitted that his uninvited passage through their territory was disturbing the peace of their country. Humayun unwisely detained these two envoys to find when he reached the capital that the water supply was being guarded by the Raja's men. After some hours' skirmish the Raja's men withdrew defeated, and Humayun's men were able to have their fill of water at Jaisalmer<sup>47</sup>.

But Maldev, son of the Raja of Jaisalmer, had been sent by his father to make the progress of Humayun difficult. He had filled the wells on their way with sand and it was with great difficulty that Humayun's men obtained water after three days' hard marching. So great

was their distress on the march that one morning on awakening Humayun found his sword drawn by somebody who must have been thinking of putting an end to Humayun as the author of all their distress and who was disturbed in his designs by Humayun's early rise. On the fourth day they reached water. Here another son of Rawal Karn approached Humayun and complained of his excesses demanding the release of the two ambassadors sent earlier by the Rawal. Humayun consented thereto and he was supplied with means of drawing water from the wells where he was encamping<sup>48</sup>

At last on August 23, 1542, Humayun reached Amarkot where he was well received. He rendered thanks to God that he had escaped safe from the unlucky desert of Rajputana<sup>49</sup>

Humayun's privation must have loomed all the larger as his young wife Hamida Banu Begum was pregnant. It was at Amarkot that Akbar was born. Thus to the dangers of the desert must have been added the ever haunting fear for the child yet to be born.

Akbar was born on November 23 1542,<sup>50</sup> though Abul Fazl tried to confuse his readers as to the exact date of his birth. One would expect that when Akbar became the Emperor in 1556, he would naturally bear some animus against the Rajput chiefs who had opposed his father's march in the desert, especially Rao Maldev who is credited with having played false to his father by some of the Persian historians. Akbar no doubt—or rather Bairam Khan in his name—made haste to attack Maldev's dominions soon after his accession and conquered Ajmer, Jetaran and Nagor<sup>51</sup> from him. But this was all in the day's work and part of the scheme of expansion on which Bairam Khan had set his heart. No narrative of these events suggests that Akbar attacked Maldev's territories on account of the incidents of 1542. Abul

Fazl is discreetly silent and so are other Persian historians Rajput chronicles as well do not try to explain Akbar's attack on Maldev's territories by any reference to earlier events. It is possible of course that Bairam Khan instigated these attacks on Maldev by reminding Akbar of his father's wanderings in the desert in 1542 in his territories. This may explain the enmity of Maldev towards Bairam Khan after his fall when Bairam Khan was trying to slip off to Gujrat, but had to change his route on hearing that Maldev intended disputing his passage through his territories to Gujrat.<sup>52</sup>

We cannot therefore resist the conclusion that Humayun had to thank himself for the cold welcome that he received in Jodhpur, that Maldev simply wanted to frighten him away from his own territory when he had become a danger to the safety of his own state, and that the pursuit by the Rajput soldiers was feigned in order to convince Sher Shah that Maldev did not intend to harbour the royal fugitive. Akbar's attitude towards Maldev as well does not seem to bear out any suggestion that he bore him any ill-will for Humayun's self-invited privations in the desert of Rajputana.

### Authorities

Maldev's rise to prominence can be studied in Nensi's *Chronicle of Jodhpur*, *Mundhyar Chronicle*, and *Kaviraj's Chronicle* described by the present writer in the *Modern Review*, April 1923, as the 'Three Chronicles of Marwar'. These are in MS and the writer has quoted from copies in private possession at Jodhpur. R. B. Pt Gori Shankar H. Ojha has a very good copy of *Kaviraj's Chronicle*.

On the Persian side the narrative is based on Jauhar's *Memoirs*. I have cited the Lal Chand Library transcript of the MS in the library of the Muslim University of Aligarh. As Stewart's translation does not mention



Humayun's going any further than one march from Phalodi, I consulted the MS in the Victoria Museum Library at Udaipur as well. The Aligarh and the Udaipur MSS agree in mentioning that Humayun reached Kaul-i-Jogi

*Tarikh-i-Hind-o-Sindh* of Ma'asum is another authority that describes Humayun's journey. It is still in MS. I have cited the MS in the Victoria Museum Library, Udaipur

*Akbar Nama* (Calcutta), *Humayun Nama*, (London), *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* (Lucknow), *Muntakhab-ut-Tavarikh* (Calcutta) tell the story from the Mughal side and can be studied in the standard editions of the Persian Text as noted in brackets. Abbas is silent as to Sher Shah's movements in Jodhpur. I consulted the MS copy in Punjab Public Library, Lahore. *Tarikh-i-Salatm i-Afghanan* as well tells us nothing.

Dr Tessitori's *Report on the Progress of Historical and Bardic Survey of Rajputana* (J. A. S. B., 1916, No. 3) contains a history of Phalodi based on a contemporary ballad

*Karmachand Charita* in Sanskrit gives a history of Bikaner to the time of its composition in 1597. It mentions that Sher Shah attacked Maldev on the instigation of Nagraj whom the dispossessed Raja of Bikaner had sent to Sher Shah for help.

Of secondary authorities Erskine and Leyden's *History of India under Babur and Humayun* describes Humayun's march into Jodhpur in detail. *Qanungo's Sher Shah, his note* in the '*Journal of Indian History*' (Allahabad) as well have a brief outline of the journey to and from Phalodi. Mr. Rao, Superintendent Archaeological Department, Jodhpur, contributed an article in Hindi on Maldev to *Madhuri*. The present article attempts to revise and supplement these earlier accounts in the light of the MS and printed material, Persian as well as Hindi.

## Notes

1. Nensi's *Chronicle of Jodhpur*, 95.
2. Born on December 4, 1511, *Mundhyar Chronicle*, 77.
3. Cf Nensi's (pp 95 to 121), *Mundhyar* (77 to 88), Kaviraj  
63 to 78
4. *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 231, 232
5. *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 205, *Akbar Nama*, I, 172
6. *Tarikh-i Hind-o-Sind*, 280
7. *Tabaqat*, 230, Dorn, I, 130
8. *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, 485
9. *Tabaqat*, 230, 231, Dorn, I, 131 132, Badaoni, I, 365
10. *Khulasat-ut-tawarikh*, 349, Dorn I, 132
11. No answer is recorded in *Akbar Nama*, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*,  
*Humayun Nama*, *Memoirs of Jauhar*, Ni'mat Ullah, *Tarikh-i-Salat-*  
*in-i-Afghanan*, *Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi*
12. *Ballad of Rao Jetsi*, edited by Dr Tessitori (A S B).
13. *Akbar Nama*, I, 179.
- 14. *Muntakhab ut-Tawarikh*, 439 *Tarikh-i-Sind* 281. Maasum  
and Badaoni leave one under the impression that an invitation was  
received about this time. They do not mention an earlier invitation.  
But all other accounts of Maldev's relations with Humayun agree in  
the statement that Humayun's march into Jodhpur was separated from  
the invitation by a long interval.
15. *Humayun Nama*, 54, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 205, *Akbar Nama*  
I, 179, Badaoni, 439 *Tarikh-i-Sind*, 281
16. *Tabaqat-i-Akbar*, 205, *Humayun Nama*, 55
17. *Jauhar*, 35.
18. *Jauhar*, 35
19. *Jauhar*, 35
20. *Akbar Nama*, *Humayun Nama*, 55; *Jauhar*, 35
21. *Jauhar*, 36
22. *Humayun Nama* 55, *Jauhar*, 36.
23. *Jauhar*, 36, 37
24. *Humayun Nama*, 55
25. *Akbar Nama*, I, 179.
26. *Tarikh-i-Hind-o-Sindh*, 282, *Akbar Nama*
27. *Humayun Nama*, 55, *Akbar Nama*, I, 180
28. Kaviraj, 33, *History of Philodi* by Dr Tessitori in J A S B.  
No. 3 of 1916, pp. 89, 90

- 29 *Humayun Nama*, 55, *Tarikh-i-Hind-o-Sindh*, 282.
30. *Humayun Nama*, 55, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 205.
31. *Akbar Nama*, I, 180. Jauhar
- 32 Jauhar, 37, *Tarikh-i-Hind-o-Sindh*, 282.
33. *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 206. *Akbar Nama* I, 180.
- 34 Mundhyar 78, Kaviraj, 68
- 35 *Humayun Nama*, 55, *Akbar Nama*, I, 180
36. *Humayun Nama*, 55, *Akbar Nama*, I, 180, *Tarikh-i-Hind-o-Sindh*, 282.
- 37 *Akbar Nama*, I, 180.
- 38 *Humayun Nama*, 55, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 206.
- 39 *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 206.
- 40 *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, 206.
- 41 Jauhar, 37.
- 42 Jauhar, 38, *Humayun Nama* 55, 56, Jauhar, 38.
- 43 Jauhar, 41, 42.
- 44 *Humayun Nama*, 56.
45. *Humayun Nama*, 57
46. *Akbar Nama*, I, 181. *Tabaqat*, 206 *Humayun Nama*, 57
58. Jauhar, 39
47. *Akbar Nama*, I, 181, Jauhar 39. 40 *Tarikh-i-Hind-o-Sindh*, 283.
- 48 Jauhar, 41, 42
- 49 *Akbar Nama*, I, 182, Jauhar, 41, *Tarikh-i-Hind-o-Sindh* 283.
- 50 Jauhar, 43. *Akbar Nama*, I, 18.
51. *Akbar Nama*, II, 46, 66, 124 to 126, Nensi (Jodhpur) pp. 117, 123, 118.
52. *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, Badaoni, II, 34, *Maasir-ul-U* II, 378.

## SHER SHAH AND MALDEV

Before Akbar began his policy of 'thorough' against the Rajput states, the relations between Muhammadan Kings of Delhi and rulers of Rajputana had only been fitful. Now and then an ambitious ruler on the throne of Delhi might think of leading an expedition against refractory Rajput chiefs, but even when the Rajput chiefs were defeated this would not establish any the more regular or normal relations between the ruler of Delhi and those chiefs. Sometimes in the course of these expeditions, on account of the personal factor, the clash of battle that would follow would produce more than local resoundings and may have had far-reaching effects. One such occasion was when Sher Shah and Maldev came in collision in the year 1544.

It was the personal factor that made this clash of the Rathor against the Pathan so memorable. If Sher Shah had risen from humble beginnings to end in sweeping away the vestiges of the Mughal Empire as established by Babur, Maldev had to his credit the transformation of a petty Rathor chieftainship into the greatest Hindu kingdom of its days as Abul Fazl was generous enough to testify.<sup>1</sup> Both of them were consummate generals; they were not sticklers for form. Maldev was senior to Sher Shah in the matter of statecraft having ascended the throne in July 1532.<sup>2</sup> Sher Shah had driven out Humayun only four years before. An earlier encounter had been planned by Maldev when he had written letters of invitation and co-operation to Humayun against Sher Shah.<sup>3</sup> That encounter had been prevented by the strong action of Maldev, though Humayun had done all that he could

to precipitate matters by coming to Maldev at an inopportune time and almost a year after the invitation <sup>4</sup> Maldev sent Humayun back because he did not wish to embroil himself with Sher Shah at that time.

But two such neighbours as Sher Shah and Maldev were bound to come into collision sooner or later Maldev was the only formidable rival of Sher Shah—he was the one ruler who could ever think of withstanding the wily Pathan. In 1542 his territory extended over well nigh 10,000 square miles It included the districts of Jodhpur, Sojhat, Nagor, Ajmer Merta Jetaran, Bilara, Bnadrajun, Mallani, Sivana Didwana Pachpadra and Bali in Marwar <sup>5</sup> This represented his small patrimony reinforced by his extensive conquests He held the larger half of the state of Bikanir <sup>6</sup> In the state of Mewar he possessed the districts of Kosithul, Badnor and Jahajpur <sup>7</sup> From the Kachhwahas of Jaipur he had conquered the districts of Jalor, Tonk, Toda, Malpura Chatsu, Kosli Bahu <sup>8</sup> Holding such a vast area in Rajputana as Maldev did it was possible for the frontiers of these two conquerors to meet in the Doab and thus an occasion for friction was sure to arise

But there were other and more cogent causes which brought about a war between the two Like Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Punjab later on, Rao Maldev had not adopted very clean methods for the acquisition of territory. Among the chieftains whom he had dispossessed two stood pre-eminent, Rao Kalyan Mal of Bikanir <sup>9</sup> and Rao Biramdev of Merta <sup>10</sup> The first had been the master of Bikanir, while the second was a Rathor second only to Maldev in the whole of Marwar They could feel their dispossession as no minor chief could, and the vengeance with which Maldev had pursued Biramdev always rankled in the minds of that chief They found their chance at last Biramdev and Bhojraj a brother of Kalyan Mal met Sher Shah at Sahasram in Bihar and there represented

their own grievances against Maldev and ended by requesting Sher Shah to lead an expedition against him<sup>11</sup>. Of course they could offer the help of their own immediate followers, but Biramdev improved the situation by producing letters from the disaffected chiefs of Maldev. Sher Shah returned to Agra and then decided to set upon his expedition against Maldev. Biramdev and Kalyan Mal were given permission to proceed earlier and thus be able to rally their sections of the Rathors to the Pathan standard.

From Agra, Sher Shah proceeded with a caution that was worthy of the foe whom he was going to meet.<sup>12</sup> Every evening the camp was guarded by an improvised earthwork against attacks from the enemy.<sup>13</sup> At one place, probably near Ajmer, that became impossible and earthwork was replaced by bags filled with sand.<sup>14</sup> At last Ajmer was sighted and there the army remained encamped for some time in March 1544.<sup>15</sup>

Maldev on his part had not been idle. The messenger who brought him the happy news of the possibility of his breaking his lance against the Pathans was suitably rewarded.<sup>16</sup> He moved his army to Ajmer and there began to play the waiting game. This would not serve Sher Shah. He was in a hostile country and could not risk his being starved out, though he must have been keeping his communication with Agra open. He had mobilized an army of 80,000 soldiers and was well equipped with a large number of elephants and some artillery. Maldev, of course, could oppose him with the bare swords of his Rathors, but the fifty thousand Rathor blades were sharp and made people look about for themselves when once they were drawn.

Tired of Sher Shah's inaction, Maldev decided to lure him on and began to retreat. It is impossible to judge what his original intentions were, but they were

frustrated by the insistence of his generals Jeta and Kumpa for encamping at Girri<sup>17</sup> They would not yield a single square inch of the fatherland of the Rathors without fighting for it Here again the tactics of Ajmer were repeated The game of waiting and watching continued till Sher Shah was tired of it He was in a tight corner The conviction began to steal into his mind that it would not be possible for him to go in an open battle against the Rathors Here he was in the country of his enemy who was patiently waiting for him to begin an attack which Sher Shah had not the courage to commence Every day might increase his difficulties while to Maldev this campaigning did not mean much trouble.

At last Sher Shah confessed himself<sup>18</sup> beaten Biramdev now came to his help By an often repeated stratagem Maldev was made suspicious of the loyalty of his troops Letters were drafted to them telling them that the promised reward would be paid to them when they would hand over Maldev. Of course care was taken that these letters fell into the hands of Maldev as they did. He at once decided to fall back again, though his chiefs protested that they knew nothing of the devilry that was at work behind this trick<sup>19</sup> His own suspicious nature and the fact that he had given most of his chiefs some cause of offence confirmed him in his belief and he ordered a retreat

His two generals Jeta and Kumpa now refused to obey him again and decided to prove their faithfulness by their blood They decided to make a night attack on the enemy but did not succeed in their aim It was morning before they found themselves face to face with Sher Shah's troops They had an army of 12 000 Rathors to face an army 80 000 strong But they had come to meet a warrior's death and not to reap his glory They fought as hard as they could but Sher Shah had his

advantage in his elephants which he sent against them as a wall of protection for his archers. His artillery also plied their weapons hard but the brave Rathors could not be easily conquered. With all the advantage that Sher Shah possessed, with seven times the number of soldiers the enemy had, he was so much on the brink of ruin, that it made him cry out while later speaking of the affair that he would have lost his empire at this battlefield of Girri.<sup>20</sup> At last numbers prevailed, more was done by elephants and artillery, but it was not before twelve thousand Pathans lay dead on the battlefield that Sher Shah was able to count it as his victory.<sup>21</sup> Had Maldev not been tricked, it was possible that Sher Shah might have lost his empire at this battlefield of Girri. Maldev lost the chance of his life, the chance for which Rana Sanga of Mewar had planned before him.

All now lay open before the conqueror. Maldev in his flight had taken refuge in the fortress of Sivana leaving the defence of Jodhpur to its governor.<sup>22</sup> Khwas Khan invested it and starved the garrison to surrender. Sher Shah busied himself in reducing other parts of Jodhpur leaving Maldev in Sivana. Garrisons were left at Jodhpur, Bhagesar, Khwaspur and Mandor.<sup>23</sup> Merta was restored to Biramdev and Bikanir to Kalyan Rao.<sup>24</sup>

The occupation of Jodhpur lasted for about two years. During this time Sher Shah's representative busied himself in adding to the works of public utility in which his master so much delighted.<sup>25</sup> But Sher Shah's death gave Maldev his opportunity and by the end of the year 1546 he was again lord and master of Jodhpur.

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## Notes

1 *Asn-i Akbari*, English translation, (Jarrett), vol. II p 271. *Akbar Nama* vol II, p 197, Asiatic Society of Bengal's edition of the Persian Text

2 Jaisht Shudi, 5 1588, as given in Mehta Nensi's *Account of Jodhpur*. The Marwari year, it should be remembered, begins in Shravan. Mehta Nensi's account was written under Maharajah Jaswant Singh whose minister he was. It has not yet been published but has been described by Dr Tessitori in the *Prose Chronicles of Jodhpur* (A. S. B.) and more fully by the present writer in, *Three Chronicles of Marwar* Modern Review April, 1923.

3 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Persian Text p 205

4 He started for it in May 1542 Cf *Sher Shah* by Qanungo

5, 6 7, 8 He had conquered these districts during the last twelve years of his reign. Vide Nensi, *ibid*, pp 95-104, *Mundhyar Chronicle* pp 78-80. This is another MS chronicle written in the times of Maharaja Jaswant Singh and described by Dr Tessitori and the present writer as quoted above

9 He had been dispossessed in April 1541, Vide Nensi p 97. Cf. *Bikanir Gazetteer* pp 10 12

10 He had been driven out in 1539 Vide *Mundhyar* p 81. Nensi p 96.

11 Nensi p 112 Cf *Karmchand Charita*, 47, 48

12, 13 *Tabaqat-i Akbari* Persian Text p 231 32

14 Badaoni, Persian Text Vol I, 267

Prof. Qanungo of the Decca University has underestimated the difficulties of the case when deciding that Sher Shah started from Delhi. Leaving aside everything else, he overlooked the fact that the armies of Maldev and Sher Shah remained a month at Ajmer facing each other (*Tabaqat-i Akbari* pp 231 and 232). Maldev could not have allowed Sher Shah to penetrate so far if he was coming not from Agra but from Delhi. The argument based on sand bags loses its importance when we remember that Abbas in Elliot vol IV pp 404 405 says that they were used only once and that Badaoni vol I p 367, says that it was near Ajmer.

15 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, *ibid* pp 231 222 Abbas in Elliot, vol iv. p 405

16 Mundhyar, p 81

17 They refused to retire from the land that had been won by their grand sire Rao Jodha who was as much their progenitor as his. The district of Jetaran had been conquered by Rao Jodha. Girn is fourteen miles to the east of Jetaran in the district of the same name.

18 In spite of Qanungo's assertions to the contrary, we are convinced that Sher Shah regarded the situation as desperate. Here are some narrative of the episode.

(a) Maldev waxed so powerful that Sher Shah nearly lost his life in his campaign against him. *Asn-i-Akbari*, Eng. Trnl, vol II p 271

(b) Firishta as translated by Briggs, vol II p 171, 'Sher Khan would certainly have retired quietly but the danger was too great to admit of his venturing to quit his entrenchments'.

(c) As we shall see below an engagement with 12,000 of Rathor blades made Sher Shah cry out later on that it would have nearly lost him his empire. The reader can well imagine Sher Shah's plight if Maldev had chosen to give him battle with 50,000 of his Rathors at his back. Cf *Tohfat ul Tawarikh* p 231.

19 Nensi p 113 Mundhyar p 85

The story is told with many elaborations in many modern chronicles of Jodhpur and Bikanir. Cf Also *Bikanir Gazetteer*, p 12. Abbas in Elliot IV, p 405, Badaoni I p 368.

20 Abbas in Elliot IV, p 405 Badaoni, I p 363

Prof. Qanungo in his *Sher Shah* has located this battle at Merta because forsooth it is a place famous in Rathor history. Rajput chronicles as well as oral tradition hold that the battle was fought at Girn though sober history records that fact in English for the first time here.

This saying had been utilized in the present colours of Jodhpur by giving a stalk of millets an honourable and a prominent place therein. millets form the one staple product and food of the Rathors in Marwar.

21. A Marwari couplet records the heroic self sacrifice of Jeta and his men on this battlefield beautifully

गिरी तोरे गार में लबी बधी खजूर  
जीते कुपे आह्या ख नेडे घर दूर

Oh, Gurri, in your plains so tall grew the palm trees that Jeta and Kumpa decided that it would be nearer heaven there than home

22 Nensi, pp 112 114

23 Local tradition has preserved some small relics of this occupation. These places are also mentioned as the places wherefrom he drove out the Pathans after Sher Shah's death

24 *Official History of Bikanir*, ibid, pp 110, 112

25. Abbas in Elliot IV p 417 *Mundhyar* p 86.

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## XIV

### A FORGOTTEN HERO OF MARWAR

The history of Rajputana can never repay its debt to Tod. What little is popularly known of it is through the delightful account preserved in his pages. Yet critical research is now unearthing many new treasures of the history of Rajputana and its students have now and again to undertake the task of modifying in detail or in essentials his view of events. It is in no spirit of carping criticism that they undertake that task. Colonel Tod was a pioneer in the field and like many such workers, has left many a patch unfurrowed. His greatest claim is that he preserved and made public the traditional account of the history of Rajputana.

One of the fondest traditions handed down in his pages is that of the fierce struggle in which Rana Partap was engaged against Akbar's imperial designs. The impression created by a cursory perusal of his pages is that Rana Partap was the only man who thus defied the great emperor. The following lines are written with a view to show that love of independence was not at an end among other Rajput princes and that there were others besides Rana Partap who carried on an unflinching war against the great Mughul.

When Akbar ascended the throne in 1556, Rao Maldev was ruling Marwar. He had extended the boundaries of his state by the help of his 'fifty thousand Rathor blades' so much so that in 1542 he was the only man who could have disputed Sher Shah's right to imperial sway. The two came face to face in 1544 when Sher Shah attacked Marwar. He came very near losing his throne.

and was only saved that ignominy on account of his employing a stratagem. All the Persian historians, Abbas, Abul Fazl and Firishta agree in testifying to the peril of Sher Shah and Abbas quoted Sher Shah himself as saying that he came very near losing his empire for a handful of millers. But this great principality was, like most other things of the same kind, ill gotten. This greatness had been piled at the cost of the ruin of many other neighbouring princes. When Akbar came to the throne he or rather his regent Bairam Khan could play upon that factor. Before Maldev died on November 8, 1562, Akbar had nibbled off a large portion of the conquests of Maldev. But the Marwari chief was as yet safe in his ancestral home.

— The succession proved to be a troublesome affair. He had disinherited his first two sons and it was the third son Chandar Sen who was on the spot who succeeded him. The two disinherited brothers, Rao Ram and Rao Udai Singh, were not ready to take the decision lying down and a civil war ensued. Rao Chandar Sen was however well supported by his nobles and emerged triumphant from this arbitration of the sword. Yet the contest had been very fierce especially in the battle of Lohavat (20 miles south east of Phalodi) and Chandar Sen therefore succeeded to a diminished military strength. What was worse still, disappointed in his hopes, Rao Ram turned to that general dispenser of high favours, Akbar. Under Ram's guidance a Mughal attack on Jodhpur was organised in 1563. The imperial intervention succeeded in getting for Rao Ram the district of Sojhat and for his imperial supporters an indemnity. This was never paid and brought on the second invasion of Jodhpur next year in March. After a tiring siege of ten months when the Rajputs were on the point of starvation, they vacated the fort and were allowed to march away unmolested.

Jodhpur was now in the hands of the Mughals. Chandar Sen however was still at large in a neighbouring district and when he married his daughter to Rana Uday Singh in 1568 Akbar's suspicions were roused. He moved on to Nagor by way of hostile demonstration. Here three claimants to the throne of Jodhpur preferred their claims before him. Rai Kalyan Mal of Bikaner, the head of the younger branch of the Rathors, was there ready to offer his daughter's hand to Akbar in marriage. Uday Singh, the second elder brother of Chandar Sen, was there to bow his head before the emperor. Chandar Sen also repaired to the imperial presence on November 15, 1570, with a contingent of 500 horse. It seems that of the three claimants Chandar Sen was the most unbending. The matrimonial alliance between Kalyan Rai of Bikaner and Akbar gave the ruler of Bikaner an advantage. It is possible that Uday Singh to match the Bikaneris, consented at this time to the marrying of Raksha Bai, a daughter of Maldev, born of a slave girl, to Akbar. Chandar Sen had poor chances against the two and some coarse jokes of Akbar settled his mind against the emperor. He left the presence smarting under a sense of humiliating disappointment and vowed never again to think of bowing his head before the mighty emperor.

Chandar Sen's position was now desperate. His ancestral home was in the hands of the Mughals, the junior branch of the Rathors was in ascendance, his own elder brothers were in Mughal service. He took refuge in Bhadravaj but was soon expelled from there. He now sought protection behind the friendly walls of the fort of Sivana. There was a chance that he would be left severely alone if he did not on his own side pick up quarrels with the Mughals. He was however, not the man to sit still. He raided the Mughal camp at Asarhi (6 miles to the east of Jetaran)

and then took the Bhil settlement of Batai. But he offended Akbar most by his presence at the coronation ceremony of Rana Partap on February 23 1572. There was again the danger of a combination between the Rathors and the Sasodias which Akbar could ill afford to overlook. But a still more serious cause for offence was given when Chandar Sen allied himself to his nephew Kalla, a younger son and successor of his eldest brother Ram who had died in May 1573. Kalla had gone to Akbar for being recognized the lawful heir and successor of his father, but somehow offended Akbar and orders were given to arrest him. He had however made himself scarce and was back in Sojhat. Kalla and Chandar Sen now held Sojhat and Shivana between them. Rai Singh of Bikaner so represented matters to Akbar that it was at last decided to take the reduction of the two Marwari chiefs in hand. Shah Quli Khan and Shamal Khan were sent to lead the Mughals in the war that followed.

The struggle that now followed may truly be termed a war of independence. It abounds in all the thrills that form such a remarkable feature of the Rajput wars of the day. Sojhat was attacked in 1574 and after a strenuous battle Kalla was defeated. He now made good his escape and made his second stand at Sivari 18 miles south of Sojhat. The fort was burnt down but Kalla had already escaped to Koranba (?). Here he was finally defeated and induced to submit. Chandar Sen's following now began to diminish and when the Mughals took Mahoba, (present Barmer) he was practically left alone, Rawal Meghraj of Mahoba crossing over to the imperial side.

The fort of Shivana however could not be easily captured. It stands on a precipitous rock and ascent is very difficult. Here Chandar Sen made his final stand. The siege was not a success at first. Rai Singh of

Bikaner who had now joined the imperial command had to return to Ajmer and request Akbar to send reinforcements. These were sent accordingly. Meanwhile Chandar Sen had made his own arrangements. He sent his harem to the friendly state of Sarohi and made over the command of the fort to Patta, a brave general of his. He himself crossed over to Rampur farther in the mountains. The Mughals were baffled. They left the siege and followed Chandar Sen who was defeated in the battle of Kanoja. Chandar Sen, however, had again escaped. The Mughal commanders tired of the chase returned to Agra where they fell in disgrace having returned without subduing Chandar Sen or reducing Shivana. Rai Singh and Shamal Khan were still at Shivana.

In 1576 Akbar found out that they had not been much successful. Reinforcements were now sent under Shahbaz Khan. Kalla had once again joined Chandar Sen. Shahbaz Khan first defeated Kalla at Degore (Dungranas in the district of Sojhat) and took the garrison prisoner. Encouraged by this victory, the imperialists now turned to Dunara, a fort 28 miles to the east of Shivana. The fort was undermined and taken. Now came the turn of Shivana. Regular siege was laid to the fort, mines were dug and duly exploded. In March, 1576, after a siege of full two years the garrison capitulated. But Chandar Sen who had returned to assume the command had again escaped.

Had Chandar Sen so desired his stubborn resistance might have procured easy terms for him. He preferred hard liberty to easy indulgence in submission and spent the next two years at Sarohi. From this as his base he never gave the Mughals any rest whenever he could get them at a disadvantage. He appeared even before the walls of Ajmer on March 10, 1580, and gave the Mughals a thorough fright.



In January, 1581, he set out to punish a rebellious chief in Sojhat who now added treachery to his rebellion. Making a show of submission he invited Chandar Sen to a feast and there poisoned him. He lies cremated with his five spouses at Saran, 14 miles south of Sojhat. A slab with dated inscription is the only memory of this brave Rathor.

Chandar Sen was one of the members of the Rajput trio that defied Akbar's might as well as his allurements. Maharana Partap, Rao Surtan of Sarohi and Rao Chandar Sen have carved out a name for themselves in the history of Rajputana which will not easily die. For full ten years Chandar Sen defied Akbar's might and during that period never allowed an opportunity of harassing the Mughals go uselessly. He was a lion of battle and the Rajput chronicles record 47 actions in which he was personally engaged. His two attempts at securing united action with the Sasodias display a breadth of vision not common to the Rajputs of those days. The generations that came after were reared in the lap of luxury and submission, naturally they refused him his place. The ruling family did not consider it in keeping with its later imperial traditions to erect a single stone to his memory and not a single portrait of his has been handed down in their portrait gallery. His modern successors owe it to him to revive his memory as that of a great and dauntless warrior, a patriot imbued with a spirit of independence and as an organiser. Of course Maharana Partap stands greater both in his achievements and in his privations, but here is a story which Rathors should never forget.

[The above account has been written with the help of *Akbar Nama*, *Am-i Akbari*, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, *Muntakhab ul Tawarikh* of Badaoni, *Firishta's History of India*, *Doctor Tessitori's History of Phalodi* in the Progress

Report of the Preliminary work of the *Historic and Bardic Survey of Rajputana* [his account in one essential is not reliable], Mehnota Nensi's *Account of Jodhpur* (MS. 12 of Dr. Tessitori's catalogue of the Prose Chronicles of Jodhpur, also described at a greater length by the present writer in the *Modern Review* for April, 1923); Kaviraj's *Chronicle*, as well as *Mundhyar Chronicle*, (written in Marwarī in the reign of Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur [died 1676 A. D.] and described by the present writer in the *Modern Review* for April, 1923, under the heading *Three Chronicles of Marwar.*) ]

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## XV

### THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN MARWAR ( 1532 TO 1619 )

No detailed study of the System of Government in Marwar has yet been attempted. The materials for it are no doubt scanty, the State records in Marwar, for example, are available only from the reign of Maharaja Abhey Singh well in the eighteenth century. By that time, the system of government had undergone many modifications and was more and more approximating to the Mughal standard. The chronicles, Persian and Marwari, do not usually concern themselves with matters of administration; it is only by chance that they happen to make some statement which may throw light on the administrative activities. It is yet possible that a careful examination of the Sanads, Farmans or letters which may have survived in private hands may throw some light on the question. But the work requires a great deal of labour and till that is done, we have to be content with a few details only.

In the period under review, administrative machinery in Marwar underwent many revisions. When Maldev became Rao in 1532, the only machinery of the state was that of a large Jagirdar. The state like its contemporaries in the east and west did not undertake any works of public utility, nor did it interfere much with the lives of its citizens. It let them alone and came in motion only for the purpose either of war, or sometimes of police or also of squeezing taxes in the form of octroi. When he conquered the neighbouring districts, Maldev seems to have reproduced the old system on a

larger scale with this difference that his contact with Muslim neighbours at this time made him establish a Persian Secretariate. His policy was to dispossess the former ruler and to send his own representative. The Jagirdar who submitted peacefully may have been allowed the possession of his district with the stipulation that he was to attend Maldev when summoned. But the rulers of the districts that had to be conquered by stubborn fighting were altogether dispossessed—in some cases as in Merta and Pohkarn all vestiges of old ruling houses were swept away by demolishing the old forts and building new ones. The machinery for holding these newly conquered districts was simple. A Fojdar or Shikdar was sent who was the commander of the fort as well as the civil officer of the district.

The next revision of administrative machinery came when the Mughals conquered and occupied Jodhpur. Here we must make a distinction between incorporated and unincorporated districts. Incorporated districts, most of them Maldev's conquests from his Muhammadan neighbours in Nagor, Jalore and Didwana, were governed just like other Mughal districts. Then there were other districts that had been under the Rathors for good many centuries. These were left to their old customs and the presence of a Rajput in the person of Rai Singh as a governor at Jodhpur meant that Akbar did not want the system to be much disturbed. Of course Persian may now have been used to a larger extent and Maldev's Persian secretariate expanded. The Mughals, however, without actually disturbing the old machinery may have engendered the habit of looking at it from a new point of view and thus a change in ideas may have taken place.

This was followed by the restoration of Udey Singh. This restoration, however, did not mean that the old order was to reign unchallenged. Udey Singh had himself been

a Mughal Jagirdar in Gwalior before he became the Raja of Jodhpur. Whatever he may have thought of his position as a Jagirdar, it is certain that he must have carried his ideas of it to Jodhpur and used them as a help in interpreting the position of Rajput Jagirdars. The tradition asserts that he began the custom of realising Pesh Kash from the Jagirdars<sup>2</sup>, they had to present a Nazar when they first got the grant. Sur Singh's accession in 1595 completed the process. By that time not only the Mughal system of Mansabdars was well established but different Rajput chiefs also had had a good deal of experience in it. The machinery was again revised. The Rathor Raja attempted to be to his Jagirdars what the emperor was to him. Necessarily a stricter definition of rights and duties from both the sides followed. Hitherto grants of land had only specified the place granted. What was given away was a Jagir and not a revenue. But the Mughal idea ran counter to it. What the emperor granted to the Mansabdar was an assignment of revenue and not the Jagir itself. The same change was introduced here. The grants now come to specify not only the place given away, but also the revenue that went with it. This made the taking of the next step easier and soon after it was ordained that an heir when he came into possession should pay Zabt. This meant that until the heir paid the stipulated sum, he did not get his Jagir renewed. Sometimes the state officials were sent to administer it for some time, usually a year, and pay the proceeds to the treasury. The idea was that on the death of the last occupant it reverted to the Raja as the supreme landlord and it was his to give it on any conditions. In practice it meant the payment of a certain sum. Thus the Raja was exalted at the cost of the Jagirdar. This was made apparent in the fact that the old intimacy between a Raja and his chiefs, an intimacy that was due

to the old idea of their being his companion in arms, disappeared and more formal relations were substituted for it. This transformation was made easy by the familiarity with the Mughal system.<sup>3</sup>

But these modifications apart, the position of Jagirdars in the Rajput state remained essentially that of clansmen. That was the one mark which distinguished them from the Mughal grandees on the one hand and the mediæval barons on the other. There were three kinds of Jagirdars. The first and a very limited class got Jagirs from their being near relatives of the reigning Raja. Another class got it as their due for fighting the battles of their chief, Mund Katai—as it is still called. The third class was that of Inamdars who received Jagirs as a mark of the Raja's favour. Besides these there were Bhumias whose title to the land in their possession was as old as that of the Rajas. The secretariate establishment was usually paid by grants of land and as some of the offices became hereditary, the land in possession became a family Jagir. We know that when Maldev established the Persian secretariate, the man who was put in charge of the work was paid by a grant of land and the family continued in possession till quite recent times.<sup>4</sup>

In the reorganisation of the state that Sur Singh undertook the grades of the Jagirdars were also fixed being indicated by the form in which the Raja returned their salutations and the place they occupied in the open Durbar.<sup>5</sup> The Pradhan or the Premier chief had the hereditary claim to lead the van and since Maldev's time it remained in the hands of the Jetavat branch of the Rathors. The premier or the prime minister was a separate functionary and had the charge of the civil administration. Usually he was paid by the grant of a Jagir but there is at least one instance in which Sur Singh appointed his prime minister on Rs 7,000 a month.<sup>6</sup>

Mughal subordination necessitated another office that of Tan Diwan or personal assistant. This was the officer who had the command of the Raja's contingent when he was serving out. He also served as his adviser there in the field.

Internal administration was not complex. The villager was not much disturbed by the central government except when he had to provide free quarters or free board to any of the Raja's functionaries who might happen to come to his village. He settled his disputes in the Panchayat. Civil law in the case of inheritance and the like was derived from the codes of Manu and Yajnavalkya,<sup>7</sup> while other disputes were settled according to custom. Of criminal jurisdiction, just as in the mediaeval state in the thirteenth century Europe, there was not much. The state had not yet come into being and such offences were counted mostly as personal offences. It fell upon the family or the particular branch of the clan to avenge all offences against its members. The case of Bhatī Gobind Dass is one in point. Theft and robbery were the two forms of crimes most common. The proximity of the Bhils made robbery significant. Justice was rough and ready as befitted those times. The Raja was also the judge. Not much taxation was resorted to as the Raja had his own demense lands. There was the income from transit dues and this some customary offerings made up the whole taxation.

In theory succession was by *primogeniture*. But it had not yet been exalted into a divine right. The state was personal to the reigning Raja, he could alter succession.<sup>8</sup> The cases of Chander Sen and then of Sur Singh can be cited in proof of this assertion.<sup>9</sup> In one case, the third son and in the other, the sixth son succeeded. Yet the very fact that in the former case the dispossessed brothers actually fought for what they considered

their right and in the other they kept up the memory of their wrong throughout their lives, goes to prove that the eldest son had a presumptive title to succeed. The death of the reigning Raja was followed, as now, by an inter-regnum of twelve days, during which his successor remained engaged in performing the last rites of his predecessor. On the thirteenth day, in the usual fashion, the new Raja was acknowledged by the elders of the clan and the coronation Tika given to him by the chief of Bagri who had earned this privilege in the reign of Rao Ganga. In the reign of the last two Rajas imperial investiture also became necessary in order to establish the Raja's title against any imperial favourite. The imperial connection came in two ways. First of all a robe of bereavement was sent to the heir-presumptive, this being followed by the regular investiture robe and the royal Farman.

This brings us to the question of the relation of the Rajas to the emperor. All the evidence that is available goes to show that the Rajas were reduced to the position of mere hereditary Jagirdars. And hereditary title did not extend to all the Jagirs of a Raja. Raja Udey Singh held some districts in the Punjab, these never formed a part of his successor's holdings. Raja Sur Singh held some districts in Gujarat and the Deccan and his charge in Rajputana proper too was large. Yet when Gaj Singh succeeded him, not only were the Gujarat and the Deccan districts not given to him, he did not get all the districts that his father held in Rajputana. Akbar's usual policy was to dispossess rulers of their old hereditary possessions and then to give them Jagirs elsewhere. Now when he departed in the case of Rajput Rajas from this principle, the departure was as small as possible. Their old hereditary possessions were of course left to them as hereditary, while any new addi-



tions at once relapsed to the emperor at the death of the first assignee. In the case of Jodhpur the matters were complicated by two considerations. When Akbar came into collision with Jodhpur in 1553, Maldev had aggrandised himself at the expense of most of his neighbours. This made it difficult to decide what hereditary dominions Rathors of Jodhpur had. Again Jodhpur was really conquered bit by bit and the restoration did not take place soon after the conquest. When Akbar restored Jodhpur to Rathors in the person of Udey Singh, eighteen years had elapsed since its first conquest. This made it easy for him to decide what to give and what to keep back, while the earlier civil war complicated the matters by leaving three distinct branches of descendants of Maldev. Thus it happened that Akbar had a free hand in Jodhpur.

The position of the Rajas of Jodhpur as Mughal grantees is again brought home to us when we remember that every bit of territory that was given to them came in the shape of higher rungs in the official ladder. If Sur Singh became a grandee of five thousand, he must have an increase of his Jagirs. And every increase almost always came in the shape of a rise in the official grade. Similarly of decreases. If Gaj Singh got less at his succession than his father had held it was because he got the grade of 3500 rather than that of 5000.

Another proof is provided by the constant employment of these princes in imperial service. There was no better method of reminding them constantly that they were imperial grantees rather than subordinate princes. And by making their imperial charges relative to their position the emperor gained a not too unwelcome service. These campaigns satisfied the Rajput princes' natural love of adventure. There was, however, a constant exile from home which made them eager to return to their native land. Anyhow there was no difference

between an ordinary official grandee and a hereditary Raja in their respective ranks. The Rajas had to serve the emperor with the usual contingent of horse and foot

So far we have considered the position of the Raja in his external aspect only—we have considered him as a Mughal grandee alone. But he was a Raja too, hereditary governor of certain districts. This made him maintain a representative of his at the imperial court. This *Vakalit* was an office of great dignity. We have one of the premiers of Sur Singh being sent out as a *Vakil* to the imperial court<sup>10</sup>. He was in charge of the Raja's interests at the imperial court generally. Besides this the Raja had to keep another representative of his at the court of the provincial governor.<sup>11</sup> The Subadar was generally in charge of the imperial districts proper as well as the "State" territories. He could ask the Raja for his usual contingent if he needed it for work in the province itself. Many imperial orders were transmitted to the Rajas through him<sup>12</sup>. He exercised some power of supervision over the administration in the State<sup>13</sup>. His interference here was of course much less than in the territories directly under his own *Fojdars*, but it was none the less real though restricted by the fact that he could not see to the execution of his policy. Difficulties arose of course when a grandee of a lesser rank than the one held by a raja was the governor.

The imperial power of interference was large. It was, however, not institutional but personal. Theoretically, imperial ordinances were co-extensive in their operation with the empire. There could be otherwise no point in issuing such an ordinance as the one prohibiting forced *Satis*. It was enforced against a raja<sup>14</sup> too. Aurangzeb's later attempt to levy *Jizaya* from the Rajput states as well was a practical application of the same theory. Rana Raj Singh's protest against it assumes the applicability of imperial orders to Rajput states<sup>15</sup>. Practically, however,

it must have been impossible to govern Rajput states in that way. Consequently much latitude must have been allowed to the Rajas. It seems safe to assume that normally there was not much interference but that the emperor could, when he liked and when he was able to enforce his orders, interfere.

The largest instance of imperial interference comes in the case of succession. The necessity of an imperial sanction in the shape of the robes of investiture and the royal Farman conferring the Mansab provided the occasion for exercising it. In the case of Marwar we are not certain but that the imperial discretion may have been used in the case of Raja Sur Singh. Here, however, the interference was not great as Sur Singh was also recognised by Raja Udey Singh as his heir. We have, however, other instances<sup>16</sup> in which this discretion was used to override the decision of Rajas themselves. It seems certain that this power of deciding as to who should succeed resided ultimately in the emperor though its exercise may have been limited by the practical exigencies of the case. But we have no means of judging how the dispossessed looked upon this exercise of his powers and what view others took of it. The emperors, however, maintained that it belonged to them<sup>17</sup> whether as wielders of a large army which could enforce the decision, or as a matter of course the right came by virtue of the emperor's position as a sovereign lord is not certain.

We thus see that Marwar, though internally free to a large extent, came in contact with the imperial power at various points. Marwar lost its position of an independent state that had generally characterised the reigns of Udey Singh's predecessors. As a subordinate principality, with its rulers virtual servants of the emperor, it gained much power, but that was simply the reflection of the imperial grandeur.

## Notes

1 The period chosen represents that stage of the evolution of Marwar state when it was transformed from a mere jagir into a great principality

2 *History of Jagirdars*, p. 4

3 *Marwar* (MS), Sur Singh, p. 25.

4 *Administration Report of Marwar* for 1883 and 1884, Part III, p. 772

5. The regulations are yet in force theoretically. But an open Durbar being now rare, they have lost their importance. See *History of Jagirdars* pp 6-17

6 Joshi Dev Dutt Nensi (Jodhpur), p. 152.

7 Pandit Gauri Shankar Ojha's note to the Hindi Translation of Tod's *Rajasthan* Part II, p. 169.

8 We should also add, generalising from the experience of the interregnum that the chiefs could in cases of emergency, ignore the claims of the eldest son and appoint a younger son to succeed

9 We should also add the case of the succession of Kala, son of Ram Singh of Shivana. He was not the eldest son

10 This was Joshi Dev Dutt who in 1619 went to the imperial court as the representative of Jodhpur. Nensi (Jodhpur), p. 152.

11 A letter of Hadi Rani (wife of Maharaja Jaswant Singh) to her Vakil at Ajmer was in possession of Munshi Devi Prasad

12 *Vir Vinod* (pp 779 and 891) quotes some such correspondence

13 The letter referred to above answers certain allegations against the administration of Marwar. We have also a letter of Husain Quli Khan to Raja Uday Singh asking him to restore certain rights of a Jodhpur Qazi

14 *Akbar Nama* in Elliot, VI p. 69. Names given therein are wrong

15 *Todds Annals*, Vol I p. 353 note

16 Other instances are

(i) Rai Sur Singh son of Raja Rai Singh of Bikaner was not allowed to succeed his father by Jahangir.

(ii) Sur Singh, grandson of Man Singh, was not allowed to succeed his grandfather. Succession was altered in the interests of his uncles. He was, however, compensated for this loss by the grant of Jagir in Bundelkhand

17 *Masir ul Umra*, Vol II, p. 154.

## XVI

### GUJARAT DURING THE REIGN OF AKBAR

#### 1 Independent Gujarat Sultanate its decline and dissolution

Of all the independent kingdoms of Northern India Gujarat occupied the most prominent position. Founded in 793 A. H (1391 A. D.) it had been expanding at the cost of its neighbours. Early in the sixteenth century its famous ruler Muzaffar succeeded in conquering Malwa and asserting his authority over Khandesh. Bahadur Shah consolidated all the conquests of his predecessors and considered himself strong enough not only to challenge the Rajputs at the very heart of their power at Chitor, but also promoted an attack on Humayun in the Doab. In this he overreached himself and naturally drew the attention of Humayun to his dominions. In his own turn Humayun was not content with defeating Bahadur Shah and expelling him from Rajputana and Malwa, but after vanquishing him in Gujarat decided, against the advice of his experienced officials to annex the whole of Gujarat. So little were the Mughals capable of keeping Gujarat under their own control that at the first sign of disturbance in Gujarat they hurried out of the province and Bahadur Shah regained his throne.

But Sher Shah conquered Malwa and thus deprived the kings of Gujarat of this rich appendage to their crown. Bahadur's successor Mahmud was a minor and the Gujarat monarchy was shorn of a good deal of its glory by the disloyal acts of his nobles during his minority. When at last he came of age, he showed no signs of proving a wise ruler of Gujarat. He declared an open war on the

religious beliefs and observances of his Hindu citizens subjecting them to unheard of indignities. They were not allowed to celebrate their religious festivals publically, they could not ride horses or dress well. One writer would have us believe that he insisted on getting all of them branded on the left arm. He hit them even harder by expropriating all the Rajputs and Koli Grassiyas and rendering them landless labourers.

While Humayun was marching to the reconquest of India, Gujarat was facing a major political crisis. The king Mahmud had been murdered in 1554, leaving no issue behind. A search was made for a representative of the governing dynasty. Of course there was Mubarak Shah, Sultan of Khandēsh who was a grandson of the house of Muzaffar. But Itimad-ul-Mulk suggested that Razi-ul-Mulk, a "poor relation" of the kings of Gujarat who was barely twelve then, be placed on the throne. This advice suited all the nobles as a minority would leave the government of the country in their hands. So Razi-ul-Mulk was brought from Mahmudabad where he was found carrying in his apron some corn for his pigeons. Seated in a bullock-cart he was conveyed to Ahmadabad and crowned as Ahmad Shah II. The nobles now proceeded to divide the kingdom among themselves. Itimad Khan was appointed the king's tutor and wazir. Sayyid Mubarak accepted the young sovereign among his followers. Nasir-ul-Mulk became one of his greatest fief-holders.

But self interest could not keep the Gujarat nobles together for long. When Jagirs were distributed, tempers were apt to be lost. But fates did not leave them alone long for the enjoyment of their new gains. Mubarak Shah of Khandesh claimed Gujarat as a representative of the ruling dynasty and invaded the province. As he lay across the Narbada opposite Ranpur Koth, the Gujarat

army intercepted his march. Sayyid Mubarak, the young sovereign's religious preceptor, seems to be the only man faithful to the cause of his master. He opened negotiations with the ruler of Khandesh and succeeded in prevailing upon Mubarak Shah to retire to Khandesh.

As the Gujarat chiefs were marching back with the king, hostility between Sayyid Mubarak and Nasir-ul-Mulk broke out openly. Mubarak was deserted by other nobles. Nasir-ul-Mulk refused to acknowledge Ahmad Shah as king, and early in 1555 opened up negotiations with the Portuguese promising to surrender all the ports they had ever coveted in return for their help. Nasir-ul-Mulk marched against Sayyid Mubarak with a very large army. Two of the chief supporters of Nasir-ul-Mulk now promised to desert to the Sayyid's side as they were afraid that once successful against the Sayyid, Nasir-ul-Mulk would not spare them. In the battle that followed Nasir-ul-Mulk was defeated and fled away.

Meanwhile at the capital, the king's uncle, Sahu had been raised to the throne. But when Ahmad returned to the capital with Sayyid Mubarak, as his wazir, the pretender was defeated and fled away.

The nobles could now wait no longer. Leaving Ahmedabad and its environs to the puppet king, they divided the rest of the country among themselves. The main beneficiaries were Imad-ul-Mulk Rumi, Itimad Khan, and Sayyid Mubarak. But they were not allowed to enjoy their gains in peace for long. That stormy petrel of Indian politics, Alam Khan Lodi, who had espoused and deserted half a dozen causes already, now again repaired to Gujarat. He had acted as the wazir of Sultan Mahmud. Sayyid Mubarak proposed to his colleagues that they should give Alam Khan refuge in his old age. Soon the astute Lodi was at his old game again, when every other intrigue of his failed, he suggested to other nobles that unless they

removed the Sayyid, they would not be able to enjoy their own rightful share in the government of Gujarat. This advice was welcomed by them all. They led an army against the Sayyid who was in his own village. Sayyid Mubarak remained undismayed. He succeeded in seducing Imad-ul-Mulk from the confederacy. Alam Khan soon found himself alone, and in the battle that followed he was defeated and fled away to Champaner. When he was followed there, he sought refuge in the neighbouring hills of Pal, ultimately to die at Kari in a battle against Ikhtayar-ul-Mulk. These troubles tempted Mubarak Shah once again, but being defeated he sought safety in flight.

Disappointed twice, Mubarak Shah was yet destined to gain a part of the frontier districts lost by Khandesh to Gujarat. The enmity between Imad-ul-Mulk and Itimad Khan at last blazed forth, Itimad Khan sought help at Mubarak Shah's court. But Sayyid Mubarak invited Itimad Khan back to Gujarat and made a compromise by giving the parganas of Sultanpur and Nandurbar to Mubarak Shah of Khandesh. Itimad Khan came back to assume his office of wazir.

Sultan Ahmad was getting sick of this perpetual wrangle among his chiefs. On July 8, 1558, he sought safety in flight to Sayyidpur.

Matters, however, now took a more serious turn by the arrival of the Pathan chief Haji Khan who had fled before the rushing tide of Mughal victories in the Doab. Itimad Khan now won over Imad-ul-Mulk to his own side by representing that the king's flight to Sayyidpur had been actively concerted by Sayyid Mubarak and so timed as to enable him to use Haji Khan as his cat's paw. They now attacked Sayyid Mubarak who on July 13, 1558 died a selfless martyr's death, the last of the Gujarat chiefs to serve its ruler.



faithfully. He was a great patron of letters; among his proteges was, Aram, the author of *Tuhfat-ul-Sadat*. Sikandar the author of *Mirat-i-Sikandar* was also being brought up under his care in the household of his father Miran Manjhu, who was a trusted agent of Sayyid Mubarak. Sayyid Mubarak's tomb on the bank of the river near Mahmudabad compelled Jahangir's admiration, built as it was at a cost of Rs 200,000 by his son Miran and ten times as magnificent as any that encased the earthly remains of Gujarat's rulers.

## 2 Troubled last years of puppet Sultan Ahmad II.

Mubarak dead, Imad-ul-Mulk and Itimad Khan could no more agree among themselves now than they had done before. What was worse, Imad-ul-Mulk invited the Portuguese to help him promising to surrender Daman to them in return. The quarrels of the Gujarat nobles had already compelled them to surrender Bassien (probably in 1557) to the Portuguese. In ceding Daman, however, Imad-ul-Mulk was making the best of a very bad bargain. It had been given in jagir to an Abyssinian officer Miftah, who only formally acknowledged Imad-ul-Mulk as his chief. But hard pressed from all sides, Miftah found it impossible to resist the Portuguese who occupied the place on February 2, 1559.

Miftah fled to the neighbouring town of Parnel, some twenty miles from Daman, and from there went on placing obstacles in the way of the Portuguese occupation of Daman. A force sent under Barrets dislodged him from Parnel, Bulsar was next occupied, thus completing the Portuguese hegemony on the Gujarat coast.

The religious intolerance of the Portuguese, however, seems to have gained them a bad name. When they occupied Daman, they converted its chief mosque into a church. No wonder that the inhabitants of Daman fled on its occupation by the Portuguese. Various tempta-

tions had to be offered to them before they could be induced to return, among them the continued collection of customs at Daman by the Raja of Sorath.

Now followed a period of conflict between the Portuguese and the Gujarat nobles, which did not terminate till 1561. The Portuguese had not fulfilled their part of the bargain with Imad-ul-Mulk, and the latter now decided to recapture Daman. The Portuguese were hard pressed and had recourse to a stratagem. They won over Khudawand Khan, governor of Surat and Imad-ul-Mulk's brother-in-law. Khudawand Khan on the strength of his relationship came to visit Imad-ul-Mulk in his camp and invited him to return the visit. When Imad-ul-Mulk did so, he was murdered, on July 3, 1559.

Imad-ul-Mulk's son Chingez Khan now decided to avenge his father's murder. He led an army against Surat, but was soon compelled to raise the siege. In 1560 he led another army to Surat when Khudawand Khan was so hard pressed that he promised to cede Surat itself to the Portuguese if they would grant him safe refuge. The Portuguese fleet now appeared at Surat and defeated Chingez Khan.

Khudawand Khan now tried to play false to the Portuguese, but was detected by them. In trying to flee he fell into the hands of Chingez Khan who executed him.

Meanwhile do what they would, the Gujarat chiefs could not delay their king's coming of age. He was nineteen in 1561. He could now feel his thralldom and nominal sovereignty as never before. But nobody had tried to train him in the discharge of his royal duties. There must have been a large number of flatterers to initiate him in all the vices of the age. He started giving vent to his suppressed personality when drunk by strik-

ing at the trunks of plantain trees and earning the praises of his coterie as he declared at one blow that Itimad Khan was dead and at another Wajib-ul-Mulk Wajib-ul-Mulk, one of the confidants of Itimad Khan, suggested to him the king's murder, but at first the minister turned a deaf ear to his disloyal suggestion. Eventually Ahmad Shah was murdered in cold blood during a royal visit to Itimad Khan's house on April 21, 1561. Rafi-ud-Din the author of the *Tazikarat ul Muluk* was present at Ahmabad the following day and was surprised to find the capital take the murder of the king tamely without any sign either of grief or disorder.

Thus passed out from the page of history a ruler of Gujarat, who had been so conveniently used by his public servants to conceal their own selfish aims. Their self aggrandizement had cost Gujarat dear. Basien, Daman, Parnel, and Bulsar had been lost to the Portuguese, Khandesh had regained its independence and occupied the frontier districts of Nandurbar and Sultanpur. Several of the Hindu chiefs of the neighbourhood, who had once been feudatory of the kings of Gujarat, now regained their independence. The royal resources were also squandered by the various claimants for the possession of the king's person. In order to keep their soldiers content, they had melted down even the gold and silver ornaments in the royal treasury on which every chief laid his hand whenever he got a chance to do so.

### 3 Accession of boy Muzaffar III

With Ahmad dead, the question of carrying on 'the king's government' in Gujarat assumed a serious form. He had been placed on the throne as the last survivor of the dynasty. How was the government to be carried on, now that the royal dynasty had become extinct? Itimad

Khan declared that a son of Mahmud III was yet alive. He declared that he had been asked by Mahmud III to procure the termination of the boy's mother's pregnancy, but as he had found it fairly advanced he had not had the heart to do so. When the child was born he had kept him in his own house. There was this much of truth in this statement that the new pretender's mother had been an inmate of the royal harem. But as Wali assures us Nunhu was born before she had been selected for this 'honour'. His royal paternity was therefore improbable. But he was a minor, this would ensure a continuation of independent administration by the principal officials. So all hastened to accept this solution. Nunhu was proclaimed the king of Gujarat as Muzaffar III on April 22, 1561.

The question of partitioning the kingdom called for an immediate solution. Itimad Khan took charge of the king's person. The districts between the Sabarmati and the Mahendri were assigned to him for the king's support and his own maintenance. Surat, Baroda, Champaner, and Nador (or Nagot) went to Chingez Khan, his brother-in-law Rustum Khan acquired Broach, Sayyid Mubarak's son, Miran, was given Dholka and Dhanduka. The Afghan chief, Amir Khan Ghorî, and Fateh Khan Baloch got Junagarh and Sorath, and Randhanpur and Nadiad respectively. The Abyssinians, Musa Khan and Sher Khan Foladi got Pattan. It was a fairly even division of the kingdom. But it could only last if it was scrupulously adhered to.

Trouble started early, first came the quarrel between Sher Khan Foladi and Fateh Khan. Worsted in the battle field, Fateh Khan repaired to the capital. Itimad Khan's attempt to assert central authority on behalf of the minor king was blandly disregarded by Musa Khan

and Sher Khan. Itimad Khan was defeated by Musa Khan at Jothana, 19 Kos from Patan.

Finding Itimad Khan hard pressed, Chingez Khan preferred his claims for additional jagirs. Itimad Khan assigned Nandurbar in Khandesh to him, thus inviting him to conquer it. Chingez Khan was young enough to swallow the bait. He succeeded in taking Nandurbar in 974, A H but his foolish attempt at following his success by the occupation of Thalner lost him Nandurbar in the end.

Matters were now complicated by the appearance of 'the Mirzas' in Gujarat in 1566. These descendants of Muhammad Sultan Mirza of Khurasan had first served and then risen against Akbar. Hard pressed by him they had sought safety in rulerless Gujarat. Chingez Khan befriended them in their distress and gave them jagirs in his own districts. But the Mirzas encouraged him in seeking a settlement with Itimad Khan. He marched on the capital. Itimad Khan took the king with him and encamped at Kadri, some five Kos from the capital intending to intercept him. But he lost heart and leaving the king alone fled to Dungarpur. Chingez Khan occupied the capital in 1567 and succeeded in defeating Miran Shah of Khandesh when he attacked Gujarat. Chingez Khan now occupied the throne of Gujarat and ruled as its king.

The Abyssinian allies of Itimad Khan led the king to Dungarpur. They next deserted to Chingez Khan but only to plan his removal. They succeeded in murdering him one day near the mosque of Farhat-ul-Mulk at Ahmedabad in 1568.

No body knew now what to do at Ahmedabad. Itimad Khan was therefore summoned from Dungarpur to assume the reins of government and bring the king back with him. It was probably during the interregnum that the Rao of Cutch acquired the right of minting

silver coins of his own bearing of course the name of the sultan as well.

Meanwhile the Mirzas had grown into a source of danger. From Chingez Khan's dependents they had become transformed into Gujarat chiefs in their own right and started annexing Chingez Khan's territories as well. When they heard of Chingez Khan's death, they started annexing territory after territory. They even besieged Broach; but it took Ibrahim Hussain Mirza a full year to conquer that fort. All the territory beyond the Mahi was occupied by them. Baroda, Broach, Surat, and Champaner now became the seats of their authority.

This disorder continued for four years. Sher Khan Fofadi now decided to challenge the position of Itimad Khan as regent at the capital. As he approached Narsinghpur in October 1572, Muzaffar slipped away to him. In the custody of a rival, Muzaffar was of no use to Itimad Khan. He now denounced Muzaffar as a pretender, and not a son of Mahmud, thus forswearing himself again. Not content with this, he invited first Ibrahim Husain Mirza and then Muhammad Husain Mirza to assume the crown of Gujarat and presumably allow Itimad Khan to continue as minister. As if even that was not enough, he sent another messenger to Akbar asking for his intervention. Before Muhammad Hussain knew what answer to return to Itimad Khan, Ibrahim Husain Mirza had answered the call. He encamped at Khamodpur outside Ahmedabad and from there started a desultory warfare against Sher Khan, who had now occupied Ahmedabad. This went on for some time. The Mirza tried to surprise the Sayyids at Dholka, but their watchfulness and courage succeeded in defeating him.

Now came the news of Akbar's march to Gujarat. Ibrahim Mirza, unaware that Itimad Khan had invited

the emperor, tried to persuade him to make up his differences with Sher Khan and then entrust the defence of Gujarat to the Mirza Itimau Khan, however, refused to fall into this trap. Sher Khan's camp broke up on hearing of Akbar's approach *via* Patan where most of this chief's followers had jagirs. During the confusion Muzaffar left him.

#### 4 Akbar's conquest of Gujarat

When Akbar had first received Itimad Khan's invitation in 1567, he had kept quiet. He did not want to commit the indiscretion of which Humayun had been guilty of trying to conquer and occupy Gujarat before he had established his authority firmly in Rajputana and Malwa and thus securing the two approaches to Gujarat. But when Itimad Khan wrote to him again early in 1572, the situation had definitely improved. Akbar was now master of Rajputana barring Udaipur, where even his agents had established themselves in the plains. The Rajas of Jaipur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, and Bundi were his feudatories. Jodhpur was a royal province. Gwalior, Nagor, Ranthambore and Ajmer had all been conquered, occupied and settled. The Afghan danger had long been over. Malwa had been an imperial province since 1562 and Baz Bahadur, its ruler, a Mughal grandee since 1570. Eastward, Akbar's dominion extended till Bihar and Patna was the capital of an imperial province. His brother's incursion into the Punjab in 1566 had long been forgotten. The forts of Ajmer, Merta, Ranthambore and Chitor had fallen to his royal arms. If Agra was the imperial capital, Ajmer had become a place of regular annual pilgrimage, thus providing a convenient halting stage in the march westwards. The rulers of most of the Rajput states were Mughal mansabdars, the cadets of most of the famous Rajput families were now royal servants.

It is not surprising therefore to find Akbar accepting the invitation of Itimad Khan to come and conquer the country. Gujarat had passed through three minorities. Two of the three minor rulers had been murdered, the third lay disowned by his maker. Since 1554 Gujarat had really been partitioned between its chief nobles and a prey to civil war. The Portuguese had grown rich at the expense of Gujarat, Khandesh had recovered its lost districts, some of the local rulers had recovered their lost authority. The people had suffered through it all. Whosoever fought, did so at the expense of the people. The civil war in Gujarat became a crying shame for the Muslims in India. As Fredrick Caeser tells us the Portuguese preyed unmolested on the ships bound for Mecca. To add to it all, the Mirzas were now taking a hand in the game. If they succeeded in establishing themselves in Gujarat as its rulers, they could use it as a jumping off ground for threatening the peace of Akbar's empire. Thus everything beckoned Akbar on to undertake this expedition. If successful, the prize was rich; the resources of Gujarat rivalled those of several imperial provinces.

No wonder then that he decided to accept the invitation. The emperor left Fathepur Sikri on June 22, 1572. Two days earlier he had nominated an advance guard and sent it along on the road to Gujarat. He halted at Ajmer to seek the blessings of Khwaja Muin-ud-Din Chisti in this great undertaking and sent Mir Muhammad Khan, Khan-i-Khanan at the head of ten thousand soldiers to Gujarat. Their attempt to persuade Rao Duda to surrender Sirohi led to some trouble. Akbar himself made a detour to Nagor where he had built a magnificent palace some time earlier and after a halt of a fortnight here for fitting out the army, he left for Gujarat. Passing through Merta, the emperor entered Sirohi. Some opposition was offered by the Rajputs here; but



Man Singh, its ruler, left for the mountains and Sirohi was occupied by the imperial troops

The emperor would do nothing by halves Chander Sen, the dispossessed ruler of Jodhpur still lay at Siwana and was capable of taking advantage of the emperor's absence in Gujarat to create trouble at Jodhpur So he appointed the Rathor prince Rai Singh of Bikaner to hold Jodhpur as an imperial grandee, trusting to the long standing enmity between the houses of Bikaner and Jodhpur to ensure that Rai Singh would not fail in his task Measures were also taken to watch Rana Partap

The imperial armies entered Gujarat through Disa, 'twenty Kos from Patan'. It was now reported that Sher Khan Foladi's sons had left for Idar Man Singh Kachhwa was told off to pursue them there. Disa was occupied by the royal troops which now moved to Patan Todar Mal here rejoined the emperor after having rendered the Afghans incapable of attacking the imperialists from the rear A garrison was now left at Patan under Sayyid Ahmad Khan Barha The country round about secured Akbar marched towards Ahmedabad On November 15, 1572, Muzaffar, the fugitive king of Gujarat was found wandering in a corn-field and brought before the emperor He did homage and thus the long line of independent kings of Gujarat was formally brought to an end Itimad Khan who had invited the emperor, read the Khutba in his name at Ahmedabad on November 13 and was then granted audience by Akbar at Kar. Other Gujarat nobles now hastened to pay their respects to Akbar They had been quarrelling with one another, to make them keep peace in Gujarat even as imperial servants was a difficult job Akbar conferred half of Gujarat, between the Mahendri and the Sabarmati on Itimad Khan and asked him to choose the Gujarat chiefs

whom he would like to keep with him. Alf Khan and Jujubar Khan, the Abyssinians were imprisoned

Akbar entered the capital on November 20, 1572 Sher Khan Foladi was still at large, Amir Khan was at Sorath and the Mirzas were on the other side of the Mahi, masters of Broach, Baroda, and Surat Ibrahim Mirza tried to open negotiations with the imperial court Akbar however refused to have anything to do with this rebel against his authority and fugitive from his justice Akbar's fears were soon justified When the Mirza learnt that Rustam Khan intended going to Akbar, in fear lest Rustam should upset his design on Gujarat and keep it safe for Akbar if allowed to become an imperial servant, he murdered him When Akbar heard the news he decided to turn his attention to the territories occupied by the Mirzas He advanced to Cambay on a pleasure trip to the sea The Gujarat nobles whom Akbar had allowed to remain at Ahmedabad for a short time in order to put their contingents in order now chose to rebel against Akbar's authority Akbar just succeeded in preventing Itimad Khan's treacherous attempt to join them He was handed over to Todar Mal to be kept as a state prisoner

From Baroda Akbar decided to attack Surat, the stronghold of the Mirzas Several amirs were nominated to the Surat expedition, even Sayyid Muhammad Khan Barha had been recalled from Patan for the purpose. But they had not long left the emperor, when he learnt that Mirza Ibrahim Husain was only eight Kos from the imperial camp which he intended to attack Akbar at once reversed his plan, he decided to seek the Mirza out and challenge him The advance-guard sent to Surat was recalled and ordered to join the emperor Malik us-Sharq Gujarati accompanied the imperial party in search of Mirza Ibrahim Husain For a night and a day they

sought for news of Ibrahim Husain in vain. Then a Brahman informed them that he lay encamped at Sarnal on the Mahi.

When Akbar reached the river opposite Sarnal, he had only forty horsemen with him. Nothing daunted, he decided to seek battle. Fortunately for him some of the party that had been recalled from the siege of Surat now joined the emperor, the total still not exceeding two hundred. Akbar crossed the river to Sarnal, Mirza Ibrahim Husain noticing the Mughals, placed his one thousand soldiers in battle array and decided to give battle outside Sarnal. Entering Sarnal, Akbar led his men through the city to the open plain on the other side. Raja Bhagwant Dass and Akbar led the attack. Bhupat, Bhagwant Dass's cousin was killed and seeing such an eminent chief fall, the army of the Mirzas advanced on Akbar. Three of the enemy fell on Bhagwant Dass and Akbar. The emperor and his faithful friend were separated, but the fates were kind to Akbar, the thorny bushes on the battle field helped him, and his assailants withdrew and fled. Seeing Akbar thus exposed, his army marched up to his help. The Mirza was defeated and sought safety in flight.

Akbar re-entered Sarnal and occupied it and returned to Baroda, the next day, Shaban 18 (December 24). It was decided to resume the expedition to Surat now. Todar Mal was sent to reconnoitre the fort. He reported that it could be easily captured. Akbar now sent an army under Shah Quli Khan to invest the outer defences of Surat and cut off supplies from the fort. As they approached, Mirza Muzaffar and his mother left the fort to their trusted servant Hamzaban and fled to the Deccan.

Leaving Baroda on December 31, 1572, Akbar reached Surat on January 11, 1573, and decided to invest the fort closely. Reinforcements were ordered from Malwa.

Qasim Khan was entrusted with the task of preparing protected approaches to the fort. The Emperor himself moved to the Gopi Talab near the fort walls, yet safe from the cannonade of the defenders. The work of attacking the fort was distributed among the commanders. After a siege lasting six weeks they succeeded in closing all the exits from the fort and made it impossible for the besieged to draw water. Earth was piled up to raise a platform for mounting cannons and a bettering ram commanding the fort. Mines were dug up to the very foot of the bastions of the fort, threatening its fall. Hamzaban who had once been a servant of Humayun, now sought for peace. The garrison was promised safe conduct. They surrendered on February 26, 1573. All others were allowed to depart in safety, but Akbar disfigured his great victory by having Hamzaban's tongue cut out. The fort was entrusted to Qulich Muhammad Khan.

Hamzaban had summoned the Portuguese for help. They had always coveted Surat, it had even been promised to them once. A Portuguese mission was sent to Surat, but after surveying Akbar's resources it converted itself into a friendly embassy to the emperor of India. The contacts now established were to bear fruit in Akbar's invitation to the Jesuit fathers.

It was also from Surat that Akbar paid a visit to Dasturji Meharyi Rana the famous Parsi priest living in the neighbourhood. This again was to result in the introduction of several pre-Islamic Persian customs and ceremonies in the Mughal court.

Mirza Sharaf ud Din Husain, a fugitive from royal wrath for the last ten years was surrendered to the emperor by the ruler of Baglana in Nasik. He was put in prison and died in Gwalior.

In order to relieve the pressure on Surat, Muhammad Husain Mirza, Shah Mirza and Sher Khan had decided to attack Patan. Its commander, Sayyid Muhammad Khan, reported the threatened danger to Akbar who immediately sent a detachment of troops to Ahmedabad, so that they might go to the relief of Patan with Azam Khan, governor of Gujarat. The reinforcements called from Malwa now joined them on January 22, 1573. Five Kos from Patan, they were intercepted when they decided to give battle. The Mughals tired by their long march were allowed no time to put their lines in order. The Gujarat army, 10,000 strong had its plan of attack ready. The Mughals were taken at a disadvantage, the vanguard was defeated, the right and the left wings were vanquished and dispersed. When the Gujarat army flushed with victory followed the vanquished wings of the Mughals and busied itself in plunder, the Mughal centre under Khan Azam fell upon the centre of the enemy and taking it unawares defeated it. Sher Khan fled to Sorath, his son sought refuge in Idar and Muhammad Husain hastened to Khandesh.

Another detachment was sent against Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk to Mamurabad; it succeeded in capturing Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk and several other Abyssinians. The forts in the neighbourhood were occupied and garrisons left in them.

On March 8, 1573, Akbar left Surat for Ahmedabad. At Broach Jujhar Khan Habshi was slain on a complaint from Chingez Khan's mother to Akbar. He had murdered Chingez Khan several years ago.

Akbar reached Ahmedabad on April 4, 1573. Khan-i-Azam, now made a Punj Hazari, was confirmed in the government of Gujarat. Patan was given to his uncle Mir Muhammad Khan, Khan-i-Kalan. Another uncle Qutb-ud-Din Muhammad Khan was set up in authority at Broach and Aurang Khan at Baroda. Dholra and

Dandura were alone left to a Gujarat Officer, Sayyid Hamid Bukhari, the living representative of Sayyid Mubarak

On Zi-l hij 10 980 A. H. (April 14, 1573), Akbar left Ahmedabad for his capital, Gujarat had been conquered and apportioned among the Mughal officers. Its last king was now appointed the imperial governor of the neighbouring province of Malwa Akbar had taken care to avoid dissensions among the Mughal officers in the province by concentrating all authority in the hands of the Aikakbail tribe But Gujarat was not yet fully conquered Akbar knew that he had broken the back of the resistance in Gujarat and could trust to his governor to maintain peace

The people must have welcomed the restoration of order in Gujarat after almost twenty years of anarchy. They could now expect to escape the disorder and plunder which had been the order of the day in Gujarat, they were relieved of several burdens which they had borne so far. Their own line of kings became extinct and they were again brought under a king of Delhi after almost two centuries

### **5 Rebellion and disorder after first Mughal conquest: Akbar's second Gujrat campaign**

No sooner had Akbar left for the capital than rebellion broke out in Gujarat Aziz Koka was returning to Ahmedabad after seeing the emperor off, at Saitpur, forty Kos from the capital, when he heard at Mahmudabad that Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk and Muhammad Khan Foladi had raised their heads on the frontiers and expelled the imperial commander Muquim from Himmatnagar. Mirza Muhammad Husain advanced from Nandurbar on Surat which however was stoutly defended Leaving it alone, he proceeded to Broach and in the absence of its Mughal commander at Baroda, he succeeded in taking it Thus

encouraged he fell upon Cambay whose Mughal commander lost heart and left the fort to the Mirza.

As soon as Aziz Koka heard of Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk's rising, he hastened to Himmatnagar. He was joined by Muqim. They attacked Himmatnagar. Here he heard of the loss of Broach and issued orders for an attack on Cambay, under Qutb-ud-Din who was now joined by several other Mughal commanders. Together they invested Cambay. Mirza Muhammad Husain finding himself hemmed in on all sides, slunk away quietly one night.

Meanwhile at Himmatnagar, Wali, the historian, advised the governor to leave it alone and make for the provincial capital. Leaving a few of his commanders at Himmatnagar the governor himself returned to Ahmedabad. Raja Narain Das of Idar had submitted to the imperialists and sent his son to Aziz Koka with valuable presents. When he heard of Aziz Koka's retirement from Himmatnagar, he joined Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk who decided to make for Ahmedabad. A race for the capital began. On the way Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk was joined by Mirza Muhammad Husain. Aziz Koka succeeded in regaining the capital where Qutb-ud-Din also joined him from Cambay. The number of the enemy now rose to 20,000. They included the Mirza Raja Narain Das of Idar, the Afghan nobles of Gujarat and the Abyssinians.

All signs of Mughal authority seem to have now disappeared from Gujarat. The imperial officers lost self-confidence. The Mughal rule in Gujarat was as yet of too short a duration to have any popular support. Its opponents had closed their ranks against the imperialists who prevented all of them equally from enjoying the revenues of Gujarat. At Ahmedabad Aziz Koka stood at bay. Akbar had wisely told his governor not to risk a general engagement in Gujarat himself but to keep the

emperor well posted with the news. He now explained matters to Akbar and asked for reinforcements. Events however were moving too fast for him. Afraid that he might be compelled to surrender, he now sent Sultan Khwaja as a confidential messenger to Akbar in the beginning of August requesting the emperor to come to his aid at once.

Akbar must have received Aziz Koka's earlier despatches in the beginning of August. Reinforcements were sent as soon as the first of those despatches arrived. The emperor then seems to have entertained the idea of visiting Gujarat again. An advance guard had already set out. Money was distributed among those who were commanded to proceed to Gujarat. Equipment was ordered for the royal camp as also for the royal army. When Sultan Khwaja at last reached Fathpur, Akbar seems to have expedited matters. He decided now on a lightning campaign in Gujarat.

He left Fathpur on August 23. Riding swift dromedaries in two days and a half he reached Ajmer, 280 miles away. Passing now on horse back now in a carriage through Jetaran, Sojhat, Jalor and Sirohi, he entered Gujarat at Deesa (20 Kos from Pattan) on August 30. The commander of the garrison was ordered to join Akbar at Balisana. Here he overtook the reinforcement that had first been sent to Gujarat. Fearful of their fate, its leaders had not cared to advance beyond Pattan. They now seem to have learnt of Akbar's march. Here Akbar reviewed his troops and decided on the plan of campaign. Muhammad Quli Khan and Tarkhan were asked to lead the advance guard. Abdur Rahim was given the command of the van, Shujaat Khan of the centre, Mir Muhammad was appointed to the right wing and Wazir Khan to the left. With a chosen band of 100 warriors



Akbar meant to be free to move where his help was needed. All told there were 2,000 Mughal soldiers. In this order the army marched towards Ahmedabad. Twenty Kos from Ahmedabad in the neighbourhood of Kari, Akbar's scouts brought the news of the presence of the enemy. He at once despatched a contingent against them which defeated them and drove the survivors into the fort. The emperor refused to be detracted from his main purpose of relieving the pressure on Ahmedabad and leaving the fort unconquered, he halted five Kos beyond Kari to give some rest to his army. Three Kos on this side of Ahmedabad, he asked all his troops to get ready for battle.

Akbar had 2000 soldiers against 20,000 of the enemy. As he approached the camp of the besiegers, his drums were beaten. Muhammad Husain Mirza ordered 5,000 soldiers under Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk to press Aziz Koka hard in the fort and make it impossible for him to come out and join the emperor. Akbar's advance guard now crossed the river and the main army followed. As they emerged on the other side of the river, their line of battle was broken up. The advance guard of the Mughals under Muhammad Quli Khan joined battle with 1500 soldiers under Muhammad Husain Mirza. The Mughal left wing under Wazir Khan faced the enemy's right wing consisting of the Abyssinians and the Afghans. It was about to give way when the emperor rode up with fresh soldiers, stemmed the tide of defeat and soon turned the tables on the enemy. Muhammad Husain Mirza fled, but an unlucky accident brought about his capture. This spread panic in the right wing of the Gujarat army. The imperial right faced Daulat Khan Foladi and defeated him. This completed the Afghan rout.

The captive Muhammad Husain Mirza was brought before Akbar who entrusted him to Rai Singh. As the

imperial army was busy thanking its stars, Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk fell upon it. When his advance guard was defeated, he lost heart and ran away. A Mughal soldier recognised him and gave pursuit. His horse in trying to avoid the thorny bushes in his path stumbled and fell, and Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk was made a prisoner. He was praying for his life when Suhrab Beg killed him.

When Rai Singh's soldiers saw Ikhtyar-ul-mulk leave the battlefield, they refused to waste further time in mounting guard over Muhammad Husain Mirza and killed him.

Two thousand Gujarat soldiers lay dead on the battlefield. Akbar ordered a minaret to be built of the heads of the slain

Aziz Koka now ventured to come out of the city and pay his respects to the emperor. Akbar entered Ahmedabad and spent about a week here announcing promotions and conferring favours on those who had served him well in this campaign. Of the new amirs Wazir Khan was asked to remain in Gujarat at Dholka and Khwaja Ghias-ud-Din Bakhshi (now created Asaf Khan) was left here as Diwan and Bakhshi. He was soon to be superseded by Todar Mal, who was sent on a special mission to Gujarat for settling its revenue. Raja Bhagwan Das was sent to Vadnagar which he conquered from Sher Khan Foladi's men

Akbar now decided to leave Gujarat. In a stay of one fortnight, he had dispersed the enemy, freed Ahmedabad, cleared the road to the imperial capital and restored self confidence to the Mughal officers. That he thought was enough. He left Ahmedabad on September 13, and passing through Champaner, Dholka, Kasi, Saitpur and Sirohi, he returned to Ajmer on September 27, only thirty two days after he had left the last named city.

### 6. Regular administration established by Akbar.

This expedition turned the scale in Akbar's favour in Gujarat. Of course that province was still to be overrun by ambitious rebels, but it was now secure in the imperial interest. Who dared rise against an emperor who, defying all conventions could travel some 500 miles in nine days and bring succour to his harassed troops? His own officers also learnt that they could easily trust to his helping hand for getting them out of scrapes.

Raja Todar Mal attended to the task of ascertaining and settling the revenue of Gujarat and submitted his report to the emperor. Itimad Khan was raised to the command of 1000 horse while his son became a 400-er. Akbar showed further confidence in local talent by appointing Wajib-ul-Mulk Gujarati, Diwan of Gujarat and promoting several others of Gujarat's former officials. Aziz Koka was recalled in 1575 and Abdur Rahim was appointed his nominal successor with Wazir Khan as his chief 'guide, counsellor, and friend.' Mir Ala-ud-Din was appointed Amin of the province. Prayag Dass who had accompanied Abdur Rahim, was now appointed Diwan of Gujarat. Some trouble seems to have been created in Gujarat at this time and Rai Singh was sent to Nadot. Pressure on Gujarat was also relieved by the conquest and occupation of Sirohi and Idar on its frontiers.

Abdur Rahim seems to have been governor in name only, Wazir Khan, the Deputy Governor, carried on the administration in his name. Soon Todar Mal was sent to restore order in Gujarat. His progress was a triumphal march. The Raja of Sirohi now submitted and undertook to send 2000 horsemen to the governor of Gujarat. The Raja of Vadnagar next waited upon him at Broach and was created a 1500-er on undertaking to send a contingent of 1000 soldiers to Ahmedabad. Todar Mal's

main task had been to settle the revenues of Gujarat. But his was a thoroughly versatile genius. While he was at Pattan, there was again a rebellion in Gujarat. In 1575 A.D. Muzaffar Husain Mirza had appeared from the Deccan, having been joined by some of the Mughal deserters. Broach was taken, a Mughal relieving force under Baz Bahadur and Prayag Das was defeated. When Todar Mal learnt all this, he hastened to Ahmedabad and persuaded Wazir Khan to come into the open and take the offensive. The enemy was defeated near Cambay and Baroda and finally at Dholka in a well contested battle in which Wazir Khan was seriously wounded.

Todar Mal soon left Gujarat. Wazir Khan again found himself in difficulties and was obliged to shut himself up at Ahmedabad against an adventurer, Mehr Ali. Mughal soldiers now began to desert him and he might have been compelled before long to surrender the fort when luckily Mehr Ali was shot down. His followers now sought safety in flight. Muzaffar Husain Mirza fled to Khandesh. Wazir Khan was succeeded by Shihab-ud-Din Ahmad. He built some eighty forts for keeping order in the country side. He raised a force from among the turbulent section of the community and entrusted to them the task of keeping law and order in the country. Meanwhile Muzaffar Khan who had left the imperial service some time earlier, raised his head in Gujarat. Akbar does not seem to have approved of the policy of granting jagirs to the local levies in Gujarat. He recalled Shihab-ud-Din, and sent Itimad Khan as Governor of Gujarat in 1583. In his old age, the king-maker seems to have lost a good deal of his self-confidence and it was very reluctantly that he accepted the office.

Akbar seems to have made a complete change in the government of the province at this time. Nizam-ud-Din

was appointed *bakhshi*, Abu Turab Wali, *amin*, and Khwaja Abul Qasim became *duwan*. A large number of new jagirdars were granted Jagirs in Gujarat in place of Shihab-ud-Din Ahmad, his retinue and the recent local grantees. Akbar seems to have decided upon the conquest of the rest of Gujarat.

### § 7. Rising under Muzaffar.

Shihab-ud-Din Ahmad whom Itimad Khan replaced worked to secure his downfall. Wali tells us that Shihab-ud-Din suggested to Muzaffar that the time was now opportune for reasserting his authority in Gujarat. Some of Shihab-ud-Din's officers even sent money to Muzaffar in order to cheer him up, suggesting that he should fall upon Itimad Khan when he has about to enter Ahmedabad. On September 9, 1583, Itimad Khan entered Ahmedabad. Some 800 Mughal soldiers deserted Shihab-ud-Din and demanded employment under Itimad Khan. They could not agree to the terms and these mercenaries left the city and took service under Muzaffar. Grown bolder by this accession of strength, Muzaffar now attacked Ahmedabad. He had some 7,000 soldiers, Mughal and Kathis. Itimad Khan found himself confronted with a serious situation at the very beginning of his government. Unfortunately all the contingents that had been appointed for service in Gujarat under him had not yet arrived, and he does not seem to have more than 3000 soldiers under him. He tried to persuade Shihab-ud-Din Ahmad who was encamping at Kari to come back and help him in repelling the attack. Shihab-ud-Din tried to drive a very hard bargain. Precious time was lost in negotiations, but at last Itimad Khan agreed to all his demands.

Meanwhile Muzaffar defeated the Mughals under Sher Khan and finding Itimad Khan absent from Ahmedabad occupied that city on September 24. The Mughals

now attacked Ahmedabad. Shihab ud-Din had gambled on his being able to win back to his allegiance the 800 Mughal deserters. They refused, however, to leave Muzaffar's side, who routed the combined Mughal armies outside Ahmedabad. Wali and Nizam-ud-din who were both present give us a vivid picture of the demoralisation in the Mughal camp. Itimad Khan and Shihab-ud-Din now sought safety at Pattan.

Other Mughal commanders seemed to do better. Cambay was recaptured by Sayyid Daulat. Nizam-ud-Din defeated Sher Khan Foladi at Jutana and Masana. Qutb-ud-Din tried to prevent Muzaffar from capturing Baroda. His advance guard sent to intercept Muzaffar at Junagarh was defeated and Qutb-ud-Din had to shut himself up in the fort of Baroda. Muzaffar invested it with 20,000 soldiers. Treachery was rife in the Mughal ranks. Qutb-ud-Din was persuaded to open negotiations with Muzaffar. During the suspension of hostilities thus caused Muzaffar attacked the fort and at last captured it. He promised Qutb-ud-Din his life but sullied his victory by murdering him.

After spending two days at Baroda Muzaffar advanced to Breach and took it. An immense amount of booty fell into his hands and enabled him to recruit a large number of soldiers. His army now rose to 30,000. Akbar had meanwhile been informed of what had happened in Gujarat. He poured reinforcements into that province from Ajmer and Malwa. Muzaffar now learnt that Abdur Rahim had been sent to Gujarat with Mughal reinforcements and so he decided to hasten to Ahmedabad arriving there on January 19, 1534. On January 25 an engagement followed near Shah Bhikan's tomb at Serkhej, three Kos from Ahmedabad, in which Muzaffar was defeated even though his forces outnumbered the Mughals three to

one The Mughal victory was partly due to their superiority in elephants and partly to Abdur Rahim's better tactics Muzaffar now ran away to Cambay. The Malwa contingent under Sharif Khan, Qulich Khan and Naurang Khan had reached Baroda on January, 27 When it learnt of the royal victory at Ahmedabad, its leaders decided to make a halt there Broach was then besieged After about a fortnight of unsuccessful operations the Mughal army left Broach At Baricha, seven Kos from Ahmedabad, they met the reinforcements which Abdur Rahim had sent from Pattan and together they now attacked Cambay Muzaffar fled to Rajpipla, where he was pursued and defeated He took refuge at Khari under Luna Kathi The entire Mughal army now pursued Muzaffar, who was compelled to give battle in the mountains of Jampa After a hard fought battle, Muzaffar was defeated and sought refuge among the Kathis

He found himself insecure among the Kathis and went to Sorath When Abdur Rahim, leading a large force threatened Sorath, its ruler disowned Muzaffar who was defeated at Uthniya The Jam now made his submission to the Mughals and surrendered the Mughal elephants he had captured during the earlier stages of the campaign Muzaffar then went back to Kathiawar among the Kathis Broach was taken after a siege lasting over seven months and then also on account of the dissensions among the ranks of the besieged

Abdur Rahim thus succeeded in recovering Gujarat He returned to the imperial capital for a short time Muzaffar tried to take advantage of his absence An alliance between the Rao of Cutch, the Jam and Muzaffar seemed imminent. The Mughal officers took prompt action and succeeded in isolating Muzaffar who fled to Kathiawar He bided his time there and then made

towards Dholka. The Mughals anticipated his movements and Muzaffar now fled towards Morvi and besieged Akhar. The beating of battle drums by a small Mughal detachment created panic in his camps and he again fled to Cutch. The Mughals established a garrison at Jhajuasa in Cutch and returned.

This was rather unwise. The Cutchis recovered the fort and attacked Radhanpur. Now followed a war of attrition. The enemy plundered and burnt all the villages within twenty Kos of Pattan. The Mughals followed the enemy across the sea into Cutch and 'about three hundred villages in the country of Cutch were ravaged and totally destroyed'. The ruler of Morvi made peace with the Mughals.

In 1587 A. D. Fath Khan rebelled against his father Amir Khan of Sorath. The Mughals invaded Kathiawar again as Muzaffar had made alliance with Fath Khan. The expedition was soon brought to a successful conclusion by Muzaffar's flight.

But consolidating Mughal authority in Gujarat was a difficult task. Under Rawat Chait the Rajputs and the Kolis created disturbance near Himmatnagar and Sarnal. Seven new forts were built in Himmatnagar and the surrounding area and many more round about Sarnal. In March 1599 Khan Azam Aziz Koka was again appointed governor of Gujarat. Muzaffar was still at large in Nawanagar. Khan Azam now asked the Jam to surrender Muzaffar or expel him. Strong in an alliance between Sorath, Nawanagar and Muzaffar, the Jam refused to entertain the Mughal proposal. Meanwhile the rains set in. The two armies were facing each other at Pattri. Five days of incessant rains rendered it untenable. The imperialists now made a dash for Nawanagar. The Jam tried to intercept the Mughal forces and an engagement followed at Dhulabar.



The Jam was defeated; 1500 of his men were killed. The Jam and Muzaffar now turned towards Junagarh. Daulat Khan besieged Junagarh and was soon joined by Aziz Koka. The Mughal captured the fort in August, 1592. Muzaffar was still at large in Sorath, but the Jam had learnt his lesson. When the Mughals again attacked Sorath, he undertook to keep them supplied. Muzaffar now fled to Jagat, Naurang Khan followed him there. Muzaffar proceeded to Satna and was at the point of embarking safely in boats when Naurang Khan appeared on the scene. He hurriedly left for Bhuj. The independent Gujarat chiefs had no intention of inviting trouble on their head by sheltering one who had no claim on their loyalty. Its ruler made over Muzaffar to the Mughals. They were bringing him as a prisoner to Morvi when, on the way, Muzaffar committed suicide at Dhaman on December 24, 1594 and left Gujarat finally without a king of its own.

Muzaffar's son, Bahadur, raised his head in 1594 but was easily defeated by Suraj Singh of Jodhpur, the deputy governor. In 1600 Mirza Aziz Koka became the governor of Gujarat once again and continued in office till Akbar's death in 1605.

### 8. New system of Administration.

After the Mughal conquest, Gujarat was divided into 9 Sarkars under Faujdars. The Sarkars were further subdivided in 138 Parganahs each with a shiqdar in charge. Raja Todar Mal carried out land revenue assessment operations, more with a view to ascertaining its resources than making settlement with the cultivators. Todar Mal's first assessment seems to have been made under peculiarly difficult conditions. Gujarat was then in the grip of an epidemic (plague) in a very severe form. People died in their hundreds and their terror-stricken relations could

not bury or burn them decently. A large number of people left their homes. It was very severe in Pattan, Broach, and Baroda. Driven out from their own homes, the people were prepared to sell themselves into slavery. In about six months the disease spent its force, but was followed by a very severe famine. Corn sold at the rate of Rs 15 a maund. The cattle had no grass to feed upon, leaves were beaten and used as fodder.

Even under these difficult conditions, Todar Mal seems to have reported that the resources of Gujarat were ample enough to turn a part of it into crown land. This was done and an imperial diwan appointed.

In 1580 with the rest of the empire the cultivable land in Gujarat seems to have been measured. In 1583 the measurement was challenged in Ahmedabad and elsewhere and the land measured again. The Nasaq system of land revenue prevailed and therefore annual surveys of the cropped area do not seem to have been made. Here the problem was complicated a little by the existence of a large number of *Watandars* in the enjoyment of rent free lands. Akbar ordered that they be allowed only one quarter of their holdings free but should pay for the rest at the current rates of one half of the produce. The *Muqaddams* were paid five percent of their collections by the State here after 1584, rather than  $2\frac{1}{2}\%$  as elsewhere. The rights of the *Desais* in land were also to some extent recognised.

There were several hereditary chiefs here with whom the provincial government maintained varying relations. Baglana, Sorath, Rajpipla, Nawanagar, Halod, Morvi, Dwarka, Cutch, Salher and Mulher, Vadnagar, Bailpara, Bansbala, Mohan and Ali find mention in the chronicles. Most of these accepted imperial authority in one form or another, varying from the occasional payment of presents

to maintaining contingent of troops for the imperial service.

The total revenue of Gujarat was estimated at Rs. 1,09,20,557 in 1594 in the *Ain-i-Akbari*. Gujarat was probably the richest province of the empire. European travellers in the seventeenth century make Ahmedabad as big as London. The court of the provincial governors is usually admitted to have exceeded those of most contemporary European monarchs in grandeur. Its wealth was not dependent on its revenue from land. The custom dues levied at Surat, Cambay, Ghogar (Bhavnagar), Broach, Manglor, Pattan, Kodinar, Nageshri, Porbandar, Taloja, Khoka (Okha) and Viramgaon, though not all credited to the imperial government, still increased its resources directly or indirectly. Surat, Pattan, and Cambay had their independent customs officers appointed directly by the emperor. To Frederick Caesar the trade of Cambay seemed so immense as to make him assert that no one who had not seen it would believe anything like it possible in the world.

Gujarat was rich in its Muslim shrines and Hindu places of pilgrimages. Akbar added to the former by the beautiful building which he raised over the sacred stone alleged to bear the imprint of the Prophet's foot. Gujarat produced several eminent scholars during this period. Abu Turab Wali who served as an Amin in Gujarat, wrote the *Tarikh-i-Gujarat*, Sikandar whose father had been a confidant of Sayyid Mubarak, served in the Mughal army and wrote *Mirat-i-Sikandari*, Haji Dabir settled in Gujarat to write his *History of Gujarat* in Arabic; Nizam-ud-Din served as a Bakhshi in Gujarat for several years and his *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* gives an account of Akbar's conquest of Gujarat by an eye-witness. Besides these historians, the Jain scholars of the period occupy a very eminent

position. Jin Chandra Suri and Man Sinh Suri have been venerated by the Jains ever since.

Akbar's conquest of Gujarat gave him Ahmedabad the 'most beautiful town in the world' according to the author of the *Haft Iqlm*. It also extended his sway to the coast in the west and provided rich markets for his ever expanding empire. Culturally it enriched him by the contact which he was able to establish with the Jains and Parsis of Gujarat and the Jesuits in the neighbouring territory of Portuguese India. It also established a direct contact with the holy cities of Islam in Arabia.

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## XVII

### A LITTLE KNOWN PERSIAN VERSION OF THE RAMAYAN

About the time when Tulsī Das, the famous author of the *Ramcharitmanas* lay dying, a Persian rendering of Valmiki's *Ramayan* was being composed by Girdhar Das at Delhi. Dedicated to Jahangir, whom the translator praises much, this adaptation of the *Ramayan* has a special interest for students of the *Ramayan* lore, of Persian literature, and of seventeenth century India. Akbar and Todar Mal had, between them, introduced Hindus to the Persian literature, a converted Hindu had helped in the Persian translation of the *Atharvveda*. It was left for Girdhar Das, however, to attempt the difficult task of translating the *Ramayan* into Persian verse and thus set up a landmark in the Hindus' mastery of Persian language and literature. This is the first considerable work to be undertaken by a Hindu in Persian and should therefore possess historical if no other interest. Unfortunately Girdhar Das's work has been the victim of neglect and has been little noticed. Beal's *Dictionary of Oriental Biography* mentions him as the author of the history of Rama translated from Sanskrit in 1/22 A. D. This notice is misleading as well as wrong. As we shall see, it post-dates Girdhar Das by a century; but, more than that, it leaves it to the reader's own imagination to decide into what language Girdhar Das translated the story of Ram. There is a conspiracy of silence about Girdhar Das and his work in most of the Persian accounts of Indian writers of Persian.

Four copies of the MS have so far come to my notice. There is a copy in the India Office Library written in

1723 A.D. The British Museum copy is ascribed to the year 1808 A.D. and is entered as item No. O.R. 1251 by Rieu in his catalogue. There is yet another copy in the Bibliotheque National in Paris numbered 221 in Blocker's Catalogue. This was written in 1719 A.D. The fourth copy was accidentally discovered by me in a heap of old books lying in a corner of the Lal Chaudhary Library, D.A.V. College, Lahore. I picked it up to find the scribe describing it as a translation of Tulsi's *Ramayan*, forgetting for the moment the fact that the scribe had transcribed the work in March, 1836, I was overjoyed at finding that Tulsi Das's famous work had acquired so much reputation in his life-time that a Persian scholar thought it worth while to translate it. A closer examination, however, revealed the fact that it was an adaptation of Valmiki's great work as Girdhar Das himself has declared in the body of the book. The mistake of the scribe, though misleading and irritating, throws a flood of light on the popularity of Tulsi Das's work in Northern India at the time. For our scribe the *Ramayan* conveyed only one meaning, Tulsi Das's immortal work in Hindi. Girdhar Das was a contemporary of Tulsi Das. He does not, however, refer to his work, thus proving that his contemporaries were slow to find the worth of the great poetical genius who has thrown such a halo of grandeur round that age.

Our MS. contains 384 pages. The author tells us at the end that the total number of verses in the book—which he calls *Ram Nama*—is 5900,

شعر دم، پنج الف ابیات ہند  
چوں مرورید نو ستم ہر فرد

The total number of verses in the MS., however, comes up to 5625 only. There are fifteen lines to a page usually. Some space, however, is left here and there,



intended probably for putting in headings and sub-headings of the story in red ink. This was never done. It seems reasonable to suppose that, poet as he was, our author was a bad arithmetician. There is no reason to believe that any of the verses are missing from our copy nor does internal evidence support that hypothesis. The story reads smoothly and does not lend colour to the second alternative that some part of the book may have been left out by the present scribe in copying.

On the question of the date of the composition again there is some difficulty. Girdhar Das—or more probably our scribe—is as careless in his chronology as in his arithmetic. He gives the date of the composition first as 1036 A H in a verse at the end

هرار و سی و شش باد شب ار سال  
شد آخر نامر در فرخنده احوال

But, as if that was not enough, he follows it up by another verse giving the year of the Vikram era

بستوب ار نونا حب گویم  
هزار و شش صد و هشتاد گویم

This would give the year 1680 A V and the Christian year 1623 A D, whereas 1036 A H corresponds to 1626 A D. Thus the two dates clash. Now there is more chance of a scribe's mistake in the first verse than in the second. If the first line of the earlier verse is correctly copied, the second line of the latter verse should read

هرار و شش صد و هشتاد و سه

thus adding سه (three) to the line and spoiling the metre. But if شش صد و هشتاد is correct the first line giving the Hijra year would need only a slight modification. هرار و سی و شش would be replaced by هرار و سی و سه thus requiring the substitution of سه (three) for شش (six)

without greatly disturbing the meter. It is reasonable therefore to prefer the emendation that would not disturb the metre to the one that would upset it. Erbe in his catalogue of the Persian MSS in the India office mentions the year 1033 A H as the year of composition. Whether this is due to his copy being better than ours or to his equating the year of the Vikram era to the Hijra date we cannot say. The British Museum copy of the MS, however, is defective as Rieu gives the year 1036, A H as the date of the composition of the work. He overlooked the fact that the MS gives two dates and without stopping to consider which of the two was correct he hastened to give the more usual Hijra date. Thus Beal was not the only scholar to misdate its composition, though in his case the difference is as much as a century.

Not much is known of this author. On pp. 8 and 9 of our MS he tells us that he belonged to Delhi which, he proclaims, stands unrivalled among the cities of the world.

چنیں ترتیب داد ایں نام رارام  
 رخواندن آن شود بسیار آرام  
 مکانش بود دہلی نادر، شہر  
 باشد مثل آن شہرے دریں دہر

This is all that we know of him or his work. Except that he expected Jahangir to patronise him, he tells us nothing more of his literary accomplishments and personal history.

Our MS of Girdhar Das is very faulty. But the faults of prosody or language that occur seems to go back to the original rather than to mistakes of the scribe. Of course it is but natural that certain mistakes may have crept into the MS. through the carelessness of the scribes, but most of the defects in the work are traceable to the

fact that a Hindu was attempting the rather difficult task of translating Valmiki's work from Sanskrit verse into Persian verse. He is very free in his adaptation of Sanskrit words into Persian, and his attempts at Persianising certain Sanskrit ideas are on the same level. We cannot but praise the writer who attempted this Herculean task, a task which even Akbar with his staff of translators dared not undertake. Girdhar Das has reduced the story of Valmiki told in about 24,000 verses to less than six thousand verses. He has not, however, made any important omissions from the main stream of the story. The reduction has been brought about by leaving out or reducing lengthy descriptions of men and things and omitting some of the extraneous stories introduced into the body of the book. Thus the interesting stories with which Vishvamitra regales Rama while they are journeying through the forest are all omitted. Similarly, dissertations on men and things that fill so many pages of Valmiki, when he is describing Rama's wanderings in the forest, find no place in Girdhar Das's version. He carefully follows Valmiki's version of the story wherever Tulsi Das and Valmiki differ, thus proving that Tulsi Das's differences from Valmiki were deliberate, and not only due to the existing state of the Ramayan story at that time. Girdhar Das has further attempted some daring identifications. When Bharata goes to his grandfather, Girdhar Das makes him go to Multan. Here and there he has modernized the story. Where Valmiki describes Ayudhya and its king in the first canto, Girdhar Das sets out to describe Oudh and passes on to a description of India. Then follow the remarkable lines

دایماں ہند چون لعلماں قاسمی      ہم ار لعلماں ندانش دکنم دانی  
منعم رار دار و جرح پیمانے      ہم چون مشتری روشن آرای

هم املاطون که نالی شده ر بند ارسطو گشت اسدانش ارین پند  
 فنون ارهند پنداشد عیان است  
 که معدن رائے دانش این مکان است  
 از نیجا ترجمه کردند دردد دیوان هم دیگر کشور سپردند

About a score more verses follow, praising the people of India, her products and her beauties. The verses quoted above, if they reflect the contemporary opinion in India, furnish a record of India's place in the Sun as understood in the seventeenth century. Girdhar Das declares with pride:

"The philosophers of India are so many Luqmans, only so much better for their critical faculty. They are great astronomers mapping out the skies. Great scholars like Aristotle and Plato derived their wisdom from India. Science and the Arts were obviously born here. India is the land of wisdom and experience. Her wisdom translated made Greece great and thence it travelled to other countries as well".

Here is a glimpse of contemporary superstitions.

Dasaratha is describing the evil omens that have been assailing him and that helped him in making up his mind to retire from the business of government.

که من هر حال در کردار هر روز  
 همی بستم درین دوران عم اندوز  
 تترارل در رمی آمد بهرگاه  
 که مرقم ماه و خور دیدم درین راه  
 زحل مریخ هم آمد بیک جا که رایده حادثه امروز و فردا  
 ستاره عس هر شب می بر آید که رای آشوب مرقم چند زاید  
 در خیال غیر موسم عیچ و بار بر آوردد ای هم رشت بی شمار

درین شب هاء فافر جام بد خواب  
 چرمی بیدم ندارم زان بحدود تاب  
 کنم چوں غسل مالد خشک سنگم بر آرد مرگ بامن بخت کینم  
 نم بیدم قطب وزیره رانش نور نم بدم کهکشان در لیل و دیحور  
 دگر ار قائم بود بر آید دگر بے فروی سایه من نماید

Here is another set of verses describing the occupations of different castes.

در همن هاء عبادت در ملک خوئی  
 جهانبا نان نم ایشان در رضا خوئی  
 کم چه توی شدو چوں حاس سیاری  
 نکرد بے برگش از زخم کاری  
 کم پشم سود مزرعه یا تجارت  
 دایشان بود از بدو اشارت

Girdhar Das here mentions three castes only and does not refer to the Shudras. 'The vacant annals of the poor', have no attraction for him. But this description provides interesting material for a study of the caste-system. The third traditional caste is here called Sud, a usage confined to the pages of Girdhar Das alone. Further, contrary to modern beliefs, he groups the tillers of the soil along with businessmen in this caste.

I have cited these few passages from Girdhar Das's pages in order to interest the reader in his much neglected work. If this rouses the interest of some reader and leads to a more detailed examination of this *Ram Nama* I shall be satisfied.

## XVIII

### AURANGZIB'S REBELLION AGAINST SHAH JAHAN

There being no *law* of succession among the Mughal emperors or among Muslim rulers either the Mughal period witnessed several princely rebellions and intrigues for succession. Babur's prime minister tried to keep Humayun out, Jahangir rebelled against his father and some of Akbar's 'nobles' intrigued in favour of Khusrau against Jahangir. Jahangir's reign saw Khusrau and Khurram rebel in turn. After his death, the unfortunate Bulaqi was raised to the throne to keep it warm for Shah Jahan who on ascending the throne had him murdered.

But Humayun, Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan had succeeded in occupying the throne. They were the eldest living sons of their predecessors and their success in ascending the throne seemed to establish a presumption in favour of the eldest son succeeding his father. Akbar and Jahangir were able to cope with their rebellious sons successfully and had, before long, become reconciled to them. Both indicated their preference for their eldest sons in several ways and allowed them to play at being heir-presumptives. Humayun and Akbar had no other son living at the time of their death and were thus spared a fratricidal war of succession after their death. Jahangir however left two sons and four grandsons living behind him. Shah Jahan and his supporters made short work of their pretensions and had them murdered, as they had murdered Khusrau, Shah Jahan's most serious rival, in prison during Jahangir's reign.

It was a bloody inheritance on which Shah Jahan entered in 1627. In 1656 he had four sons liv

them governors of several provinces. Like Akbar and Jahangir he had chosen to indicate the eldest son, Dara, as the heir-presumptive but unlike them both he tried to keep him at the capital instead of employing him in administrative or military job elsewhere. But unlike Salim or Khurram, Dara had presented no problem to his royal father. He had never tried to pull down his father from his throne as both Salim and Khurram had done. Unlike Khurram again, he had not murdered a possible rival during the life time of his father. It is not surprising, therefore, that Shah Jahan was not afraid of keeping Dara near him.

But Shah Jahan may have had another good reason for keeping Dara near him. With his advancing year, Shah Jahan may have felt that this was the only way to keep the throne safe for Dara. Shah Jahan himself would have missed his chance to the throne if his father-in-law had not put up a blind in Bulaqi to act as an estoppel. He may have thought fates might not be as kind to Dara.

But those who blame Shah Jahan for keeping Dara at the capital, do not suggest an alternative which would have either made the rebellion of Shuja Aurangzib and Murad against Shah Jahan impossible or avoided the war of succession which began after Aurangzib had made Shah Jahan a prisoner. Shah Jahan was faced with a problem which none of his predecessors had faced. He had four sons long past majority for whom he had to find continuous employment. Unlike Akbar's sons, none of them drank themselves to death. Unlike Jahangir's son, Khusrau, no one disputed the throne unsuccessfully to die in prison. They were all alive and kicking. Shah Jahan answered the question by distributing, towards the end of his reign, the government of the larger part of his empire, among his sons. Aurangzib had the four of the Deccan; Khandesh, Telangana, Bedar

and Ahmednager Murad had Malwa, and Gujarat. Shujah held Bengal. Dara was governor of Punjab and Multan.

Of course it is possible to argue that if Shah Jahan had allowed Dara to remain in his provinces, Dara might have become a better leader of men and a more consummate diplomat <sup>1</sup> He might have thus bettered his chances of survival in the war of succession. But this is something quite different from asserting that Shah Jahan could have avoided the rebellion of his sons by *not* keeping Dara with him.

Shah Jahan became ill on Sept 6, 1657, while in Delhi <sup>2</sup> Delhi was in commotion. The high officers of state only were admitted to the royal bed chamber. But by September 14, he was well enough to show himself at the window of his bed chamber to waiting multitude outside <sup>3</sup> This was followed by a court. Prisoners were set free, Zakat was remitted and Rs 5000/- was given away in charity.

Shah Jahan now remained in his chamber but disposed off urgent and personal matters as they arose. Problems connected with the war in the Deccan were decided here <sup>4</sup> Aurangzib's letter reporting the birth of prince Muhammad Akbar was read here and special robes of honour were ordered to be sent to him <sup>5</sup>

It has been customary to accuse Shah Jahan of having resigned all authority in the hands of Dara or alternatively condemn Dara for usurping all royal power during this period. This accusation has arisen on account of a revised version of what happened during this period which Kambu added possibly after Aurangzib's accession to his account of Shah Jahan's reign. His first version makes no mention of Dara's exercising any authority on behalf of the emperor whereas the second version lays the foundation of the story as it was deve-



developed later on by Aurangzib's historians. It is unfortunate that Sir Jadunath<sup>6</sup> accepted the second version of the story and thus perpetuated the legend. But as the imperial orders issued during the time amply prove, authority was still in Shah Jahan's hands.<sup>7</sup> Of course Aurangzib's letters to Shah Jahan justify his own rebellion by asserting—what Aurangzib had no means of learning—that he was marching north because Dara had usurped all authority in the state.<sup>7</sup> Aurangzib could have offered no other explanation for his rebellious conduct but this is no reason for our believing that what Aurangzib asserted was true.

Tavernier reports a conversation between Dara and Shah Jahan in which the emperor suggested that Dara should seat himself on the throne. Dara naturally refused to follow this advice.<sup>8</sup> It would have been suicidal for him to assume royal authority while Shah Jahan was still alive. It would have been nothing short of rebellion and would have considerably weakened Shah Jahan's chances of helping Dara to succeed him.

Shah Jahan gave public audience on October 15 and 17 and deemed himself well enough to move down to Agra, by river on October 18. Kambū would have us believe in his second account that the move was actuated by Shah Jahan's desire to end his days in peace at Agra<sup>9</sup> within sight of the Taj Mahal, the tomb of his beloved wife. It has yet to be suggested that Shah Jahan intended to abdicate in favour of his son. But even if he did he could not be sure of living in peace after abdication as there was no chance of his other sons accepting his abdication in favour of Dara. If anything such a move would have destroyed whatever chances Dara might have had of succeeding Shah Jahan. As Shah Jahan wrote to Aurangzib, the move was intended to restore order in the empire.<sup>10</sup>

Shah Jahan made several appointments before leaving Delhi and distributed a large number of presents. He travelled by slow stages reaching Ghat Sami, six miles from Agra on November 5. He did not, however, enter the city till November 20. The delay was partly caused by astrologers' search for an auspicious day for the imperial entry into the capital. On December 5 a great public court was held in the fort when a large amount was given in charity as a thanksgiving offering for Shah Jahan's complete recovery. Presents were given to several officials including Dara. Agra celebrated the emperor's recovery with great rejoicing.<sup>11</sup>

But elsewhere Shah Jahan's illness in his advanced age opened the flood gates to rebellion. Aurangzib, Murad and Shuja all found in it an excuse—if one was needed—for treading the path of rebellion against Shah Jahan so that one of them may wrest the reins of government from his hands and hold on to them against other contestants. The struggle that followed differs from the earlier princely rebellions in two things, three of the princes simultaneously rebelled against their father and unlike all other Mughal princes in earlier rebellions, one of them was able to dethrone his father and keep him a prisoner for seven long years till his death. No princely rebellion had been successful so far. Mughal princes had rebelled against their fathers no doubt, but none had been able to lay his hands on the person of his father and make him a prisoner. This culminating honour in princely rebellions seems to have been reserved for Aurangzib alone.<sup>1</sup>

It has been customary to look upon this struggle as a war of succession between four brothers. This it certainly was not in its origins, though it suited the purpose of the three princes to proclaim that each one of them believed Shah Jahan to be dead. After Shah Jahan had

been imprisoned and Aurangzib had gone through the brief ceremony of coronation, Dara and Shuja became rebel princes to Aurangzib. Of the two Dara, while Shah Jahan was alive, would not have dreamt of claiming the throne himself. Even Aurangzib could not persuade the chief Qazi to crown him while Shah Jahan was alive.<sup>12</sup> So Dara tried to find a haven of refuge somewhere in India or outside.<sup>13</sup> With Murad in prison at Gwalior, Shuja was the only claimant to the throne.

It is rather amusing to find Aurangzib appearing to be acting in opposition to Dara alone and seeking his brothers' cooperation therein.<sup>14</sup> He was able to deceive Murad thoroughly. Opinion has been divided on what exactly was the carrot that he dangled before this imperial ass. The evidence from Aurangzib's<sup>15</sup> side gives one version non-official historians supply another,<sup>16</sup> none of them flattering to Murad's intelligence. Aurangzib in a letter to Murad is said to have proposed a division of the empire between the two, Murad taking the Punjab, Kabul, Kashmir and Sind. Abul Fazl, Bhimsen, Ishardas, Tavernier, Lal and Manucci are all agreed that Aurangzib offered much more attractive terms to Murad. Abul Fazl Mumari has it that Aurangzib told Murad that he did not covet the throne for himself, but was only interested in keeping Dara out. He promised Murad, who had already crowned himself,<sup>17</sup> that after helping Murad in defeating Dara and Shuja, he would retire to Mecca leaving Murad to the enjoyment of the crown and the empire. It has been suggested that Murad would have seen through Aurangzib's deceit if Aurangzib had promised to efface himself to this extent.<sup>18</sup> But the critics forget that Aurangzib was out to deceive Murad in any case and that Murad had already crowned himself whereas Aurangzib had not. Any offer from Aurangzib had to start by accepting Murad's coro-

nation Foolish though he was, even Murad would have been offended if Aurangzib had offered him Dara's inheritance only adding, as Aurangzib's version of the negotiations does, that as soon as Dara was defeated Aurangzib would allow Murad leave to enter upon his inheritance One does not, if one is intelligent—as Aurangzib certainly was—deal in this way with crowned kings. Aurangzib had nothing to loose by making any tall promises to Murad, the taller the better as it would take in Murad more completely. Aurangzib did not intend to keep his promise even though his letter to Murad said that he took God and the prophet as witness. The alleged agreement between the two brothers finds no place in the official history of the first ten years of Aurangzib's reign The entire tenor of the letter is so very condescending that it could have only exasperated Murad rather than make him join Aurangzib.

As against this the agreement given in *Lubb-ut-Tawarikh* and supported by other non-official historians strikes just the note which would have made a prince, who had already crowned himself and issued coins in his own name, to accept the offer of help which Aurangzib makes in that letter Aurangzib had to pretend taking Murad's coronation seriously. His entire attitude thereafter is governed by the assumption that he is dealing with a crowned king. He congratulates Murad for his kingdom when the two meet at Dipalpur<sup>19</sup> After the battle of Dharmat, Aurangzib congratulates Murad as one does a sovereign<sup>20</sup> When the battle of Samugarh is happily over Aurangzib congratulates Murad on the commencement of his reign.<sup>21</sup> He asks all the commanders to go and wait upon Murad as upon their king<sup>22</sup> When Aurangzib is about to set out from Agra in pursuit of Dara he waits upon Murad and asks his permission to do so.<sup>23</sup> As Manucci has it, during all this time, Aurangzib

showed the greatest respect to Murad in public and in private and referred to him and spoke to him as to a king and sovereign <sup>24</sup>

Though Aurangzib was pretending to act against Dara alone, his rebellion came as a culmination of a series of defiant acts against Shah Jahan. He had been disobeying and defying Shah Jahan for long in the South. While he was on his way to assume his viceroyalty of the Deccan Aurangzib displeased Shah Jahan by his conferencing with Shuja at Agra and with Murad at Doraha. While Shah Jahan was ordering him to assume charge of his province by promptly going to Daulatabad, Aurangzib spent nine months at Burhanpur <sup>25</sup>

When in the south, he added one act of disobedience to another. When Shah Jahan ordered that Aurangzib close the huge gap between income and expenditure in the Deccan, Aurangzib saucily suggested that his staff and his armies be paid from the revenues of other provinces <sup>26</sup>. When some officials complained to Shah Jahan against Aurangzib's high handedness, Shah Jahan was moved to admonish Aurangzib dubbing his conduct unworthy of a Musalman <sup>27</sup>. Shah Jahan would not accept some of Aurangzib's recommendation for appointments under him <sup>28</sup>. Aurangzib employed all the skilled weavers at Burhanpur in his own workshop. This led to Shah Jahan's angrily ordering that all other weaving factories at Burhanpur except the royal factory be closed. <sup>29</sup> When Shah Jahan ordered Aurangzib to secure some elephants from Qutb-ul Mulk in lieu of his tribute, Aurangzib procured <sup>30</sup> the elephants but long delayed sending them to court. <sup>31</sup> Shah Jahan got offended at Aurangzib's alleged failure to write in his own hand to the emperor <sup>32</sup>. But his final act of defiance made Shah Jahan suspect his good intentions. In order to strengthen himself for the inevitable contest for the throne he cleverly got Shah Jahan

agree to Aurangzib's making war upon Bijapur and Golkonda but in specified circumstances. When he had thus slyly procured additional military and financial resources, he started disregarding all the imperial instructions in order, so Shah Jahan began to suspect, to aggrandize himself. Shah Jahan had asked Aurangzib to demand, in the emperor's name the release of Mir Jumla's family from the king of Golkonda and if he disregarded the demand, then alone to invade Golkonda. Aurangzib invaded Golkonda without giving Qutb Shah the chance of accepting Shah Jahan's ultimatum. When Qutb Shah agreed to release Mir Jumla's family, Aurangzib, in defiance of Shah Jahan's instructions, did not cease hostilities. Peace was made only when Qutb Shah had at last succeeded in establishing direct contact with Shah Jahan. Aurangzib crowned this act of disobedience by forcing a treaty upon Qutb Shah which made a grandson of Aurangzib born of Qutb Shah's daughter heir to Golkonda to the exclusion of every other claimant. No wonder Shah Jahan became suspicious and refused to ratify this treaty<sup>33</sup>. When ordered to send the rich prize of war with Golkonda, Aurangzib with his tongue in his cheek, flatly denied that any booty had fallen into his hands<sup>34</sup>.

The same story repeats itself in Bijapur with a little variation, partially due to the fact that anti-Deccanese Mir Jumla had by now become the prime minister of Shah Jahan. On the death of Muhammad Adil Shah of Bijapur in 1656 Aurangzib played upon Shah Jahan's greed and anti Shia sentiments to wring from him an order sanctioning invasion of Bijapur without any cause whatever. Imperial contingents were sent under Mahabat Khan and Chhatarsal to reinforce Mughal military resources in the Deccan. With their help Bijapur was invaded, Aurangzib however was told that should the king seek for peace

hostilities should cease at the cost of annexing a part of Bijapur and exacting an indemnity. Aurangzib in his letter to Mir Jumla quotes Shah Jahan as authorizing him to conquer Bijapur, if he could, otherwise be content with annexing a part and exacting an indemnity<sup>34</sup>. It is more reasonable to suppose that Shah Jahan put the second alternative first.

Bidar fell to Aurangzib in March 1657 and Kalian on August 1, 1657. When Bijapur was facing extinction, it seems to have dawned upon Ali-Adal Shah II, that he may yet save himself, as Golkonda had done by direct negotiations with Shah Jahan. An envoy was sent to the imperial court who seems to have succeeded in persuading the emperor that Bijapur had given him no cause for offence and therefore his war there was not justified. Shah Jahan seems to have been taken aback by what the envoys represented to him and immediately sent orders to Aurangzib to cease hostilities. As was but natural, this order was accompanied by another order to imperial commanders to return in all haste with all the Mughal reinforcements sent south for the prosecution of the war. Shah Jahan seems to have been so upset by all this that he tentatively offered the government of the Deccan to Shah Shuja<sup>35</sup>. Shah Jahan seems to have rightly suspected Aurangzib of intriguing in the south for an increase in his resources in order to follow the usual path of a Mughal prince in rebellion against his father. It is wrong to think of Shah Jahan being pre-occupied in his design for securing for Dara the throne of Delhi after his own death. The contingency of a civil war was remote and would not affect Shah Jahan very much. But a princely rebellion was one thing which his predecessors had to face in their own life time. It was a prince toying with the idea of rebellion whom Shah

Jahan sought to curb; it was a defiant governor that the emperor sought to bring to the right path.

When the news of Shah Jahan's illness came, Aurangzib decided to play for the high stakes of the Mughal throne. He had long been preparing himself for this day. His objective was to become the emperor of India and he decided to allow nothing to stand in his way. It would have complicated matters and detained him in Gujarat if he had declared war on Murad. So he duped the unlucky prince just as Bulaqi had been duped in the interest of Shah Jahan. Earlier rebel Mughal princes before him had never succeeded in their designs; Aurangzib therefore decided on more comprehensive plans.

The success of a rebellion depends very much on the resources of the rebel. Aurangzib, therefore, decided to cast his net wide for allies. He was sure to find them among dissatisfied ruling princes and disgruntled Mughal public servants and army leaders<sup>36</sup>. Fortunately for him, Dara had been so long at court that every grievance could be easily laid at his door and help sought against him. Aurangzib wrote to Maharana Raj Singh of Mewar tempting him with the promise of returning the districts of Pur and Mandal Garh which the Rana had lost to Shah Jahan.<sup>37</sup> He tried to entice the rajas of Devgarh and Chanda to his side so that they should not obstruct his path to Agra<sup>38</sup>. He wrote to several nobles at Court. Mir Jumla was in the south about this time but under an order of return to the court. Aurangzib tried to dissuade him from obeying the royal summons and on his refusal arrested him. Bernier and Manucci suggest that he was arrested at his own suggestion. Had this been the case, Aurangzib would not have tried to offer excuses to Mir Jumla for his arrest later on when he had no need to dissemble<sup>39</sup>.



Aurangzib now decided to advance upon the capital. He left Daulatabad on February 5 and reached Burhanpur on February 18. Here he received a letter from Shah Jahan reprimanding him for his leaving the Deccan and marching north. With his tongue in his cheek, Aurangzib assured Shah Jahan that he was only trying to serve Shah Jahan and restore order in the kingdom disturbed by Dara's actions.<sup>40</sup>

It has been customary to see in Aurangzib a standard bearer of Islam against Dara whom Aurangzib accuses of being a heretic. But this did not mean that Aurangzib was setting himself up as the guardian of Islam in the sense in which he unfolded himself in the later part of his reign.<sup>41</sup> He could not afford to be anti-Hindu at this time. He needed all the help that he could get; Hindu rajahs wielded a lot of power in India at this time<sup>42</sup> and Aurangzib could not neglect this source of strengthening himself. He might have hoped to secure some Muslim commanders to his side by representing Dara as a heretic. His standing as a rebel prince is well brought out by the refusal of a Muslim mulla Hazrat Haji at Burhanpur to wish him well. Try as Aurangzib would, all that he could get from the saint was that Islam should succeed.<sup>43</sup>

Aurangzib and Murad met the royal army sent to dissuade them from proceeding any further at Dharmat. Shah Jahan had accused Aurangzib of rebellious intentions but his orders to Jaswant Singh laid emphasis on Jaswant's securing Aurangzib's and Murad's retirement peacefully.<sup>44</sup> Much time was wasted by the royal commanders in parleys with the rebellious princes. This put life into the rebel army and to some extent demoralized the royal troops. The battle that followed was like so many other battles that had been fought between rebel princes and their fathers. Those in the royal army were torn between their loyalty to the king *de jure* and the suspicion that the

rebel princes may after all succeed in making good their claim to government. If his sons would not be loyal to the emperor, why should his public servants imperil their lives in his cause? But it was Shah Jahan the imperial commanders were seeking to serve not Dara. Aurangzib's success in the battlefield made it possible for him to march to Agra and threaten his father.

The battle of Samugarh on May 29, 1658 was waged by Dara on behalf of Shah Jahan. Much ingenuity has been wasted on what would have happened had Shah Jahan marched against Aurangzib in person.<sup>45</sup> But Shah Jahan was restrained from marching at the head of his armies by the usual Mughal tradition of the emperor's not facing his rebel princes in person.

Samugarh apparently left the coalition of Aurangzib and Murad victorious. But Aurangzib had never intended to allow Murad any share in the government of the country. The luckless prince was invited to meet Aurangzib in his tent and there imprisoned. He was later on sent to prison in Gwalior. Then on December 4, 1661 he was surprised to learn that an old incident of his *Governorship of Gujarat-his execution of Ali Naqi* in 1657 had been revived. He was sentenced to be executed<sup>46</sup> Thus did Aurangzib keep his word to God and the Prophet!

After disposing off Murad's pretensions, Aurangzib marched on Agra. Here helpless Shah Jehan tried to play at still being the emperor. When this failed he tried to act the part of an affectionate father.<sup>47</sup> Aurangzib matched Shah Jahan in his duplicity. He posed as both a loyal subject and a dutiful son.<sup>48</sup> Much ink has been wasted in determining who was trying to deceive the other and to what extent.<sup>49</sup> Neither of them was sincere in his protestation. Both were trying to gain time in one

way or another. Shah Jahan's cause was however lost forever. Aurangzib could not even pretend to be moved by Shah Jahan's offer of letting Aurangzib run the empire in Shah Jahan's name. He aimed at both the form and substance of power and could not be content with one of them only. So Shah Jahan had to accept Aurangzib's assumption of imperial power on twenty first of July, 1658 and be content with being spared his life. He passed his days as Aurangzib's prisoner from the eighth of June, 1658 to die in 1665. Shah Jahan had thus the unique distinction of bowing to a rebel son and pass his days as his son's subject and prisoner. Aurangzib thus began what became so common in the eighteenth century India—the sight of a former Mughal emperor spending his last days in prison. He spared his father the final humiliation of being executed which many Mughal 'emperors' suffered in the eighteenth century in the 'interests' of their successors.

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## عمل صالح

- 264 هفتم ذی حجه سنه ۱۰۶۷  
ضعف رو بکمی نهاده طبعیت مکرر اجابت نمود درین مدت اگرچه شاه بلند اقبال محمدمدارا شکوه و بعضی از خامان و مقربان حضرت خلافت در آسایش گاه مقدس بار یافتند از مشاهده طلعت خجسته کسب ماده آرامش خاطر و تسلی می نمودند
- 265 یازدهم ذی حجه بهیرو که دیوان خوابگاه معلی تشریف آورده
- 265 دین و لا خیر تولد فرزند سعادتمند شب یازدهم ذی حجه سنه ۱۰۶۷ از نظر فیض اثرگزشت
- 266 هفتم و نوزدهم محرم بهیرو که درشن در آمده
- 266 بهیست تخفیف کوفت و تعبیر مکان حرکت برتوقف اولی دانستم بیستم محرم روی توجه بصوب اکثر آباد آورده
- 268 طبعیت اجابت نموده روز بروز اثر صحت رو باندایش نهاد
- 268 مزاج و باج بمرکز اعتال و حالت اصلی باز آمد
- 269 (فوزدهم محرم) بعد از نه روز .....  
رای علم آرا بر آن قرار کوفت که مجلس ترقیب دهد .....  
..... جشن قمری انتهای سال 68 روز دوشنبه
- 24 ربیع الاول در دولت خانه پذیرفته

## Notes XVIII

1. Cf. Dara's relations with nobles in *Anecdotes*, 34, 35
2. Salih, III, 264
3. Kambu, III, 265.
4. Kambu, III, 265.
5. Kambu, III, 265.
6. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, I, 281.
6. Tavernier, 327.
7. Kambu, III, 264, 272
8. *Ruqaat*, I, 197 to 199, 211.
9. Kambu, III, 277, cf. *Aurangzib*, I, 278, 279, *CHI*, IV, 211.
10. *Ruqaat*, I, 298
11. Kambu, III, 266 to 271.
12. Tavernier, 355
13. *Ruqaat Shah Abbas Sans*, (7 to 10)
14. *Letters*.  
*Ruqaat*, I, 352
- (i) Aurangzib to Murad (*Ruqaat*, I, 367), Murad to Aurangzib  
(Ibid, I, 359),
- (ii) Agents exchanged, *Ibid* I, 352, 364-65
- (iii) Promise of help to one another, *Ruqaat*, I, 351-52, 256-57.
- (iv) Suggested reply to Dara, *Ibid* I, 256-257, 354.
15. Aqil Khan Razi, 25  
*Adab-i-Alamgiri* in *Ruqaat* I, 265-66
16. *Adab-i-Alamgiri* in *Ruqaat*, I, 265-69  
*Muntkhab ul-Lubab*, II, 9. *Nushka : Dilkusha* 18;  
*Fatihat i-Alamgiri*, 17-A, Tavernier; 330-31
17. *Chhatar Prakash*, 45, *Storia*, II, 248
18. Sarkar, II, 428.
19. Ishar Das, 17 b and 18 a, *Storia*, II, 253.
20. Ishar Das, 21 b.
21. Ishar Das, 26 a, cf. *CHI*, IV, 214
22. Khafi Khan, 19.
23. Ishar Das, 30 a.
24. *Storia*, 253.
25. *Adab-i-Alamgiri* in *Ruqaat*, I pages 80, 84, 85, 86 to 102.
26. *Ruqaat*, I, pages 121, 122
27. *Adab* in *Ruqaat*, I, pages 111, 114.
28. *Adab* in *Ruqaat*, I, 115.

29. *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 176 b.
30. *Ruqaat*, I, 160
31. *Ibid*, 166
32. *Ruqaat*, I, 171.
33. Cf. Kambu, III, 281, 282.
34. Kambu, III, 281.
35. *Ruqaat*, 317
36. Kambu, III, 271
37. *Ruqaat*, I, 339-40.
38. Cf. *Anecdotes*, Also *Dara Shakoh* by Qanungo, I, and *Aurangzib* by Sarkar, I and II
39. *Vir Vinod*, II, 419 to 424 *Amal-i-Salih*, Bernier, 31, ff. *Storia*, II, 249 *Adab-i-Ruq*, 428-29.
40. *Ruqaat* I, 197-198.
41. *Ruqaat*, Cf. However *Aurangzib*, I and Ch I, 211.
42. *Ruqaat*
43. Cf. *Religious Policy of Mughal Emperors*. Aurangzib's letter to Rana Raj Singh of Udaipur preserved in the Udaipur Archives and reproduced in *Vir Vinod*, II, 419 to 421 assures Raj Singh that Aurangzib, when he became emperor, would govern as his forefathers had done before him so as to secure equal protection for all his subjects.
44. Cf *Ibid*, 129, 130, Hindu contingents in Aurangzib's ranks include those from Udaipur, Toda, Deogarh, Chanda, Gohad and Bikaner.
45. *Tarikh-i-Kashmir*, Azami, 159.
46. *Alamgir Nama*, 58, 64, 65, cf. CHI IV, 212.
47. Aurangzib's historians assert that Shah Jahan advised Dara not to fight and even moved his own advance camp between the two armies in order to avert war. *Alamgir Nama*, 84 to 87. Aurangzib's letters to Shah Jahan reproduced by Aqil Khan advise Shah Jahan against moving in person against Aurangzib.
48. Khafi Khan, 156.
49. Cf. Aqil Khan Razi, *Salih* 303, 303, 308, 309, 305 to 315, 317; *Fayyaz-ul-Qawanin in Ruqaat*.
50. Cf *Salih*, 304, 305, 311, 305 to 315, 317, Aqil Khan Razi, *Alamgir-Nama in Ruqaat*
51. Cf *Aurangzib*, Shibli and *Aurangzib* by Faruqi.

## XIX

### THE FOUNDER OF BANERA RAJ

Maharana Raj Singh of Mewar (1652 to 1680 A D) had eight sons. The first two, Sultan Singh and Sardar Singh, predeceased their father.<sup>1</sup> Jai Singh, the third son, succeeded Rana Raj Singh at his death in 1680. The fourth son, the subject of this note, was Bhim Singh who first gained fame in the Rajput struggle against Aurangzib and, after the conclusion of the peace, rose to eminence under Aurangzib in the Deccan.

It is claimed by his descendents of the Banera Raj (in Mewar) that Bhim Singh and Jai Singh were born on the same day of different mothers and that Bhim Singh was born earlier. This was accepted by Tod<sup>2</sup> and later on by Kaviraj Shyamal Dass in his *Vir Vinod*<sup>3</sup>. A chronicle of Mewar written probably in the first half of the eighteenth century supports this tradition.<sup>4</sup> But the evidence on the other side is overwhelming. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* calls him a younger son when speaking of his expedition to Gujarat in 1680<sup>5</sup>. Earlier we find from the *Ma'athir-i-Alamgiri*, that in March 1679, the Maharana sent his son Jai Singh as his representative to pay his respects to the emperor who had moved on to Ajmer immediately after hearing of Jaswant Singh's death.<sup>6</sup> It was customary to send the eldest son as the representative of the Maharana to the court now and then, and the deputation of Jai Singh to the imperial court meant that he was at that time the heir-apparent. Further, the different collections of horoscopes as pointed out by MM. Gori Shankar Ojha all indicate the same conclusion.<sup>7</sup> There does not seem to be any reason to disregard the combined weight of all these facts.

Soon after Bhim Singh's birth Shah-Jahan's armies invaded Mewar. On September 24, 1654, Shah Jahan ordered Sa'd Allah Khan to invade Mewar at the head of an army 30,000 strong<sup>8</sup> and containing many Mughal veterans. He discovered when he reached Pur on the outskirts of Rana Raj Singh's territories on October 23 that the countryside was being vacated and the Rajputs were running for refuge to their mountains. It seems that the Rana with his court remained at Udaipur to conduct the negotiations that followed; though it is probable that the danger of the Mughal depredations might have made the Rana send his Rani and young princes to some place of greater safety. An attack on Mewar so soon after Bhim's birth might have made the superstitious Rajputs view his coming into the world with disfavour but we hear nothing about it, probably because peace was soon concluded, through prince Dara, between the Maharana and the emperor.<sup>9</sup>

Bhim Singh received the usual type of military training that befits a Rajput prince. The death of Sultan Singh and Sardar Singh made him the second living son of the Maharana and as such increased his status at the court. The Rajput annalists and Muslim chroniclers, as well as the original papers of the period, are silent about the early career of Bhima Singh. The first we hear about him is in connection with the Rajput War of Aurangzib's reign.

It is neither the time nor the place to examine the origins of this Rajput-Mughal struggle. It is sufficient for our purpose here to remember that Aurangzib's attitude towards Jodhpur united against him the Sisodias and Rathors in 1679. It is interesting to record, however, that when, after Maharaja Jaswant Singh's death in 1678, Aurangzib visited Ajmer for the first time in February 1679, Maharana Raj Singh sent his eldest son Jai Singh to the emperor's court.<sup>10</sup> He was presented at the court



on March 10, 1679 when Aurangzib was about to leave Ajmer for Delhi. On April 19, Jai Singh was given leave to depart to Mewar. This visit of Jai Singh to the imperial court must have been the result of Aurangzib's attempt at isolating the Rathors. If so, he did not succeed very much therein as the war with Sisodias and Rathors combined in a united front followed soon after. Raj Singh had refused to hand over Jaswant Singh's successor Ajit Singh to the emperor.<sup>11</sup>

When the war began Bhim took a leading part in it. The Maharana retired to his mountains and let the Mughal emperor occupy Udaipur and Chitor.<sup>12</sup> But the Maharana did not sit idle. He sent his sons in command of raiding expeditions to all sides. Bhim was sent to Nadol, where he created a stir by his surprise attacks on the Mughal outposts.<sup>13</sup> Ten thousand bullocks were being brought from Malwa with other supplies when Bhim's flying columns fell upon them, scattered the Mughal convoys, took possession of the supplies and drove away the bullocks.<sup>14</sup>

These successes emboldened Bhim Singh, who now invaded the Mughal province of Gujarat.<sup>15</sup> He penetrated as far as Vad Nagar, Bes Nagar and Sidh Pur<sup>16</sup> and carried away a large amount of booty. He was able to persuade the Raja of Idar to strike at the imperialists in conjunction with his own Rajputs and make himself master of the fort. Idar was thus lost to the empire, through Bhim Singh's exertions, though only temporarily. Its Mughal commander could not withstand the sudden rush of Bhim Singh's forces, the fort was occupied by the Rajputs and a good deal of booty fell into the hands of Bhim Singh.<sup>17</sup> The *Raj Prashasti*<sup>18</sup> relates that he advanced as far as Ahmedabad where also he was able to seize and carry away property worth two lakhs of rupees. This is borne out by the account of Bhim's depredations in *Fatihat-i-*

*Alamgiri*,<sup>19</sup> which places these raids after the imperial occupation of Udaipur and the demolition of temples in Udaipur and Chitor in February-March 1680. He is alleged by the same authority to have demolished one great mosque at Ahmedabad besides 300 small ones in revenge for the demolition of Hindu temples in Mewar.<sup>20</sup> So hard pressed were the Mughals on all sides that, as Isher Dass relates, their communications were entirely cut off and 'a live bird dared not flutter his wing.'<sup>21</sup> This compelled Aurangzib to instruct his son Muhammad A'zam, who had been appointed commander of the expedition in place of Akbar, to conclude peace with the Rana at any cost.<sup>22</sup>

Again Bhim Singh was in command of the Rajput defences at Deosuri<sup>23</sup> when Akbar tried to penetrate from Nadol into Mewar.<sup>24</sup> A junction of the Rathor and Sissodia forces was feared and to prevent that contingency Akbar was sent from Sojhat to occupy Nadol, advance to the pass at Deosuri and occupy it. But Rajput tactics had completely demoralised the Mughal armies. The Mughal commanders, despite repeated orders, were not prepared to enter a narrow pass where the Rajputs swarming from all sides could make short work of their forces.<sup>25</sup> Prince Akbar, a young man of 23, repeatedly complained of the fact that the Mughal commanders 'look as if they have lost all power of movement.'<sup>26</sup> Almost all of them refused to obey Prince Akbar's commands whenever he asked them to occupy a post in the interior, patrol a difficult road, or post a garrison at some strategic point.<sup>27</sup> The difficulties of the Mughals were increased because of the fact that Aurangzib was directing all operations from Ajmer, and it was always possible to trump up excuses for not being able to carry out his orders. He distrusted his officers, none of whom was entrusted with the supreme command. At long last Akbar

was able to persuade the Mughal commanders to agree to an attack on the Deosuri pass.

Akbar, Badshah Quli Khan, Shujaat Khan, Mohtisham Khan, Mohammad Na'im Khan, Muhammad Khan Bakhshi were appointed to co-operate in carrying out the warlike operations in the neighbourhood of Deosuri. Badshah Quli Khan had been asked to cross the pass near the village of Dolai and occupy the village which he succeeded in doing without opposition early next morning. He was told here that the Rathors and the Sasodias lay further on in the pass of Deosuri. Afraid of a surprise attack, he sent an advance guard under Qaraval Khan to reconnoitre the position. He found the Rajputs in battle order some four miles from the village with the mountains as their protection in the rear. He failed to find out the strength of the Rajput army but passed on the information he had gathered to Tahavar Khan. Afraid of the Rajputs, he followed close upon the heels of his own messenger and joined Badshah Quli Khan, who, however, persuaded him to go back, following himself soon after. Engagement followed on September 26, 1680, in which the Rajputs were worsted, not without heavy Mughal losses.<sup>28</sup>

But this forcing the pass of Deosuri proved of no avail to the Mughals. Even its occupation did not enable the Mughals to take the offensive against the Maharana, who soon retaliated by expelling the Mughals from the pass. Akbar fell back upon Nadol.<sup>29</sup> Aurangzib sent repeated orders to Badshah Quli Khan and Akbar to advance to Jhilwara through the Deosuri pass and occupy Kumbhalmer. When he pleaded want of money, the emperor sent him a lakh of rupees. At last Akbar left Nadol for Deosuri on the 18th of November and encamped at Ladlai. Aurangzib now sent Bakhshi Ruh Allah Khan to Akbar in order to compel Badshah Quli Khan to advance through

the pass of Deosuri to Jhilwara and therefrom to Kumbhalmer

On 22 November Akbar at last sent Badshah Quli Khan and Ruh Allah Khan into the pass where a battle was fought on November 24. The Mughal army consisted of 6,000 horsemen and 3,000 musketeers. The matchlockmen ascended the surrounding hills in order to assail the Rajput position more effectively. The Rajput army under Bhim was defeated and the Mughals too sustained some losses. Shujaat Khan brought back the Mughal dead the same day to the Mughal base, while Badshah Quli Khan advanced further and occupied Jhilwara.<sup>30</sup>

This Mughal success proved the beginning of the end. Badshah Quli Khan and Akbar now opened negotiations with the Maharana which ultimately resulted in the rebellion of prince Akbar. Here as well, Bhim Singh played his part. On 31st December, 1680, two days before Akbar proclaimed himself emperor, Bhim Singh was in Akbar's camp<sup>31</sup> with a son of Jai Singh, the new Maharana who had succeeded his father Raj Singh on October 22, 1680. This visit of Bhim Singh put the finishing touches to the Rajput pact with Akbar, who proclaimed himself emperor on January 1, 1681. But this was probably the shortest princely rebellion of the Mughal period though Akbar had so many advantages to begin with. Within a fortnight Aurangzib succeeded in worsting him. We do not know what part Bhim Singh played during this shortlived struggle. When Akbar fled he sought refuge at Maharana Jai Singh's court where he lived for some time.<sup>32</sup> The Mughals however were too near the Rana's territory to render Akbar's position here safe, he sought safety in flight to the Deccan towards the end of April 1681.

But this episode awakened Aurangzib to his danger. He could not afford a war with the Maharana if he was to

deal successfully with the danger presented by Akbar's rebellion. Negotiations were now opened between the Maharana and Aurangzib, and by a royal Farman dated February 23, 1681, Aurangzib promised peace if the Maharans would see prince A'zam<sup>32</sup>. Hostilities between the two parties seem to have ceased after that. In a letter dated March 24 1681, we find A'zam asking the Rana not to give refuge to Akbar who was coming towards Deosuri<sup>33</sup>. On June 14, 1681, the Maharana saw A'zam and peace was concluded. Aurangzib's officers were very anxious about Bhim Singh's submission. But he was not to be found in Jai Singh's retinue, and A'zam had to be content with Jai Singh's assurance that he knew nothing about him as he had quarrelled with him<sup>34</sup>.

But Aurangzib was not prepared to let slip his opportunity. This quarrel between Bhim Singh and Jai Singh enabled him to lure Bhim Singh to his own service.

On 24th July, 1681 Bhim saw Daler Khan, the Mughal commander, who received him graciously and recommended to the emperor that he should be granted a jagir. On 29th July, 1681, Aurangzib accepted this recommendation and conferred the jagir of Bahera on Bhim Singh. On August 2, it was decided to call Bhim to court and Daler Khan was ordered to bring him to court himself. Daler Khan however, excused himself and Bhim was sent to Ajmer with Muzaffar. On 11th August Bhim was admitted to the imperial presence at Ajmer the signal honour of sending the Bakhshi and other high Mansabdars to meet him at the gates of the court being accorded to him. He was created a commander of 4000 horse and 3000 Zat and created a Raja. Of course presents were also showered on him. Further, he was asked to report himself daily in the private audience-chamber of the Emperor, the Ghusal Khana. However, on Friday no audiences were usually given and we find Raja Bhim's

vakil asking for instructions on August 19, as to where his master should report himself on Friday. The Emperor was therefore pleased to order that Bhim should have audience even on Fridays when the Emperor was riding out. On August 16 Raja Bhim requested the Emperor to confer the Parganah of Mangrot as a Watan Jagir on him. He was asked to submit his application through the usual official channels. On the 17th Bhim's son Ajaib Singh and his cousin Fatah Singh had audience and Ajaib Singh was awarded suitable gifts on August 21. Early on August 23, Raja Bhim's mother died and the Emperor ordered an officer of rank to go to his house and get the mourning terminated. This was done and on the 25 August Raja Bhim paid his respects to the Emperor. On the 27th he accompanied the Emperor to Pushkar and presented Rs 2000 as a Nazr probably on account of his having received the patent for his Mansab. His earlier application for Mangrot having been rejected, he now requested for the grant of Mui Maidana. This again was refused as it was Jagat Singh's Jagir. Though a high Mansab was conferred on Raja Bhim, he was still impoverished. On Daler Khan's recommendations, Rs. 20,000 was granted to him on September 15 in order to enable him to tide over his difficulties. He was now left behind at Ajmer to help its viceroy, prince A'zam. Bhim however was not very happy in his new command. He seems to have been kept at Ajmer merely as a watcher and, though the Rathors were still in the field, he was not yet trusted enough to be sent against his whilom allies. While Aurangzeb was proceeding to the Deccan, he received a letter from Bhim which was discussed on October 13 in the court. He wanted to take an active part in the warfare of the times and had requested that he might be allowed to join the Emperor in the Deccan and given some active command there. Orders were issued, therefore, to

a mace-bearer to bring Bhim to court after allowing him to spend a fortnight in his jagir. Bhim's efforts to get a suitable jagir for his maintenance now bore fruit and his vakil attached to the imperial court succeeded at last in getting Khairabad and Mui Maidana in jagir in exchange for Baran. It took, however, more than two months to get the regular Farman, which is dated December 24, 1681. Of course all this took time and we find Bhim still in Rajputana in November. On November 13, Rs 1,000 was granted to him as his travelling allowance to the Deccan. His efforts to get some land as a Watan Jagir (irrevocable grant), meanwhile, bore fruit and on the same day Lolai was given to him in Watan Jagir. He was now allowed three months' respite in his jagir after which he was to leave for the Deccan. An imperial messenger was again told off to see to the execution of the imperial command. But Bhim Singh was not destined to reach the Deccan till August 11, 1686. Whether Bhim did not like to leave Rajputana or Aurangzib thought his presence necessary there and cancelled his earlier instructions, it is difficult to decide. Bhim had audience on August 21, 1686 and was appointed to a suitable post in the army<sup>35</sup>. But he soon incurred imperial displeasure and his rank was reduced by 500. At the siege of Hyderabad, however, he displayed conspicuous valour. This resulted in an increment and he again became a commander of 4 000 horse<sup>36</sup>.

He rendered very useful services against the Marathas and the Shi'a States of the Deccan. In 1691, probably, his services were rewarded by an increment in his Mansab and the grant of a jagir in Malpura in Jaipur. This opened up a very difficult chapter in the relations between the Rajas of Jaipur and Bhim Singh. The Kachhwahas did not like the Sasodias butting in on what they had regarded as their own preserve. Bhim kept his brother

Dal Singh there, and the revenue and civil administration was entrusted to one Dil Ram Brahman.<sup>37</sup> The Kachhwahas complained that neither Bhim nor his brother was keeping the requisite number of soldiers in the jagir. This led to a reduction in Bhim's jagir though not probably in his Mansab. Towards the end of the year 1692 the contested territory was divided between Bhim and Raja Bishan Singh, but this did not ease the situation.<sup>38</sup> Both sides went on making claims and counter-claims and heavily bribed the Mughal officers concerned, especially Bahramand Khan.<sup>39</sup> Bhim, who was serving at that time in the army of Mu'izz-ud-Din, probably had suffered a set-back early in the year 1692. Aurangzib had prohibited the public celebration of Hindu festivals. These orders were enforced strictly even in the camp. Bhim, however along with certain other Hindu Rajas, celebrated the Holi festival. The censor accompanying the expeditionary force tried to stop the celebration, but in vain. He complained to the emperor and on April 1, 1692, the case came up for imperial orders. Of course nothing could be done then, but the emperor gave orders that in future the prohibition should be strictly enforced.<sup>40</sup> Naturally the emperor was displeased with Bhim, and this might have given the Kachhwahas a chance for creating trouble against him. But Bhim was a great warrior. The emperor could not afford to be displeased with him for long; and on May 8 he was appointed to command an expedition on his own.<sup>41</sup> The cause of the Kachhwahas received further help on account of the appointment of Bishan Singh against the Jats. This Kachhwahas-Sasodias struggle continued with varying fortunes for some time, ending in favour of the Kachhwahas by the death of Bhim Singh in 1694.

Bhim died in August 1694 in the Deccan, while serving in Bedar Bakht's army. One of his Ranis, daughter



of Padam Singh, burnt herself to death on her husband's funeral pyre though an attempt was made to dissuade her. Of his sons the eldest at this time was Suraj Mal who, unfortunately, was absent in Rajputana, getting married. He was appointed a commander of 1,000 on the 26th of August, 1694.<sup>42</sup> On Bedar Bakht's recommendation, on September 19, 1694, mansabs were conferred on Bhim's sons. Sujan Singh became a commander of 300, Ajab Singh of 300, whereas Suraj Mali's personal command was raised to 900 horse.<sup>43</sup> Zorawar Singh, another son of Raja Bhim, had audience on April 3, 1703.<sup>44</sup> Bij Singh, another son, was appointed a three-sadi on August 23, 1703.<sup>45</sup>

Raja Bhim Singh was a great warrior. He served Mewar faithfully till the treaty of peace between the Mughals and Mewar. His courage and bravery won for him the signal honour of becoming a commander of 4,000 horse at his entry into the Mughal service, with the title of Raja. He served the Mughals faithfully in the Deccan and, despite his religious prejudices, Aurangzib raised his command to 5,000 horse, so pleased was he with his work. His career in the Deccan goes against the commonly accepted belief that, after the war in Rajputana in 1680, the Rajputs ceased to serve in the Mughal armies. Here was Bhim Singh, their toughest opponent in Rajputana, enlisting himself under the Mughal banner and serving Aurangzib faithfully.

## Notes

1. *Vir Vinod*, D. A. V. College transcript, 437, 434.
2. *Tod*, I 316.
3. *Vir Vinod*, 597.
4. *Udaspur Ki Kheyat* (MS), D. A. V. College transcript, p 12.
5. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* I 204,
6. *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, p. 173.
7. *History of Mewar* (Hindi), vol. II. p. 888
8. *Warris, Padshah Nama* (MS), f. 92a,
9. *Chandar Bhan, Chahar Chaman*, pp 39, 98 to 100 *Jasipur Records* vol I p. 90, 91; *Warris*, ff 90 to 93a.
10. *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*, 172; *Fatuhat-i-Alamgiri*, f 73b *Raj Prashasti*, Canto 22, verses 1 and 2 *Tazikra us-Salat-in-i-Chughta* by Muhammad Hadi (MS) p 130 asserts, however, that Jai Singh was given leave to return to Mewar, only when the Rana had promised help in carrying on the Mughal designs on Marwar.
11. *Raj Vilas*, 189.
12. *Ibid*
13. *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, letters 740, 686, 667.
14. *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, letters 666, 667.
15. *Raj Vilas* p 226 to 231; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, I 294; *Raj Prashasti*, Canto 22, *Fatuhat-i-Alamgiri* (f. 79 b.), *Jasipur Records*, XIII, 72 to 74
16. *Raj Vilas*, 230
17. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, I, 294 *Raj Vilas*, 227 to 229, *Raj Prashasti*, Canto 22, verse 26.
18. Canto 22, verses 28 and 29.
19. *Fatuhat-i-Alamgiri* MS f 79b
20. *Raj Prashasti*, Canto 22 verse 29, *Jasipur Records*, XIII, 72 to 74.
21. *Fatuhat-i-Alamgiri*, p 79b
22. *Jasipur Records*, vol III p 109, 110 Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar has placed Bhim Singh's expeditions to Gujarat in the reign of Maharana Jai Singh. This is obviously wrong. *Raj Vilas*, a contemporary account of Raj Singh's reign can be expected to be right at least as to the reign in which this event took place. *Raj Prashasti*, a contemporary inscription on the columns of the Raj Samud lake as quoted above, bears it out. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* (I 294) also places Bhim's incursion into Gujarat in March/April 1680. Ishar Dass as well, on whom Sir Jadu Nath has relied, gives the same date, though

he says that these incursions took place after Raj Singh's death. It is much more likely that Ishar Dass should be mistaken about the time of Raj Singh's death than about the relation of these incursions of Bhim Singh to the emperor's movements. It is impossible to reject the authority of four independent accounts simply because one account happens to assign two contradictory dates to the same event.

23. *Adab-i-Alamgiri* MS. Letter No. 675.
24. *Ibid*, Letter No. 666.
25. *Ibid*, Letters No. 667, 733.
26. *Ibid*, Letter No. 734.
27. *Ibid*, Letter No. 734.
28. *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, Letter No. 670, *Fatuhāt-i-Alamgiri* MS. f. 77a 77b, 78a and b, 79a.
29. *Adab*, No. 662
30. *Adab*; Nos. 675, 700, 657, 660, of Also the *Tazik-ra-uls-Salatin-i-Chughia* by Muhammad Hadi, pp. 271 to 278.
31. *Adab*, 676.
32. *Khatut-i-Shivaji*, Letter from Akbar to Sambhaji.
33. *Vir Vinod*, 587, 588, 592
34. *Vir Vinod*, 589.
35. *Jaipur Records*, vol. III, 87, *Vir Vinod* 591.
35. This is mostly based on the daily imperial newsletters of Aurangzib's reign. Whenever a date is given the statement is based on the newsletter of the same date.
36. *Zawabat-i Alamgiri* (MS), f. 163 b.
37. *Jaipur Records*, vol. XI, pp. 84 to 87.
38. *Jaipur Records*, vol. VIII, vol. XI 91, 113, 200 pp. 19, 21 and 22, 44 to 49; 94, 95, 107 to 112
39. *Jaipur Records*, vol. XI, p. 200.
40. *Imperial News-Letter*, dated April 1, 1697.
41. *Ibid*; dated May 8, 1692.
42. *Ibid*; dated August 8, 94; The date given in *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* which is equivalent to January 7, 1694 is wrong. The death was reported on 26th August, 1694 it could not have occurred seven months earlier. A letter from Bhim was read in the court on July 17, 1694 (vide Newsletter of that date).
43. *Ibid*, dated 18th September, 1694.
44. *Ibid*, dated April 3, 1703
45. *Ibid*, dated August 23, 1703.

# RULES AND REGULATIONS ABOUT THE IMPOSITION AND COLLECTION OF JIZYA UNDER AURANGZIB

(The Hyderabad Record Office possesses quite a large number of original records of Aurangzib's reign. Among them is the order reproduced below on the imposition and collection of Jizya. I am thankful to the Director of Archives, Hyderabad and his deputy for their kindness in permitting me to study some of the material they have in their possession and for supplying me a copy of this order along with an English translation ).

26th July, 1696

تاریخ ۲۵ ذی حجه سنه ۱۰۴۰ رساله تن بخشی

امران دستور حزیب شرعیہ

شروح دستخط بخشی (الملک انکم

نظر در آمد

گرمتم شود حزیب ار بر دمی حر عاقل بالغ صیغہ معتمل کتابی  
و معنوسی و نت پرست عجمی و صانی لم ار نت پرست عربی  
م موند در و معلوک و مدبر و مکاتب و نابالغ و حائے ماندہ  
دست و پائے نریدہ و رمن و نابینا و مس فانی و معلوج و معذور  
و معتوه برادر است کہ این عوارض حائے ماندگی وعدوہ ماندند آن  
لاحق شود بعد وضع حریر یا قتل آن و وضع کردہ نشود حریر

را در فقره غیر معتمل که قدره ترکسب و عمل نداشته باشد و اگر  
 او خود قدره ترک عمل نماید حکم معتمل دارد -

در هر سال دو آورده درهم شرعی ارفقیو و دست و  
 چهار درهم از متوسط و چهل و هشت درهم از علی ناند  
 گرفت و اگر درهم شرعی میسر نیاید مقدار آن بهره دورن سه ۳  
 تو لچم و یکما شم و سرربع ماش و دستم حصه ماش از فقر و نصف  
 آن از متوسط و نصف متوسط از علی. . . هر سال گرفته شود اگر  
 روپی بماند مقدار دورن مرکور بگیرد - در تفسیر علی و متوسط  
 و فقر اختلاف کثیر است تفسیر معتمد علم اینست که فقر که  
 است که مالک نباشد و صد درهم یا اقل را و متوسط آنست که  
 مالک نباشد ریاضه ارد و صد درهم را قاده هزار درهم و علی که  
 است که در ملک او ریاضه آمده هزار و رستم نباشد -

اگر دمی در اول سال نالغ شود پیش از وضع حریم بر اهل  
 دهم یا بنده آداد گردد یا حربی عقد دهم قبول نماید یا مریض  
 صحیح شود قتل از وضع حریم آن سال موافق حال دور  
 مدام از آنها وضع نموده ناید گرفت و اگر بعد وضع حریم بر اهل  
 دهم دمی صغیر نالغ شود یا بنده آزاد گردد و یا حربی دمی  
 شود یا مریض صحت یابد حریم آن سال از آنها نباید گرفت و  
 اگر دمی فقر در اندامه سن قادر نباشد در پنج شیئ و بعد از آن  
 در آخر سن علی شود گرفت شود از حریم آن سال برابر است که  
 علی شود بعد وضع حریم بر اهل دهم یا قتل آن -

و اگر دمی در بعض سال علی نباشد و در بعض فقر ناید داد  
 کم اگر اکثر سال علی نباشد حریم اعلیاء نگردد و اگر اکثر سال فقر  
 باشد جزیم فقرا ناید گرفت و اگر نصف سال علی و نصف سال  
 فقیر باشد جزیم متوسط دستا نلد -

و اگر دمی مریض باشد نصف سال یا زیاده از آن حزیم آن از و نباید گرفت۔

و حزیم ساقط می شود بموت و اسلام و فرق بیست درین کم مسقط عارض شود در تمام سن یا در بعض آن و اگر دمی بعد از ادای حزیم در اثناء سال اسلام آرد یا بموت شود حزیم آن سال تر و نباید نمود۔

و اگر یک سال تمام یا زیاده از آن بر دمی نگردد و حزیم آن گرفته نشود و سال آخر در آید بر قول امام ابوحنیفه رحمت الله تداخل را اعتبار نموده حزیم سال حال را استاند و حزیم سال سابق را نباید گرفت و بر قول امام ابو یوسف و امام تداخل را منظورند اشته حزیم سال حال و سابق را نباید گرفت۔

حزیم واحد می شود در اول سال و استیفاء آن در آخر حول بطریق تکحیف و تاحیل ناید نمود۔

دمی حزیم را خود گرفته بیاورد و اگر بدست نایب خود بفرستد قبول نکند و دمی در حال ادای قایم باشد و قاصص از آن قاعد وید دمی اسفل باشد وید قاصص نالایه آن و نگوید اعطای تحریر یا دمی و نگوید یا کافر۔

Jizya will be collected from every free, sane, adult, healthy and able-bodied non-muslim subject, the Jew and the Christian, the Zoroastrian and the non-Arab and Sc'ian idol-worshiper, but not from an Arab idol-worshiper, an apostate, a woman, a slave, a renegade, a slave who has been promised freedom on payment of stipulated price, a minor, a bedridden person, a person whose hands and feet have been cut-off, a paralytic, a blind man, a decrepit, a palsied man, an insane person and an idiot.

Whether they have fallen victims to these ailments and others resembling them, on account of which they have been bed ridden, after the imposition of jizya or before, it is immaterial. Jizya will not be imposed on an invalid beggar who is not able to work and earn and if inspite of his ability he avoids work he should be treated as an able-bodied person

Every year twelve Dirhams should be taken from a poor person, twenty four Dirhams from a middle class man and fourty eight Dirhams from a rich person. If the Dirham which is a legal tender, is not available an equivalent of it should be realised in silver, every year, weighing exactly three *tolas*, one *masha* and  $6\frac{3}{4}$  *gunjas* from a poor person, double of it from a middle-class man and double that of a middle class man from a rich person. When paid in rupees the equivalent of this weight should be taken

There is a lot of difference in the interpretation of the terms, a poor person, middle-class man and a rich person. According to the most reliable interpretation a poor person is he who possesses two hundred Dirhams or less than that, a middle-class man is he who has more than two hundred Dirhams but less than ten Thousand and a rich man is he who has more than ten Thousand Dirhams in his possession

During the first year (of the imposition of Jizya on the non-Muslim subjects) if a non-Muslim comes of age or a slave gets free or a soldier marries a non-Muslim or a sick person recovers, before the imposition of Jizya on the non-Muslims, the Jizya of that year should be imposed and realised from every one of these in accordance with his (monetary) condition. And if after the imposition of this tax on the non-Muslims, a non-Muslim minor becomes a major or a slave becomes a free man or a soldier becomes

a non-Muslim or a sick person regains his health, Jizya of that year should not be collected from him. If a poor person does not possess anything in the beginning of the year but becomes rich in the latter part of the year Jizya of that year will be realized from him. Whether he becomes rich after the imposition of this tax on the non-Muslims or before it being one and the same.

If a person has remained partly poor and partly rich during the year and if on investigation he has been found to be rich during the major part of the year, the rich man's Jizya should be realised from him and if he has been found to be poor for the major part of the year, the poor man's tax should be applied to him. But if he was poor for half of the year and wealthy during the other half, he should be charged the middle-class man's tax.

If a non-muslim subject has remained sick for half of the year or more than that, Jizya of that year should not be taken from him.

Jizya lapses on death and on acceptance of Islam. Whether such lapse continues for the whole year or a part of it is immaterial. If a non-muslim subject during the course of the year dies or embraces Islam, after making the payment of Jizya, the tax of that year should not be shown against his name.

If a complete year or more passes and still Jizya is not collected and if the year comes to an end, according to the assertion of Imam-abu-Hanifa, (may the mercy of God be upon him) placing faith in his importunity, Jizya of the current year should be realised and that of the previous year should not be taken but according to the opinion of Imam Muhammad the Jizya of the current as well as the preceding year should be taken without accepting the importunity.



The Jizya becomes due in the beginning of the year and complete payment should be made by instalments and respites till the completion of the year.

The non-Muslim should himself bring the Jizya: if he sends it through his deputy it should not be accepted. At the time of the payment the non-Muslim should keep standing, while the chief should keep sitting, the hand of the non-Muslim should be below and that of the chief above it and he should say, "Make payment of Jizya on non-muslim" and should not say, "Oh infidel".

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## NASAQ AS A SYSTEM OF LAND REVENUE ASSESSMENT IN THE MUGHAL PERIOD.

Messrs. A. Yusaf Ali and Moreland in their joint contribution on Akbar's Land Revenue System to the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, were unable to define Nasdaq though they laid it down that it was a system of land revenue assessment.<sup>1</sup> However Mr. Moreland in his *Agrarian System of Muslim India* described it as group assessment viz. assessment of a lump sum of the village (or occasionally the Pargana) by agreement with the headmen as representing the peasants, the distribution of the assessment over the individual peasants being left in the headman's hands.<sup>2</sup> This interpretation is alleged to be based on a number of passages in the *Am-i-Akbari* and *Akbar Nama*. Let us try to examine them and see whether they support Mr. Moreland's thesis.

1. In the thirteenth year Shahab-ud-Din was entrusted with the management of crownlands and he set aside the annual Zabt and introduced Nasdaq.<sup>3</sup>

This passage simply suggests that zabti and Nasdaq are two different forms of assessment.

2. The *Am* describes the province of Gujarat as 'mostly Nasdaq'.<sup>4</sup>

This again only proves that Nasdaq was a method of assessment. We are also told that measurement was little practised. Naturally Nasdaq would mean a method of assessment wherein measurement and survey were not essential.

3. Khandesh is described as being a province where Nasdaq was practised.<sup>5</sup> No Dasturs have been preserved

for this province. Naturally Nasaq would not require Dasturs (schedules of revenue demand in cash levied on one Bigha of different crops under cultivation) as it did not necessitate survey.

4. In the *Ain-i-Amal*, Nasaq is described as a system of assessment where measurement was not necessary.<sup>6</sup>

5. We are further told in the same regulation that Nasaq was not to be made with headmen but with individual cultivators.<sup>7</sup>

6. It is laid down that the *Nuskha-i-Nasaq*—papers of Nasaq demands—is to be amended in case some damage to crops is reported to the emperor and he orders modifications.<sup>8</sup>

7. *Akbar Nama* further declares that keeping the increasing annual prosperity of the cultivators in view, Nasaq should be established.<sup>9</sup>

8. The Collector should send the demand papers of the part of the village where Zabti was practised after completing the papers laying down the Nasaq demands.<sup>10</sup>

This extract suggests that sometimes in the same village these two systems of assessment prevailed.

All these references bear out Messrs. Moreland and A. Yusaf Ali's main contention that Nasaq was a system of assessment of land revenue. The citation No. 5 above however shows that though Nasaq could be as easily made with the headmen as with individual cultivators, Akbar did not like it to be made with the headmen. The extract No. 6 suggests that the assessment made was subject to decrease on account of damage to crops. The extract No. 8 implies the prevalence of Zabati and Nasaq systems simultaneously in the same village.

Now Mr. Moreland's definition of Nasaq as group assessment goes counter to the extract No. 5 which implies that Nasaq assessment was preferably made with

the individual cultivators. When we find the *Am* suggesting, as it does in the extract No. 8 cited above, that the *Zabt* and *Nasaq* could be practised in the same village, it knocks the bottom out of Mr. Moreland's case. If *Nasaq* was settlement of a lump sum with the village as a whole, there would be no place for *Zabt* in the same village for settling land revenue according to the schedules of demands preserved in the *Am*. The only reason which Moreland suggested for his interpretation was that he knew of no other system of assessment which could be opposed to *Zabt*. Fortunately for us a MS. of a *Dastur-ul-Amal* of Todar Mal preserved in the State Library, Rampur (United Provinces) not only describes the *Nasaq* system of assessment but contrasts it with five other systems in vogue. The six systems described therein are —

1. *Nasaq*, 2. *Zabt*, 3. *Kankut*, 4. *Ghalla Qisami*, 5. *Lola Bandi*, 6. *Deh Bandi*.

The last system of assessment covers what Mr. Moreland described as group assessment. The state settled the land revenue as a whole leaving it to the villagers themselves to apportion it among themselves. Now this is definitely not *Nasaq* which is the first method of assessment described. According to this *Dastur-ul-Amal*, *Nasaq* was a method of assessment when paying heed to the last ten years or twelve years of land revenue demand,  $1/12$  of the total was fixed permanently as the land revenue of the land in question<sup>10</sup> Now this involved no survey of the land, and no keeping of the seasonal records of produce. The demand was fixed irrespective of the area under cultivation and the crops cultivated. A lump sum was agreed upon by way of an average of the last ten or twelve years' demand.

Now this definition is borne out by all the extracts that refer to Akbar's reign. Unlike Mr. Moreland's

definition it does not run counter to any of the suggestions contained in the extracts. As Mr. Moreland's definition was simply based on guess work and does not cover all the known facts as revealed in the contemporary records, this definition of Nasaq, though of a later date, must be accepted as correct

### Notes

1. *J R A. S.*, 1918, pp 8 and the following.
2. *Moreland*, 236
3. *Akbar Nama*, Vol II, 333.
4. *Asn i Akbars*, Vol I, 485.
5. *Asn i-Akbars*, Vol I, 474
6. *Ibid* I 285
7. *Ibid* I, 286
8. *Asn i-Akbars*, I 286
9. *Akbar Nama*, III, 381.
10. *Asn*, I, 287

## DISINTEGRATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi in 1526 and Rana Sanga in 1527. His success against Sanga confirmed him in his right to stay in India. In 1540 Sher Shah defeated Humayun at Chaunsa and thereby asserted the right of Afghans once again to Delhi. Sher Shah's successors continued ruling Delhi till 1555 when Humayun defeated the Surs at Machhiwada and occupied Delhi. Another Sur claimant to the throne of Delhi however advanced upon Delhi from the east to oust Humayun. Before the Mughal and Sur armies could clash in a mortal combat at Delhi Humayun died and Hemu drove out his governor of Delhi in 1556 and occupied the throne himself as Vikramaditya. It was now the turn of Bairam Khan to meet Hemu. The battle of Panipat resulted in the death of Hemu and the triumphant entry of Akbar in Delhi. The Mughals were now back in the saddle.

From 1556 to 1707, Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzib ruled the country for 151 years without interruption. Whereas from 1206 to 1556, nine reigning houses occupied the throne of Delhi during a period of 350 years, the Mughal dynasty sat firmly in the saddle at Delhi for 151 years. The average duration of a reign during the first period was less than ten years, the average for the Mughals was about 38 years. The Sultanate and the Mughal empire during this period thus display a curious contrast.

Aurangzib died in 1707. During the next thirteen years, ten of his descendents claimed the throne of Delhi. In the twenties of the eighteenth century, Hyderabad became independent, Maharashtra's independence was

recognized and the right of the Marathas to levy Chauth and Sardeshmukhi admitted over a wider area. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Mughal empire had passed into the custody of the Marathas who had to defend it against Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1761 at Panipat. The emperors had long been playthings, now of one political faction, now of another. Thus though the Mughal empire came to be formally buried in 1857, it had ceased to be an empire by about 1724. The kingdom of Delhi to which it gave place did not last for more than 30 years during which period it displayed all the characteristics of the Sultanate period, its rulers very often being placed on the throne as if in jest. One is reminded of the Holy Roman Empire with which at least superficially, the Mughal Empire seems to have many things in common.

For all practical purposes the 'Mughal empire' may thus be deemed to have died with Aurangzib in 1707. Its life of a century and a half however gave it prestige enough to make it convenient for various factions to claim to derive their authority from its name. Except the Sikhs in the Punjab and Marathas in Maharashtra, Central and Western India all founders of independent dynasties retained the Mughal titles they had at the time they threw off the Mughal yoke. Their descendents retained these titles as long as they could.

We have thus to explain this apparent contradiction. What gave the Mughal empire its prestige may be studied elsewhere. We would confine ourselves here to studying the causes that led to its disintegration. A state—and therefore its government—derives its strength from four sources, its military resources, its economic strength, the organisation and composition of its administration and the ties that bind its citizens together or to its government. The Mughal government became much stronger than the Sultanate on account of its progress in all

four directions Its armies organized under the command of its mansabdars with graded salaries, recognized commands, a paymaster's department, an intelligence service, all strengthened by the imperial artillery, war boats and elephants, were superior to anything that even the strongest of the Sultans had possessed Its strength was maintained by an effective system of *Dagh* and *Chihra*, the horses were branded, the descriptive roll of the soldiers forming a Mansabdar's command was taken down so that there was no chance of fraud on government. The army was paid well and regularly The strength of the army was institutional, it was strong because it had been organised in a particular way. The emperor rode at the head of his armies, now here and now there and thus kept the loyalty of the rank and file <sup>2</sup>

The financial resources of the Mughal empire were ample enough to keep it going and to lend lustre to the country The total revenue receipts under Aurangzib were estimated at Rs 38,68,16,584 by Sujan Rai in 1668 <sup>3</sup> This may have been the total of the land revenue, sales tax and customs alone. The imposition of the *Jizya* under Aurangzib increased it by 4% at least <sup>4</sup> The presents, forced labour and tribute from feudatory princes must have brought the total to a still higher figure Apparently this was enough to provide for the expenses of administration, personal expenses of the emperors and the public works with which most of the emperors chose to beautify the country Akbar had put the assessment and collection of the land revenue on a satisfactory basis securing that the cultivator paid no more than the dues to which his holding had been assessed. Quite a large number of customary cesses were remitted from time to time leaving the citizens with enough to live in comfort if not in prosperity <sup>5</sup>



The military strength of the empire and its wise disposition secured peace for the country. The new organisation of the public services made both for good government as well as for the unification of the country. The Mansabdars included almost all the public servants.<sup>6</sup> Those serving in civil offices were not always required to maintain a substantial number of soldiers.<sup>7</sup> In their case their rank in the service proclaimed their salary as well as their status among fellow public servants. But on the civil side, the system secured a uniformity of salary for various offices and made public service attractive by offering a wide field of service throughout the empire. Administrative practice was standardized. Promotion for good work seemed to be sure. The field of selection was widened under Akbar to include citizens from all castes and creeds.<sup>8</sup> The organization of provincial administration offered many well paid jobs and posts of great power and responsibility.<sup>9</sup>

But Akbar secured the loyalty of the vast majority of his subjects by giving them an equal status in the country.<sup>9</sup> With the abolition of the Jizya and pilgrimage tax, punitive imposition on the non-Muslims were removed. With their admission into the services on terms of equality, all inequalities among citizens disappeared. Understanding between various sections of the people was promoted by Hindus studying Persian and by Persian translations of Sanskrit works.<sup>10</sup> Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan patronized Persian, Sanskrit and Hindi scholars.<sup>11</sup> They respected Hindu and Muslim saints alike.<sup>12</sup> Following them, Hindu and Muslim princes and public servants encouraged scholarship and promoted literature.<sup>13</sup> Akbar's patronage of other fine arts had its reward; architecture and painting flourished as never before during the last one thousand years.

. For more than a century the Mughal empire gave India peace and offered to citizens of all classes an almost equal opportunity in its service. But Aurangzib went back on many of the principles and practices which had created an identification in the interests of her rulers and her citizens under his predecessors<sup>14</sup>. He destroyed the *raison d'être* of the Mughal government when he once again divided Mughal subjects into two distinct classes: Muslims and non-Muslims, and assigned to the preponderant majority of his non-Muslim subjects an inferior status. They paid additional taxes like *Jizya* and pilgrimage tax. They were no longer enlisted in the Mughal public services on terms of equality, certain appointments were denied to them on religious grounds alone<sup>15</sup>. Their places of worship became targets of his religious frenzy<sup>16</sup>. Muslim officials refused to serve under Hindu superiors<sup>17</sup>. The Qazis assumed airs which they had not been allowed to put on for more than a century. Even for such a profane calling as astrology he would have only Muslims serve him.<sup>18</sup>

This break with the people destroyed whatever claims the empire had on their loyalty. But the Mughal empire might have survived a little longer if he had not played havoc with the organization of its public services. No longer was it an open service providing a highly useful and lucrative career to entrants in it. Promotion had ceased to be open to merit towards the end of Shah Jahan's reign. All the topmost jobs came to be reserved for the royal princes alone.<sup>19</sup> The Mughal public service had no longer the attraction it had earlier. To cap it all Shah Jahan started the custom of assigning several offices to a single person and Aurangzib continued the practice in one form or another.<sup>20</sup> Provincial government ceased to have the meaning Akbar had given to it when the same man held four provinces under him depriving

three other capable persons from heading provincial government. No man could be in more than one place at a time, but the deputies which the principal holder of an office appointed were selected less for their capability for the job and more for their amenability to the principal holder of the office<sup>21</sup>. A capable deputy would be looked upon as a dangerous rival. The number of public officials who were called upon to exercise initiative decreased, those who had large discretionary authority vested in them also dwindled. Aurangzib tried to profit from his career as a public servant and prince, he denied most of his high officials the right to exercise discretion and act on their own<sup>22</sup>. It is amusing to compare his letters of complaint written to Shah Jahan chafing against Shah Jahan's curbing his propensity to exceed his powers<sup>23</sup> with the way he treated his own governors and commanders. Suspicious that all exercise of independent authority in his empire might become a source of danger to him at anytime, he would not let any one act on his own<sup>24</sup>. All authority was overcentralized. No one thus could be blamed if anything went wrong, his commanders and public servants could well plead that they had only obeyed orders<sup>25</sup>.

Bribery and corruption also became more widespread. When public servants found normal promotion closed and exercise of power denied to them, they could, with an easy conscience, turn to the making of money. Despite the very high salaries paid to topmost officeholders they ~~would live beyond their means~~<sup>26</sup>. All would like to ape the emperor and strut about their own stage as little great men<sup>27</sup>.

But Aurangzib was not content with breaking up the fine traditions of the Mughal public service. He sapped its military strength as well. The effectiveness of the Mughal army as a fighting machine had mainly rested

on the enforcement of regulations for branding horses and for taking descriptive rolls. His twenty seven year's stay in the Deccan almost put an end to this system as a normal requirement.<sup>28</sup> Those who were constantly serving in the south would like to get out of such galling requirements. Aurangzib could not but consent to their being partially relieved in this way. In the north his governors neither had the power nor the inclination to make a distinction between public servants serving in the north and the south. A commander may now be in the Deccan and then be sent up. He could not be treated differently in the north and the south. Thus the result was that though on paper the Mughal army looked formidable in its numerical strength, its effective strength was much smaller. What was still worse the individual soldier was not always effectively equipped for battle.

Previously an 'imperial' war had been an occasional 'incident' in some part of the empire and was usually brought to an end sooner or later. But twenty seven long years of war which the emperor spent in the south were unprecedented in the history of Mughal warfare. No normal requirement of war could be insisted on in an army which did not know how long it would be at war. The mansabdars would now be permitted to have their families with them and then again denied normal family life for years.<sup>29</sup> The state did not officially arrange for supplies to them, it did not provide them with transport. The mansabdars, we are told, became dandies rather than officers in a war theatre.<sup>29</sup>

Aurangzib's practice of directing his own armies in every important battlefield, though it proved that he was a successful general, sapped the will to assume responsibility and the habit of command of his military commanders.

It has been sometimes asserted that the Mughal stock deteriorated by years of residence in India. Whether it did so we have no means of ascertaining. But it were not the 'Mughals' alone, or mainly, who had won imperial battles for Akbar and Jahangir. The number of 'Mughals' must have been much larger under Humayun who was soundly defeated by Indian soldiers Sher Shah and Bahadur Shah led. In 1748 the foreign troops led by Ahmad Shah had been defeated by the 'Mughal' army at Karnal which thus proved that under proper conditions, it was more than a match for any 'Mughal'-foreign-army.

The growing Mughal dependence on the artillery and matchlockmen further raised problems which Aurangzib did nothing to solve. No attempt was made to find a place for matchlockmer in the contingent of the mansabdars, like artillery they were treated as a royal preserve<sup>30</sup>. Artillery was under European command and thus free from any but mercenary ties with the army in which it served<sup>31</sup>.

The legend of Mughal military supermacy was shattered by Shivaji and his successors. In an area where Mughal authority had not been established very long, Shivaji's daring exploits could be easily ignored. But the flight of Shaista Khan from Poona and the sack of Surat made the Indian bazars resound with gossip never flattering to imperial prestige. Even while Aurangzib was in the Deccan his officers played at fighting the Marathas rather than seriously pitting their military strength against them<sup>32</sup>. With Aurangzib in the Deccan the Mughal commanders could only *buy* the surrender of one Maratha fort after another, the emperor paying the purchase price as a 'gift' to the lucky commander who had made the successful deal<sup>33</sup>.

His anti-Hindu policy also effected the military strength of the empire. If Durga Das found a Muslim

subordinate unwilling to serve under him,<sup>34</sup> we cannot but believe that it represented a feeling which had become—or was becoming—common under Aurangzib. This once again made the military forces of the empire an army of occupation alien in faith and culture to the preponderant majority of Mughal subjects. It deepened the obligation of his immediate successors to commanders who could function as king makers by their exclusiveness. Non-Muslims in turn ceased to owe an obligation to an empire which had no use for them. The Marathas, the Sikhs and the Jats had proved a running sore during the life time of Aurangzib. They destroyed the authority of his successors.

Aurangzib destroyed the financial solvency of the empire as well. War is always a costly affair. But a war in a poor country, as Maharashtra was, which offered neither rich plunder nor large amounts in indemnity became much more costly. Aurangzib tried to wage a war in the south for twenty seven years during which he was seldom rewarded by payment of an indemnity or acquisition of rich plunder. He had to maintain an army in the south on a continuous wartime footing pay 'surrender money' to his commanders, secure supplies for the entire army in the south and arrange for the transport of arms, ammunition and supplies of all sorts. It bled the empire white.<sup>35</sup> It is a pitiable tale to read of 'the Grand Mughal', the richest prince in the world, being surrounded by soldiers clamouring for arrears of pay and not getting them.<sup>36</sup> All 'the wealth of Ind' which the richest and most powerful prince in the world commanded had been wasted in the drain of the war in the south. Religious considerations had now entered the revenue field as well. The customs duty on Muslims was one half of what the Hindus paid, Hindus had their goods imported in the name of their Muslim proteges and

defrauded the government for its discrimination<sup>36</sup> The Jizya may have increased the total revenue due it is doubtful if all of it was collected and if so at what cost If the chronicles of Gujarat are to be believed, assessment of land revenue now came to be influenced by the religion of the assesses<sup>37</sup> Muslims had to be granted relief, but the tax on Hindus remained where it was The State lost in the deal

India is a big country It covers an area more extensive than that under the Holy Roman Empire in its palmiest days Napoleon at the height of his power was master of a much less extensive empire The attempts to hold the entire country together during the Sultanate had not lasted long Akbar's religious policy lessened some of the strain to which an Indian empire was subject by giving all of his objects a stake in the country He himself had been content with holding only a fringe of the Deccan His successors were satisfied with the absorption of Ahmadnagar which he had begun. Shah Jahan had ultimately overruled his viceroy in the Deccan—Aurangzib—when it seemed to Shah Jahan that he was bent upon incorporating Bijapur and Golkonda in the Mughal empire His predecessors had thus acknowledged that there were limits to the expansion of their territory which in prudence they should not transgress Aurangzib chose to invade the south and tried to incorporate it all in the Mughal empire He failed in his designs, but unlike Muhammad Tughlaq who learnt his lesson sooner, Aurangzib continued wasting 27 years of his life in the south leaving the north to be governed by his underlings The experiment failed To the difficulties of means of communications in the seventeenth century was added Aurangzib's attempt to allot the majority of his subjects an inferior status. The empire was once again subject to the strain which

Akbar's 'comprehensive' state had removed. It broke down under its new weight.

Thus all the props of government were undermined by Aurangzib's policy. But he was not content with it. He had ascended the throne by rebelling against his father and after making him a prisoner. This origin of his power dogged his footsteps throughout his reign. He would not trust his sons. Whether his reign would have presented a different story if he had trusted them, we cannot be sure of. Aurangzib brought his mistrust of his sons to a point where it ultimately brought the empire tumbling round his grave. He cajoled and imprisoned them in turn.<sup>38</sup> The son who had kept his father under 'house arrest' could not trust his own sons. If any of them had the chance, he might pay him back in his own coins! Shah Jahan had in the matter of succession openly declared himself for Dara; no one can accuse Aurangzib of such a straightforward course of action. During his lifetime he entertained proposals for the partition of the empire after his death among his sons.<sup>39</sup> At his deathbed he left instructions for such a partition in his last will and testament.<sup>40</sup> It delivered the last blow to Mughal imperial authority. The right of every Mughal prince to the throne was implicitly recognized and flood gates to civil war were opened. No wonder then that ten Mughal emperors sat on the throne at Delhi between 1707 and 1720 and by a series of never ending political revolutions brought the Mughal empire as near to a sticky end as they dared. That none of them was a great statesman or a successful military leader goes without saying. But it is doubtful even whether a Jahangir among them would have stopped the institutional rot that had set in.

Of the external causes that contributed to the disintegration of the Mughal empire, the rise and growth of the Maratha empire deserves mention. Shivaji destroyed



the magic spell that had kept up the authority of the Mughal emperors unchallenged<sup>41</sup> He proved as strong after his death as when alive. Despite a civil war sapping their energies, the Marathas once aroused by Shivaji, would not bow down to an external authority even with Aurangzib's devoting twenty seven years of his rule in the Deccan to this task. They lost as many battles as they won, but they did not lose their war of independence as they refused to acknowledge defeat<sup>42</sup> When the rajas lost vital power to lead them the Peshwa occupied the stage till Balaji Vishwanath had wrested from the unwilling hands of Muhammad Shah the surrender of the Mughal right to rule in Maharashtra, central and western India in favour of the Marathas<sup>43</sup> The Mughal empire came then virtually to an end.

As during the Sultanate the disintegration of imperial power was followed by the founding of independent dynasties in outlying parts of the country Hyderabad, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Oudh fell away from Delhi under their Mughal governors who assumed independent power.

Nadar Shah's invasion, like Temur's invasion earlier, destroyed the kingdom of Delhi and as after Temur's invasion provided an occasion for the emergence of local leaders in north-west and the Punjab to repudiate Mughal authority by pledging loyalty to an absent foreign ruler. Ahmad Shah Abdali was opposed at Panipat not by the Mughal emperor but by the Marathas who had taken over the Mughal imperial rule The battle of Panipat in 1761 affected the fortunes of Marathas much more than those of the descendents of Aurangzib who had long since been reduced to a nonentity

By the time the French and the English began to fight among themselves, Mughal authority had ceased to be acknowledged in most parts of the country. The

disintegration of Mughal authority made it possible for the British to acquire dominion in India, their political ambitions did nothing to destroy an institution which was already dead. They made as clever and convenient a use of the prestige of the Mughal empire for their own purposes as the Nizam or the Nawab Vazir of Oudh had done.

### Notes

1 Cf *Mughal Administration* by Sarkar *Mughal Government and Administration* by Sri Pam Sharma

2 Cf Irvine *Armies of the Indian Mughals* Sri Ram Sharma—*Mughal Government and Administration* Chapter IX  
Sarkar—*Mughal Government*

3 *Khulast ut Tawarikh*.

4 Sarkar *History of Aurangzeb* III Sri Ram Sharma *Mughal Government and Administration* p 66

5 Smith *Akbar* 378 Beni Prashad *Jahangir*, 123 Sarkar, *Mughal Administration* 72 to 76 Sri Ram Sharma—*op cit* 83 to 86

6 Sri Ram Sharma *Op Cit* 112-113

7. Sarkar *Aurangzeb* Sri Ram Sharma—*Op cit* 107

8 Sri Ram Sharma *Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, 26 27

9 Sri Ram Sharma *Mughal Government and Administration* 236 to 247 Sarkar *Mughal Administration*, 47 to 64, Nathan *Baharistan i Ghaibi*

10 Sri Ram Sharma *Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors* 59

11 Cf Sri Ram Sharma, *Sanskrit Writers of Mughal India*, New Review Calcutta Cf Smith Beni Prashad Saxena *op cit*

12 *Akbar Nama* and *Tuzak i Jahangiri* mention several Hindu saints with whom Akbar came into contact *Tabaqat* and *Badaoni* have a long list of Muslim saints Akbar paid respects too *Tuzak* makes similar mention of Muslim saints under Jahangir and *Amal i-Salih* mentions saints and scholars of Shah Jahan's reign

13 *Promotion of Learning in India*—N. N. Law

14. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, III, 265 to 279, Sri Ram Sharma, *Religious Policy*, 118 to 190.

15. *News letters* of July, 27, 1703, Khafi Khan II, 249, 252, *Ahlam-e-Alamgiri*, 72 a, *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, 528, *Kalimat Tayyibat*, letter 34

16. Sarkar, *History*, III, 265, 266, 280 to 286, Sharma - *Religious Policy*, 136, 249.

17. *News letters*, *Gujarat Series*, 3 Shaban, 46 regnal year.

18. Khafi Khan, II, 214-215 records dismissal of Hindu astrologers. *Imperial News Letter* of 20 August, 1681 records appointment of Muslims.

19. Salih, III, pp 446 to 448 for the mansabs held by Shah Jahan's sons and some of his grandsons. Dara, Shuja Aurangzib and Murad held between them 10 provinces.

20. Mir Jumla, for example, was prime minister of Shah Jahan and leader of the expedition to the Deccan.

21. Mir Jumla's deputy in the office of the prime minister was his son who was only a 3000er. Dara's deputies in his provinces were usually mansabdars of 1000 only.

22. *Adab-i-Alamgiri*. Letters on Rajput War give detailed instructions to all his commanders in the field, Cf. Sarkar, *History*, III, Chapter XXXVI, *Aurangzib*, 462, 463.

23. Cf. above, pages 256, 257.

24. Letters preserved in the *Adab*, about the Rajput War bring this out clearly, Cf. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, 462, 463.

25. Khafi Khan, II, 550-51.

26. Cf. Sharma, *Mughal Government and Administration*, 124 to 126.

27. The accounts of the European travellers bear witness to the growing luxury of the Mughal mansabdars.

28. Sarkar, *History*, IV, 453n, Sharma, *Mughal Government and Administration*, Bhim Sen, 140 b.

29. Cf. Orme, *Fragment of Mughal Empire*. Also note above 27.

30. Cf. *Selections from the Documents of Shah Jahan's Reign*.

31. Cf. Manucci.

32. Sarkar, *History*, IV, 351, V, 106, 187n, 128n.

33. Sarkar, *History*, V, 177, 12, 190.

- 34 Sharma—*Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, 195.
  - 35 Sarkar, *History* V, 235 to 237, 238, 240, 242, 243.
  - 36 Sharma—*Religious Policy*, 151, Sarkar, *History*, IV, 275, 276.
  - 37 *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, I, 268 to 272
  - 38 Cf Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzib's Reign*.
  - 39 Cf Sarkar, *History*, V, 262
  - 40 *Ibid*, 262, 263
  - 41 Sarkar—*Shivaji*.
  - 42 Sarkar, *History*, V, 236 to 238
  - 43 Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, II, 46, Irvine—*Later Mughals* Kincaid and Parsanis, 215, C H. I., IV, 396.
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## Some useful dates.

- 712 Muhammad bin Qasim defeats Dahir of Sind  
 988 Subuktigin defeats Jaipal  
 1008 Mahmud occupies the Punjab  
 1011 Mahmud occupies Multan  
 1191 Prithvi Raj defeats Muhammad Gori at Taraori  
 1192 Muhammad Ghori defeats Prithvi Raj  
 1194 Ajmer takes by Aibak  
 1202 Bakhtyar Khilji conquers Bengal Scorched earth policy in  
 Kamrup defies and defeats Bakhtiyar  
 1206 Qutb ud Din Aibak ascends the throne of Delhi House  
 of Aibak  
 1211 Iltutmish's accession House of Iltutmish  
 1266 Accession of Balban House of Balban  
 1290 Accession of Jala ud Din Khilji—House of Khiljis  
 1320 End of the Khiljis Accession of Nasir ud Din Khusru at  
 Delhi Hindu rule at Delhi Death of Nasir ud Din and  
 accession of Ghias ud Din Tughlaq House of Tughlaq  
 1398 Timur's expedition to Delhi Virtual end of Tughlaq authority  
 Khizr Khan Proclaims himself Timur's deputy  
 1414 Khizr Khan ascends the throne at Delhi The House of Sayyids  
 1451 End of the Sayyids Bahadur Lod ascends the throne The Lodis  
 1526 Babur defeats Ibrahim Lod End of the Lodis The Mughals  
 1530 Intrigue for keeping Humayun out Humayun's accession  
 1540 Sher Khan drives out Humayun End of the Mughals The Surs  
 1553 Humayun defeats Sikandar Sur a Machhiwada End of the Surs  
 1555 End of the Surs The Mughals  
 1556 Accession of Akbar  
 1564 Jizya abolished  
 1599 Revolt of Salim against Akbar  
 1603 Akbar reconciled with Salim  
 1605 Accession of Jahangir  
 1606 Revolt of Khusru  
 1622 Khusru murdered Rebellion of Khurram  
 1625 Khurram's final defeat and submission  
 1627 Death of Jahangir Dawar Bakhsh Bulaqi ascends the throne  
 Shah Jahan proclaimed emperor Bulaqi murdered  
 1632 Aurangzib appointed viceroy of the Mughal Deccan  
 1653 Shah Jahan sanctions conditional attack on Golkonda Aurangzib  
 invades Hyderabad  
 1656 Shah Jahan persuaded to attack Bijapur Imperial reinforce-  
 ments sent to the Deccan  
 1657 Shah Jahan orders peace with Golkonda Illness of Shah Jahan  
 Shah Jahan ends war on Bijapur recalls imperial commanders  
 who return to court except Mir Jumla whom Aurangzib imprisons  
 in defiance of Shah Jahan's orders First overt act of  
 Aurangzib's rebellion against Shah Jahan  
 1658 Aurangzib joins Murad and promises him help in mounting the  
 imperial throne Murad and Aurangzib defeat Shah Jahan's  
 forces at Dharmat and at Samugarh Aurangzib makes Murad  
 a prisoner Aurangzib enters Agra Shah Jahan attempts to  
 negotiate with Aurangzib in vain Aurangzib makes Shah  
 Jahan a prisoner and is crowned

- 1658 Dara defeated, made a prisoner and executed.  
 1661 Murad executed  
 1664. Shivaji plunders Surat  
 1665 Customs Duty on Hindus doubled  
 1666 Death of Shah Jahan in prison  
 1669 Aurangzib breaks out into his anti-Hindu frenzy  
 1670 Shivaji plunders Surat  
 1671 Hindus in the revenue department dismissed  
 1678 Death of Jaswant Singh of Jodhapur  
 1679 Jizya reimposed by Aurangzib  
 1680 Death of Shivaji Aurangzib invades Marwar, Rajput War  
 1681 Rebellion of prince Akbar Aurangzib leaves for the Deccan  
 1686 Aurangzib conquers Bijapur and makes it a Mughal province  
 1687 Prince Shah Alam imprisoned by Aurangzib Aurangzib takes Golkonda  
 1692 Prince Kam Bakhsh arrested  
 1695 Prince Shah Alam released and nominated Governor of Punjab  
 1707 Prince Kam Bakhsh appointed Governor of Bijapur and Prince Azam of Malwa Aurangzeb's death Accession of Bahadur Shah  
 1707 to 1709 Civil War  
 1712 Death of Bahadur Shah Jahandar ascends the throne  
 1713 Farrukh Siyar ascends the throne Jahandar murdered  
 1719 Farukh Siyar dethroned and murdered Rafi ud Darjat ascends the throne  
 1720 Death of Rafi ud Darjat Rafi ud Daulah succeeds him His death Accession of Muhammad Shah  
 Balaji Vishwanath secures imperial Farman for sovereignty in M. Marashtra and Chauth and Sardeshmukhi outside Virtual end of the empire  
 1722 Oudh becomes independent Marathas in Gujarat  
 1724 Nizam ul Mulk rebels at Hyderabad  
 1725 Marathas in Bundelkhand  
 1732 Marathas invade Malwa  
 1739 Nadar Shah's invasion  
 1748 Invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali He is defeated.  
 1748 Accession of Ahmad Shah  
 1752 Punjab and Multan annexed by Ahmad Shah Abdali  
 1754 Accession of Alamgir II  
 1758 Marathas in the Punjab  
 1759 Accession and deposition of Shah Jahan II Shah Alam III proclaimed emperor  
 1761 Battle of Panipat  
 1765 Shah Alam signs the farman recognising British authority in Bengal  
 1784 Shah Alam recognizes the Peshwa as his vice regent and appoints Madhavi Sindbia as his prime minister and governor of Agra and Delhi  
 1787 Shah Alam blinded by Ghulam Qadir  
 1803. Shah Alam taken under British protection and granted Rs 11½ a year from assigned districts as a complimentary recognition of a nominal sovereignty  
 1856 Bahadur Shah II notified about the end of the 'emperors' after his death  
 1857 Mutiny and extinction of the Mughal dynasty